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Abstract 
This thesis studies the determinants of pay and well-being. The first three chapters 
use new British employer-employee data to study the determinants of pay. Chapters 
three and four are also interested in the determinants of job satisfaction, whilst 
chapters five and six analyse factors that shape reported well-being. 
Chapter two tests whether firms share product market rents with their 
employees. After controlling for worker and firm fixed effects, we observe evidence 
in support of rent-sharing upon weekly earnings, but no robust positive effect upon 
hourly pay. 
The third chapter analyses the observed positive relationship between 
employer size and wages. It designs a test as to whether this relationship reflects a 
compensating differential. This is not found to offer a good explanation as to why 
wages are greater in large establishments. Instead, correlates of worker skill and 
person fixed effects are most successful in explaining the plant size-wage 
differential. 
There has been very little research on racial differences in job satisfaction 
levels. Chapter 4 examines the relationship between race, pay and well-being. 
Workplaces that employ more ethnic minority employees are associated with lower 
levels of job satisfaction, for both white and non-white workers. Non-white 
employees are paid less than otherwise similar white employees, and are less 
satisfied with their pay even when pay is held constant. 
One of the most fundamental ideas in economics is that money makes 
people happy. Chapter 5 constructs a test. In the spirit of a natural experiment, it 
shows individuals who receive windfalls have higher mental well-being in the 
following year. It calculates the size of the effect. 
The final chapter studies the well-being of British public sector workers in 
the 1990s. Relative to private sector employees, stress levels and job satisfaction 





This thesis studies the determinants of pay and well-being. These outcomes are 
likely to be the product of complicated interactions between workers and 
employers. Understanding these interactions, and how they shape behaviour, is 
crucial to our understanding of the working of the labour market. The need for a 
more complete picture of the labour market, and the relationship between 
individuals and firms, has been known for some time. Data sufficiently rich to allow 
us to study such situations have, however, only recently become available. 
This study uses such data, with detailed information about both the worker 
and the firm, to analyse the determinants of pay. These data allow a fuller 
examination of the relationship between employer and employee characteristics, and 
their impact upon pay. Simply put, what determines wages? Is it education or skill, 
or the type of employer for which an individual works? Chapter two analyses 
whether more profitable firms pay higher wages, whilst chapter three examines 
competing hypotheses for the existence of a positive relationship between employer 
size and pay. The role of the employer in explaining the racial wage differential, and 
in particular the effect of the sorting of ethnic minority workers into different types 
of workplaces, is analysed in chapter four. This work provides a new examination 
of the effect of the employer upon pay, and adds to the recent research that has 
studied linked employer-employee data. 
' By implication this questions whether 
wage determination is, to some degree, non-competitive. 
This thesis also examines the determinants of worker well-being, using self- 
reported measures of job satisfaction and mental health. Some economists have 
been wary of studying such subjective outcomes. Yet workers' perceptions of their 
jobs are likely to be an important determinant of behaviour. A more satisfied 
Examples include Abowd et al (1999), Entorf, Gollac and Kramarz (1999), Goux and Maurin 
(1999), Groshen (1991), Hildreth (1998) and Troske (1999). 
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worker, even when compared to an otherwise identical employee, is less likely to 
quit their job. Job satisfaction is negatively correlated with absenteeism, non- and 
counter-productive work. 
3 Subjective measures of well-being are also correlated, in 
the expected direction, with objective characteristics, such as unemployment, and 
with assessments of the person's happiness by others. 
4 These subjective measures 
may then allow us to infer, albeit with some error, the relative well-being of 
different types of individuals. 
This thesis uses these subjective measures of well-being to provide new tests 
of economic hypotheses. Chapter three uses these data to examine whether 
working conditions are inferior within large employers. In chapter four measures of 
job satisfaction are used to provide a new analysis as to whether ethnic minority 
employees are economically disadvantaged. Arguably the central tenet of economics 
is that money makes people happy. Chapter five constructs a test. It studies 
whether the recipients of financial windfalls have higher mental well-being in the 
following year. Finally, the well-being of British public sector workers over the 
1990s is examined in chapter six, and outcomes contrasted with those in the private 
sector. This work adds to a recent literature, on the border between economics and 
5 
psychology, which has attempted to understand the patterns in well-being data. 
Chapter two uses new British employer-employee data to examine the effect 
of the financial conditions of the firm upon worker pay. It tests whether firms, for 
some reason, share product market rents with their employees. The elasticity of 
wages with respect to firm profits per worker is estimated, at the mean, to be 
2 See Freeman (1978). 
3 See Clark and Oswald (1996). 
4 See Konow and Earley (1999). 
S For example: Blanchflower and Freeman (1997), Blanchflower and Oswald (1999), Clark 
(1996), Di Tella and MacCulloch (1999), Frank (1985,1997) and Frey and Stutzer (1998). 
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approximately 0.02, after controlling for observed firm and worker characteristics. 
This positive effect is found to be robust to controlling for formal profit-sharing 
schemes, within occupations where labour supply difficulties should be limited, with 
respect to past firm profitability, and to not be limited to the union sector. 
After controlling for worker and firm fixed effects, we observe statistically 
significant evidence in support of rent-sharing upon weekly earnings, with an 
estimated elasticity of 0.01, but no robust positive effect upon hourly pay, in a 
sample that potentially favours the rent-sharing hypothesis. A key issue with 
estimation is endogeneity: an increase in worker pay will reduce firm profitability, 
other things being equal. The estimated coefficient upon firm profitability may then 
be downward biased. Firm profitability is therefore instrumented by measures of 
overseas product market shocks, here captured by movements in US industry 
profitability. The resulting estimates of the parameter upon firm profitability are, 
however, either incorrectly signed or statistically insignificant. The evidence in 
favour of the rent-sharing hypothesis is then, at best, modest and limited to weekly 
earnings. 
The third chapter tests competing explanations for the famous positive 
correlation between employer size and wages. Wages are observed to be 
monotonically increasing in workplace size, whilst firm size is found to exert a 
positive, but concave, effect upon pay, holding constant the size of the 
establishment. The addition of more refined controls for employer characteristics 
(the capital to labour ratio, the intensity of monitoring, and firm profitability) leave 
the establishment size-wage premium largely unperturbed. 
The role of unobserved differences in labour productivity is analysed in two 
ways. Correlates of worker skill, such as the use of information technology and the 
skill of the establishment's workforce, are found to explain up to 15 percent of the 
4 
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plant size-wage differential, and up to 30 percent of the firm size-wage premium. 
Secondly, controls for person fixed-effects are found to reduce the estimated effect 
of workplace size upon wages by over a half. Nevertheless, wages are still observed 
to be significantly greater in large establishments. 
One of the contributions of the chapter is to design a novel test, using job 
satisfaction data, as to whether the relationship between employer size and worker 
pay reflects a compensating differential (perhaps for inferior working conditions). 
Job satisfaction is found to be superior in the smallest plants, yet differences in 
satisfaction between medium-sized and large establishments are not pronounced. A 
compensating-differential-for-size theory cannot then explain why pay is observed 
to be higher in the largest plants, relative to medium-sized workplaces. 
Establishment size is, furthermore, found not to exert a robust influence upon 
worker satisfaction once we hold constant the size of the firm. In contrast, wages 
are statistically significantly greater in large plants, holding firm size constant. 
On this evidence, employee distaste for employer size does not offer a 
strong explanation for the existence of a plant size-wage premium, though it may 
help to explain the firm size-wage premium. Correlates of worker skill and person 
fixed effects are, here, found to offer the most convincing avenue from which to 
explain the establishment size-wage differential. 
Chapter four investigates the role of the employer in explaining racial 
differentials in pay and job satisfaction. The effect of the ethnic composition of the 
plant's workforce is extensively examined. Non-white workers are found to earn 
lower wages in plants with a higher proportion of ethnic minority co-workers. 
White wages, on the other hand, are only weakly related to the racial composition of 
the workforce. The difference between the wages of white and ethnic minority 
workers is then greatest in workplaces that hire a large proportion of minority staff. 
5 
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The racial differential in wages is found to be robust for workers within the same 
occupation and establishment. The source of the racial wage gap is then, chiefly, not 
that ethnic minority workers are `crowded' into low-pay plants but, rather, they are 
paid less well in any given workplace. 
Workers in plants that employ more non-white workers are found to have 
lower levels of job satisfaction. This is found for white males and females, and for 
ethnic minority women. Results are, however, more mixed for non-white men. The 
plant's rates of quits, separations, and absenteeism, are also positively related to the 
ethnic minority employment share. The evidence then suggests workplaces with a 
large proportion of minority workers are, here, associated with inferior working 
conditions. This is consistent with, both, models of discrimination and unobserved 
worker quality differences, where non-white workers are, for some reason, less 
productive (possibly due to pre-labour market discrimination). 
Evidence is also observed consistent with ethnic minority employees trading 
off lower pay to work with more fellow minority co-workers, where they may 
perhaps encounter less prejudice and racism. Non-white pay is lower, and tenure 
higher, in plants with a greater proportion of ethnic minority staff. Nevertheless, 
ethnic minority employees, both male and female, are less satisfied with their pay, 
compared to otherwise similar white workers, even when pay is held constant. 
Results remain when we hold constant the establishment's effect upon satisfaction. 
This provides new evidence that would appear consistent with discrimination within 
the workplace. 
One of the most fundamental ideas in economics is that money makes 
people happy. Chapter five constructs an empirical test. Its approach seems to have 
three advantages. First, we follow a group of individuals longitudinally, and hence 
can measure the same person's well-being and income level at different points in 
6 
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time. Second, these data provide information on two sources of financial windfalls - 
inheritances and lottery wins. In the spirit of a natural experiment, they are probably 
as close as can be achieved to randomly occurring events in which some individuals 
receive money while others, in a control group, do not. Third, information is 
available on two measures of well-being: mental stress using a standard 
psychological health measure, and happiness using a simple four-point question. 
We find that, as theory would suggest, a windfall of money is followed by 
lower mental stress and higher reported happiness. A windfall of 50,000 pounds is 
predicted to improve mental well-being by between 0.1 and 0.3 standard deviations. 
In the early 1990s, the British government embarked on a process of 
reform, with the objective of improving the provision of public services. The public 
sector was subjected to greater scrutiny and the introduction of market forces, and 
tough budgetary limits imposed. Chapter six seeks to examine the well-being of 
British public sector workers, and contrasts outcomes with those in the private 
sector. At the start of the 1990s, levels of psychological health, as measured by a 
General Health Question score, for public sector workers were similar to those 
within the private sector, but by 1998 are noticeably worse. Consistent with this, a 
relative decline in public sector job satisfaction is also observed over the decade. 
These effects are found whichever way the data are cut and irrespective of 
the estimation method used. It is not possible to be completely certain as to why 
stress has risen with the public sector. The evidence suggests it cannot be 
satisfactorily explained by the changing composition of public sector employment, 
by the relative decline in public sector pay, or by aggregate movements in economic 
conditions. What can be said, however, is that the evidence points to an 
unambiguous reduction in well-being amongst Britain's public sector workers. 
7 
Introduction 
Finally, the seventh chapter summarises the conclusions from the research 
undertaken in the thesis. 
Chapter Two 




This chapter uses new British linked employer-employee data to test whether firms 
share product market rents with their employees. We find OLS estimates, of the 
effect of firm profitability on worker wages, to be positive and statistically 
significant. Results are robust to controlling for formal profit-sharing schemes, 
within occupations where labour supply difficulties should be limited, with respect 
to past firm profitability, and are not limited to the union sector. After controlling 
for worker and firm fixed effects, we observe statistically significant evidence in 
support of rent-sharing upon weekly earnings, but no robust positive effect upon 
hourly pay. These results remain when firm profitability is instrumented by 
international product market shocks. The evidence in favour of the rent-sharing 




This chapter examines the effect of the financial conditions of the firm upon 
employee pay. By implication this questions whether wage determination is, in 
some way, non-competitive. Do firms, for some reason, share product market 
rents' with their employees? In the textbook competitive, employees receive 
compensation equal to the opportunity cost of their time, and pay is independent of 
firm profitability. Yet, in less simplified frameworks, alternative competitive models 
do allow a positive correlation between pay and profitability. An essentially 
competitive model, but one which allows for lags in adjustment, may predict such a 
relationship, albeit only in the short-run. Alternatively, principal-agent problems 
may lead firms to directly link pay to performance, producing a correlation between 
wages and firm prosperity, but one linked to worker productivity. 
New employer-employee data are used to attempt to distinguish between 
the competing hypotheses for the existence of a positive relationship between 
profitability and pay. These data match individual responses from a nationally 
representative panel survey, the BHPS, to the company accounts information of the 
employing firm. Such data should allow a fuller examination of the relationship 
between employer and employee characteristics, and their impact upon pay. 
Additionally, these data have the advantage that they are not constrained to 
manufacturing, publicly quoted or unionised employers, though large firms are 
heavily represented. 
The elasticity of wages with respect to firm profits per worker is estimated, 
at the mean, to be approximately 0.02, after controlling for observed firm and 
1 The term `rents' here denotes super-normal returns, that is a return to the entrepreneur in excess 
of the competitive market level. 
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worker characteristics. Moving from one standard deviation below mean 
profitability to one standard deviation above is predicted to increase wages by 
approximately 8 percent. This positive effect is found to be robust to controlling 
for any explicit performance pay, and remains statistically well determined within a 
sample of low-skill occupations where `thin' labour markets, and hiring difficulties, 
should be least likely. This suggests the relationship between wages and profitability 
cannot be simply explained by a competitive framework with hiring frictions, or by 
performance pay. Evidence is also presented that rent-sharing is not limited to the 
unionised sector. 
After the addition of controls for worker and firm fixed effects, OLS 
estimates of the rent-sharing parameter are attenuated, from 0.045 to 0.013, and are 
no longer robust, in a sample that potentially favours the rent-sharing hypothesis. 
When weekly, rather than hourly, pay is examined as the dependent variable, OLS 
estimates remain positive and statistically significant, at 0.026, despite potential 
downward endogeneity bias. 
A key issue is endogeneity: when wages increase, other things being equal, 
firm profits will fall. Such a feedback effect may cause the estimated parameter upon 
firm profitability, in a wage equation, to be downward biased. It is then desirable to 
instrument the profitability variable. Profits per worker are here instrumented by 
measures of international product market shocks, captured by movements in US 
industry profitability. The cross-section estimates of the rent-sharing parameter then 
increase by between 50 and 100 percent but are, however, not statistically robust. 
Where models include controls for unobserved heterogeneity, instrumentation 




More profitable firms are then found to pay higher wages, other things 
being equal. Yet, with respect to hourly pay this result is not robust to the inclusion 
of controls for worker and firm fixed effects. Such models are, generally, to be 
preferred. Whilst we find no robust positive effect of firm profitability upon hourly 
pay we do, however, find evidence in support of rent-sharing upon weekly pay. This 
may yet reflect unobserved differences in the hours of work. The evidence in favour 
in the rent-sharing hypothesis is then, for these data, moderate and confined to 
weekly pay. 
The plan of the chapter is as follows. In section two, models that can 
explain a positive correlation between firm profitability and worker pay are outlined. 
Section three documents previous empirical evidence. Section four outlines the 
data, whilst section five discusses the econometric strategy and presents results. 
Finally, section six concludes. 
2.2 Models of a wage-rents correlation 
In a textbook model of a competitive labour market, firms are wage-takers, wages 
fully reflect workers' opportunity costs, and pay is independent of firm 
characteristics. On this view, an observed correlation between wages and firm 
profitability is then an artefact of unobserved, to the researcher, differences in 
worker productivity. Alternative models do though predict a positive relationship 
between profitability and pay. Three models are here studied. The first, a non- 
competitive model of wage setting, examines a process where bargaining determines 
wages, and implies rents are divided between the firm and its employees. The 
second, a modified competitive framework, retains the assumption that workers are 
wage takers but posits that firms may face short-run labour supply constraints. In 
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the face of a demand shock the wage can then be, temporarily, bid above its 
competitive level. Finally, firms may link pay to performance, as an incentive 
mechanism to induce greater worker effort. Wages determined in this way, whilst 
related to profits, reflect productivity. These models are discussed, in turn, below. 
2.2.1 A bargaining model 
Bargaining over wages, either explicit or implicit, may provide a link between the 
profitability of the firm and the wages of its employees. The union (or bargaining 
unit) is assumed to maximise a Utilitarian utility function2 (Oswald, 1982), it then 
maximises the `total' utility (U) of its members: max U= nu(w) + (m - n)u(w*); 
where u(w) is the representative worker's utility derived from wage w, w* is the 
alternative wage available outside the firm, m is the union's membership and n is 
employment within the firm (n<m). 
The firm is assumed to maximise profits: max it = pf(n) - wn; where lt is the 
firm's profits, p is a demand shock or output price variable and the firm's 
production function, f(. ) is assumed dependent only on labour, n. As a 
simplification we assume no adjustment costs to labour. 
The employer is assumed to bargain with workers over both wages and 
employment - an efficient bargain - and the Nash maximand' is expressed: 
Max 
u,,,, 
[U - U*]0[7t- 7T*]' 
0 (1) 
where 0 can be viewed as the relative bargaining power of the unions or employees, 
and U* and it* are the threat points of workers and firms respectively. In the event 
2 This is equivalent to the expected utility form of McDonald and Solow (1981) when union 
membership is fixed. 
3 The Nash solution to the bargaining problem maximises the product of agent's utility net their 
threat points. Binmore et al (1986) show this is equivalent to the outcome of a strategic non-co- 
operative bargaining game of alternating offers, where delays in agreement are costly. The threat 
points are then interpreted as the fall back options in the case of no agreement. 
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of a breakdown in negotiation, we assume the firm earns zero profits (It* = 0) and 
all the union members receive the alternative wage (U* = mu(w*)). The Nash 
maximand is then: 
Max, [nu(w) + (m - n)u(w*) - mu(w*)] 
o[ pf(n) - wn]' -0 (2) 
Cancelling the mu(w*) terms and restricting attention to interior optimum, the first 
order conditions are: 
w: 
u1 (w) 
-(1-0)n _0 (3) [u(w) - u(w*)] 
n: 
e+ 
(1 - 0) 
pf1(n) w=0 (4) 
n 7l 
Re-arranging the first order condition with respect to wages implies: 
[u(w) - u(w*)] _0' (5) ü (w) 1-0 n 
This result can be simplified by using the first order Taylor approximation: 
u(w*) = u(w) + (w* - WM W) (6) 
substituting this expression into (5) and re-arranging implies: 
W=W*+ I'ý (7) 1-O n 
The equilibrium wage is then an increasing function of the outside wage, the 
bargaining strength of the union (or worker group), and profits per employee. ' As 
this relationship is derived from only the first of the first order conditions it holds 
irrespective of the exact form of the employment function. Conditional on 
efficiency, it allows employment to be located on the labour demand function, if 
° This result can be obtained directly if one assumes the union's membership is risk-neutral (i. e. 
u(w)=w). The union then maximises the rent (the difference between the wage and the alternative 
wage) appropriated by its members. This is a `strongly' efficient bargain which, indeed, Abowd's 
(1989) evidence supports. 
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indifference curves are locally horizontal (Oswald, 1993), or on an upward sloping 
contract curve (McDonald and Solow, 1981). 5 
This model lays the foundation for much of the subsequent empirical 
discussion. Given the union bargaining framework, from which it is derived, one 
may expect it to offer a poor description of behaviour in a non-union setting. Yet 
there are arguments to suggest such a relationship may still apply. If insiders derive 
bargaining power from skill shortages or costs in labour adjustment, and act as a de 
facto union, then the model may generalise to one of implicit bargaining. ` Frictions 
upon job mobility, either due to search costs or informational lags regarding job 
opportunities, may generate rents and worker bargaining (see Pissarides, 1990). 
Equity concerns may lead to bargaining in a non-union setting, if the concept of 
`fair' treatment depends upon the employer sharing some of its profits. It may then 
be optimal for the firm to bargain with its employees, who may otherwise withhold 
effort. However, it remains controversial as to whether convincing models of rent- 
sharing can be constructed within competitive labour markets. 
2.2.2 Competitive frictions 
A rent-wage correlation can also occur in a competitive model, where workers are 
wage takers, if there are temporary supply constraints on labour. ' If we assume, in 
the short run, there exists impediments to the mobility of labour or skill shortages, 
the (short run) labour supply curve will slope upwards. A positive shock to firm 
revenue, that generates super-normal returns, can then cause firms to bid up wages, 
5 Nickell and Wadhwani (1990) develop an alternative right-to-manage model, where wages lie 
strictly upon the labour demand curve. The resulting wage is a convex combination of insider 
factors, relating to the firm's ability to pay and union power, and outside pay. 
6 For a full description of insider-outsider models see Lindbeck and Snower (1989) 
1 See Hildreth and Oswald (1997) for a fuller discussion. 
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and produce a positive correlation between wages and profits. ' The model then 
suggests the correlation between profits and pay should be strongest within `thin' 
labour markets, where constraints on hiring are most severe. Nevertheless, this can 
only be a temporary phenomenon, workers will migrate to the high wage firm or 
industry, bid down the wage and restore competitive conditions. 
2.2.3 Performance-related-pay 
An alternative explanation for a positive correlation between wages and profits lies 
in contract theory, and is linked to the research into principal-agent models. `' Here 
employers link pay to performance to provide workers with incentives to supply 
effort. In a typical hidden action model the risk averse worker is assumed to provide 
effort (e) at convex cost, c(e). This effort is translated into output (y) through a 
stochastic production function, y=e+E, where E is a normally distributed random 
error, with mean zero and variance a2. Firms are risk neutral, and pay a wage 
conditional upon worker output, w(y). We assume this contract takes the linear 
form, "' w=s+ by, where s is the fixed salary and b the pay-performance sensitivity. 
The optimal wage contract, that maximises output subject to worker behaviour, is 
characterised by a sharing rate (b*) which is decreasing in the risk aversion of the 
agent, in the random variation in output, and where the disutility of effort increases 
at a faster rate. Intuitively, employees dislike variability in their income and prefer 
more stable wage contracts. 
8 This result requires the profit function to be homogeneous of degree one. 
For a review of the literature studying executive compensation see Murphy (1999). For non- 
executive employees see Baker et al (1988) and Burgess and Metcalfe (1999). The risk-sharing 
contract model (Baily, 1974, and Azariadis, 1975) is not here discussed. 
10 The linearity assumption has some theoretical support in that non-linear contracts may lead 




This pay structure predicts a positive relationship between wages and 
output. Yet it is not obvious why there should be a strong link between pay and 
profits. The increased productivity induced is compensated with greater pay. A 
further question is; how prevalent are performance based wage contracts? Baker, 
Jensen and Murphy (1988) suggest the compensation system, "appears to be one 
with little or no pay for performance" (p. 599). Difficulties in setting and evaluating 
(the correct) targets, difficulties in up-rating standards, and in horizontal equity 
problems of fairness amongst employees, are suggested as reasons for this lack of, 
non-executive, performance pay. 
Whilst performance pay does not appear pervasive, profit-sharing, in which 
an individual's compensation is tied to the performance of the firm, either through 
shares scheme or bonuses, has seen a marked growth in the UK in the 1990s. Booth 
and Frank (1999) document evidence that the number of employees in such 
schemes rose from 232,000 in March 1990 to 2,438,000 in March 1995. This was 
probably in part due to tax exemptions, which were subsequently phased out in 
1997. Such schemes were felt to raise worker productivity, possibly due to feelings 
of greater involvement in firm success. Yet in large organisations the free-rider 
problem is considerable, an individual bears the full cost of increased effort but 
gains only a fraction of the increased profits. Peer pressure may, however, act to 
mitigate this externality. Profit-sharing schemes, for incentive reasons, should then 
be less likely in large plants or firms, or in plants or firms where there are a large 
number of managers (monitoring offsets the need to provide incentives). 
2.3 Existing Empirical Evidence 
2.3.1 Industry and Establishment effects upon Worker wages 
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Some of the earliest evidence as to whether more profitable firms pay higher wages 
is that of Slichter (1950), who documented empirical regularities in the inter- 
industry wage structure for the United States in the early 1940s. Whilst highly 
aggregated, the evidence suggested a positive relationship between industry profit 
margins and wages. The data also revealed a strong correlation between the pay of 
skilled and unskilled labour within industries, and that the inter-industry wage 
structure remained relatively stable over time. 
More modem research by Dickens and Katz (1987) and Krueger and 
Summers (1987,1988) analysed these empirical regularities using more rigorous 
regression techniques. The unexplained inter-industry wage differentials is found to 
be relatively stable across time and between countries, and for workers of different 
age, gender, skill type and occupation. In line with Slichter's earlier findings, the 
estimated US industry wage differentials are positively correlated with industry 
profitability, and Krueger and Summers (1987,1988) suggest these wage 
differentials represent some form of rent-sharing. Subsequent research has, mainly, 
focussed upon whether the competitive model can explain these results. 
That inter-industry wage differences reflect different working conditions 
would appear unlikely as, Dickens and Katz (1987) have shown, industry wage 
differences are present within detailed occupation groups. For example, secretaries, 
for whom presumably working conditions are generally very similar, are paid more 
in highly profitable industries. Krueger and Summers (1988), using a sample of 
displaced workers and employing a correction for false industry transitions, examine 
whether the inter-industry wage differential is robust to controls for unobserved 
worker fixed effects. The estimated industry effects are found to be very similar to 
those estimated in the cross-section. Gibbons and Katz (1992), who study a sample 
of workers specifically displaced by plant closure, find similar evidence. Blackburn 
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and Neumark (1992) instead proxy the effect of unobserved worker skill by IQ 
scores and find ability, as measured by test scores, has little impact upon the 
industry wage differential. 
In contrast, Murphy and Topel (1987) find only a third of the wage change 
predicted, for a worker moving between industries, by cross-section estimates is 
actually captured by employees when they change jobs. However, pay is defined by 
annual earnings and so is liable to include the effect of both the pre- and post- 
mobility industry. Estimates may then be biased downwards. Abowd, Kramarz and 
Margolis (1999) and Goux and Maurin (1999), studying distinct French employer- 
employee panel data, also find individual effects to be the primary force behind 
inter-industry wage differentials. " 
The evidence as to whether the inter-industry wage differential represents 
unobserved worker skill is then, at best, mixed. Furthermore, evidence at the 
industry level may be biased, due to omitted market characteristics (such as the state 
of technology) or the aggregation assumptions implicit in industry analysis. Together 
these suggest analysis should be, within industries, at the level of the firm. Groshen 
(1991), in one of the first studies to examine data with information regarding the 
worker and their workplace, finds significant wage variation within industries is 
attributable to establishment wage differentials, after controlling for occupation, 
gender and region. Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) and Goux and Maurin 
(1999) also find evidence of substantial firm heterogeneity in wages. 
2.3.2 The Employer's `ability to pay' and Employee wages 
11 Hamermesh (1999) has suggested that with limited controls for observed worker characteristics 
such estimates may place too much emphasis upon unobserved individual rather than firm 
heterogeneity. This may bias results in favour of the individual heterogeneity explanation. 
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Subsequent to the research of Dickens and Katz (1987) and Krueger and Summers 
(1987,1988) a second generation of studies has sought to test the rent-sharing 
hypothesis more directly, by estimating versions of (7) using firm or establishment 
data. 
Blanchflower, Oswald and Garett (1990) use the 1984 Workplace Industrial 
Relations Survey (WIRS), of establishments with 25 employees or more, to examine 
insider and outsider influences upon pay. Employer effects, as measured by the 
extent of product-market competition and (manager-rated) firm performance, are 
found to be significant determinants of the pay of skilled employees, but not that of 
unskilled workers. Stewart (1990), using the same data, examines the factors that 
determine the union's ability to extract rents. Where competitive market conditions 
are present the union mark up is estimated to be close to zero. In contrast, where a 
firm has market power the union wage differential is estimated to be 8 percent. 
Even when unions are not present, plants with market power are estimated to pay 
significantly higher wages than plants in competitive product markets. 
Nevertheless, as cross-section evidence, results are potentially contaminated 
by unobserved differences in employee skill. Subsequent studies have then, largely, 
examined wage equations using company or establishment panels, and controlled 
for unobserved heterogeneity by including employer fixed effects. Typically the 
measure of earnings is the average annual pay per employee, and the external wage 
is captured by region and industry effects. Econometric analysis of the effect of 
employer `ability to pay' upon wages then faces two main problems. Firstly, wages 
and profits may be endogenously related. An increase in wages, ceteris paribus, will 
cause profits to fall, and the parameter upon profits per worker may then be biased 
downwards. Secondly, as the dependent variable is the average pay per worker and 
the key variable of interest profits per worker, any measurement error in firm 
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employment will cause a spurious positive correlation between pay and profitability. 
In response to these problems some authors have replaced, or instrumented, the 
profitability term by its lag. These variables are assumed to be pre-determined, and 
so uncorrelated with the wage equations error term. Other studies have sought to 
identify exogenous shifts in firm profits. 
Nickell and Wadhwani (1990) estimate firm-level earnings equations using a 
panel of 219 publicly quoted UK manufacturing companies from 1972 to 1982. The 
firm's ability to pay is measured by its sales per worker which, due to potential 
endogeneity and measurement error, is instrumented by its lagged values. The long 
run elasticity of wages with respect to sales per worker is then estimated to be 0.11. 
Currie and McConnell (1992) observe similar results for the US. Using a large panel 
of union contracts the authors estimate a positive and statistically significant effect 
of sales upon wages. Nickell, Vainiomaki and Wadhwani (1994) extend the earlier 
work of Nickell and Wadhwani (1990). They study a sample of 800 manufacturing 
firms, and examine the role of market power upon pay. Market share is found to 
enter the wage equation positively and statistically significantly, with an estimated 
long run elasticity of 0.08. This effect is found to be more pronounced for large, 
non-unionised, and non-competitive firms. 
Christofides and Oswald (1992) examine the effects of lagged company 
profitability on wages, in a sample of some 600 Canadian union labour contracts 
from 1978 to 1984. The long run elasticity of wages with respect to profits per 
employee is estimated to be 0.006, and statistically significant. A 100 percent 
increase in firm profitability is predicted to increase worker wages by 0.6 percent. 
This effect is small but non-negligible. A movement from mean to maximum profits 
per worker is predicted to increase pay by some 14 percent. Denny and Machin 
(1991) similarly examine the impact of lagged profits upon wages (instrumented by 
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further lags), using a sample of 436 British manufacturing firms for the period 1976 
to 1986. The estimated long run elasticity is very similar to that of Christofides and 
Oswald (1992) at 0.005, and again statistically well determined. 
Hildreth and Oswald (1997), using company and establishment panels for 
the UK, examine long lags upon profits per employee. Current profitability is also 
included, and is again instrumented by its past values. The long run elasticity is 
estimated to lie between 0.02 and 0.04. Blanchflower, Oswald and Sanfey (1996) 
instead use CPS individual-level data from 1964 to 1985, for full-time workers in US 
manufacturing, merged with industry profitability data. Lagged profitability and the 
cost of energy are used to instrument industry profits per employee, and the 
estimated elasticity is 0.04. There are, however, no controls for unobserved worker 
heterogeneity. The authors then examine a panel of industries, by taking cell-means 
of individual characteristics, profitability is entered in lags (but not instrumented) 
and equations include controls for industry fixed effects. The elasticity of wages 
with respect to profits per worker is estimated to be 0.08. 
These studies of rent-sharing, examining plants, firms and industries, predict 
a long run effect of profits per worker upon wages ranging between 0.005 and 0.08. 
Abowd and Lemieux (1993) criticise such estimates as characterising a `trivial' 
amount of rent-sharing. Oswald (1996) counters by demonstrating that, given the 
volatility in the profit data, even relatively small point estimates can generate large 
variations in pay. A more damaging critique is applied to the choice of lagged 
profitability as an instrument. Past values are at best ad-hoc instruments, and may 
be weak predictors of the growth in profitability. Results may then underestimate 
the true extent of rent-sharing, and Abowd and Lemieux assert exogenous 
instruments are required. The authors study a panel of some 1100 Canadian union 
contracts from 1963 to 1985 and adopt industry import and export prices as 
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instruments, assumed to capture foreign competition shocks upon the domestic 
product market. These should be correlated with demand shifts but not, directly, 
with the error term in the wage equation. In the authors' preferred specification the 
estimated effect of quasi-rents12 per employee increases more then ten-fold after 
instrumentation, from 0.018 to 0.195, implying a long run elasticity of wages with 
respect to quasi-rents of 0.283. 
Van Reenen (1996) instead examines technology shocks, in the form of firm 
and industry innovations, as instruments for firm profitability using a panel of 600 
large British manufacturing companies. These instruments should cause positive 
shocks to firm profits. They may, however, also raise the productivity of employees, 
and then be an independent shifter of wages. The majority of innovations are 
though associated with products rather than processes, and tests do not reject 
instrument validity. The long run elasticity of wages with respect to profits per head 
is then estimated to be 0.365. Teal (1996) presents similar evidence for a sample of 
Ghanaian manufacturing firms from the early 1990s. The amount of foreign 
borrowing per employee and the share of intermediate costs in total output are used 
to instrument profits, and the rapid decline in Ghana's exchange rate, in the period, 
is assumed to generate exogenous shifts in profitability. The elasticity of wages with 
respect to firm profits is then 0.200. Estevao and Tevlin (2000) study a panel of US 
manufacturing industries from 1958-1994, and instrument profitability by output 
movements in the sector to which an industry sells. The comparable elasticity is 
estimated to be 0.143. 
Whilst the exogenous approach to instrumentation is preferred, estimates of 
the magnitude observed appear implausibly large. A four standard deviation increase 
12 Quasi-rents are defined as `profits' per employee when the wage is set equal to the alternative, 
rather than the actual, wage. 
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in firm profitability is predicted to raise wages by between 90 and 120 percent. " 
These estimates may potentially be biased due to the pay measure commonly 
employed. A product market shock, that increases profits, could induce an 
expansion in worker hours, satisfied by overtime, increasing the wage bill but not 
necessarily employment. The authors may then capture increased overtime hours. 
Also, where workers do capture a share of firm rents employers may seek to 
upgrade the quality of their workforce. Whilst firm fixed-effects will capture the skill 
of workers that remains constant over time, skill upgrading may cause the rent- 
sharing effect to be overstated. These factors indicate the benefits to analysing the 
firm's effect on pay at the individual level, incorporating the hours of work and 
personal characteristics. 
Black and Strahan (1999) offer an interesting, alternative, approach to 
estimating whether rents are shared with employees. The authors analyse the impact 
of the deregulation of the US banking industry upon pay levels. They hypothesise 
regulation impeded competition and generated product market rents. Deregulation 
is assumed to act as a negative shock upon bank profitability, and to be exogenous 
to the labour market. Post-deregulation, banking wages are estimated to fall, on 
average, by 6 percent. This reduction in wages was observed to be greater in states 
that had more restrictive legislation ex-ante. The evidence suggests these phenomena 
cannot be explained by demand shocks or changes in the observed skill of banking 
employees, but rather are consistent with rent-sharing. These results are of 
particular interest as unions are largely absent from the US banking industry. 
13 These figures are based upon Abowd and Lemieux (1993), Van Reenen (1996) and Teal 
(1996). The comparable calculation was not possible for Estevao and Tevlin (2000). Estimates of 
this size are logically possible, if high wage (skill) workers are disproportionately employed in 
unprofitable firms (see Oswald, 1996). 
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2.3.3 Recent Research using Linked Employer-Employee data 
One of the first studies to analyse linked individual-firm panel data is that of 
Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999). They examine a large French panel to 
estimate the unobserved worker and firm fixed-effects on wages, assuming 
exogenous job mobility and conditional orthogonality between the unobserved 
worker and firm heterogeneity. Firms that hire high-wage (skill) workers are found 
to be more productive and capital intensive, but not more profitable. High-wage 
firms are both more productive and more profitable. This latter evidence is 
potentially consistent with rent-sharing, but cannot distinguish cause and effect. In 
contrast, the evidence for the US, in Abowd et al (1998), is that high-wage firms are 
associated with reduced profitability. Interestingly, the authors find only a weak 
correlation between the (unobserved) worker and firm fixed-effects. Goux and 
Maurin (1999) using alternative French data, and a different estimation technique, 
observe a similar result. 
Studies that have used employer-employee data to analyse the rent-sharing 
model are, as yet, relatively scarce. Troske (1999) studies a cross-section of 
employees with linked establishment data and examines whether rent-sharing can 
explain the employer size-wage differential. The firm's market share is found to 
enter negatively, but statistically insignificantly, industry concentration with a 
positive and well-determined effect. The author also mentions that, in results not 
reported, profits per head and value added per head entered positively and 
statistically significantly. 
Hildreth (1998) studies a cross-section of British manufacturing 
establishments, where detailed information concerning two employees (the most 
recent hire and a randomly selected employee) is recorded. Profits per head are 
observed to enter wages positively and statistically significantly, with an estimated 
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elasticity (at the mean) of 0.02. When firm profitability is instrumented by foreign 
price shocks this estimate increases to 0.168, when instead profitability is 
instrumented by product or process innovations the estimate is 0.251. These 
estimates are comparable to those observed by Abowd and Lemieux (1993) and Van 
Reenen (1996). Nevertheless, some caution should be attached to the results, as 
cross-section estimates unobserved person-specific effects may be captured. With 
respect to innovation, Doms et al (1997) find that plants that introduce new 
technology employ more skilled workers both pre- and post-adoption. Whilst, 
Entorf et al (1999) find that workers in `new technology' jobs were already more 
highly paid in previous employment spells. 
This chapter adds to this, currently, relatively limited literature that studies 
rent-sharing using employer-employee data. 
2.4 Data 
The data used in this study come from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). 
The BHPS is nationally representative sample of more than 5,000 British 
households, containing over 10,000 adult individuals, conducted late each year since 
1991 (see Appendix 1 for discussion). These data include detailed information 
concerning earnings, education, employment characteristics, and demographics. 
Attention is here restricted to those individuals aged less than 65 and in private 
sector employment at the survey date, approximately 3,500 respondents in any one 
year. 
In 1991 and 1994 the BHPS included a question, asking respondents: 
"What is the exact name of your employer or the trading name if one is used" 
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Responses to this question produced a list of company names used to merge in firm 
data, held in the Dun and Bradstreet (DB) database of UK enterprises. 14 This is a 
privately run database that seeks to sample the universe of `large' firms, in the UK. 
All enterprises that have 60 employees or more, a sales turnover in excess of £3.5 
million, or total assets in excess of L10 million are contacted (there is the possibility 
of missing companies if no details are held at Company House, or with DB 
themselves). Enterprises that do not fulfil these criteria may still be sampled if they 
volunteer, or if previously sampled. Of the firms contacted, generally only one 
percent refuses to respond. The database then includes some 50,000 companies, and 
has the advantage of not being limited to publicly listed companies or the 
manufacturing sector. For the key firm variables studied, the disclosure rate is 
approximately 89 percent with respect to firm employment, and 84 percent for 
company profits. 
However, in linking the BHPS employee data to the DB company data, 
attrition is likely, as a result of non-response and coding error with respect to the 
employer name, and due to the limited coverage of small enterprises within the DB 
data. This is examined in more detail below. 
2.4.1 Properties of the Linked Employer-Employee Data 
Taking as the starting point the employee data, there are 2092 responses to the 
question regarding company name. Of these 596 could not be located within the 
DB database, leaving 1496 matched worker-firm pairs. Cleaning the data and 
conditioning on non-missing observations of the variables of interest left 1113 
observations. For this sample there are a maximum of two waves of data for each 
individual present, here 868 observations are recorded for respondents observed 
14 Data made available by Andrew Hildreth. 
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twice. The remainder, as single data points, are the result of moves into or out of 
employment or, more prosaically, that the matching of the data is successful in only 
one period. Finally, of the 868 observed multiple time-period observations some 
774 are observed to work for the same firm at both points in time. To capture 
unobserved heterogeneity, of both the worker and the firm, analysis is here 
restricted to this balanced, worker-firm, panel (see section 5). The final sample then 
includes 387 workers, within 267 firms, observed for two periods. 
Controlling for worker and firm fixed effects has strong merits, but here is 
achieved at a cost; the resulting sample may overstate the returns to firm 
profitability. By focussing upon individuals working in the same firm in both 1991 
and 1994 we are liable to observe large and well-established firms, for whom we 
witness repeat observations over time, who may be more likely to share rents. 
Secondly, we may capture workers who benefit most from any sharing of rents. 
Those workers who are `outsiders', who are low paid and do not share in firm 
success, are possibly more likely to quit the firm. " (For a further discussion see 
Appendix 2. ) 
The properties of the sample, and how it compares to the full BHPS data, 
are examined in Table 2.1, where summary statistics are presented. As suggested, 
large employers are more prevalent in the linked data and workers are observed to 
be more likely to work within large workplaces. Union recognition and 
performance-related pay are also more prevalent. In part this may reflect the 
preponderance of large employers. Workers with accompanying firm data are 
slightly more likely to be found within manufacturing industries, yet differences are 
relatively small. For occupation, gender and race, the composition of the linked data 




seems comparable to that observed for the BHPS as a whole. Finally, workers with 
matched firm data are, on average, slightly less educated, but have greater job 
tenure, potential experience, and higher pay. 
2.5 Results 
2.5.1 Summary Statistics 
Whether there are systematic differences in employee characteristics, according to 
the firm's profitability, is now investigated for the employer-employee (BHPS-DB) 
data in Table 2.2. Column one presents summary statistics for workers in firms 
with below median profitability, column two firms with above median profitability. 
More profitable firms are observed to be both larger (greater firm 
employment) and more capital intensive (a higher capital to labour ratio). They are 
also associated with slightly smaller workplaces. Mean profits per worker for firms 
with below median profitability are here, for the years 1991 and 1994, negative. This 
may reflect the difficult trading conditions within the UK in the early 1990s. More 
profitable companies are observed to pay higher wages, but also to hire more 
educated workers. There is thus some evidence of more able workers working 
within more profitable firms. 
Whilst workers within more profitable firms are, on average, more educated 
their levels of potential experience (age - years of schooling - six) and job tenure are 
lower. With respect to gender and race, the proportions of male and ethnic minority 
employees are approximately equal in the high and low profitability samples. More 
profitable firms are also observed to be more unionised - where there are more 
rents to bargain over the gains to unionisation are likely to be greater. Finally, more 
profitable firms are more likely to run performance-related compensation schemes. 
30 
Rent-Sharing 
2.5.2 Estimation Strategy 
To investigate issues in more detail we turn to regression analysis, and estimate an 
extended version of equation (7). Wages are modeled as a function of personal 
characteristics (such as education, experience, gender and race) and employer 
characteristics (e. g. firm profitability, establishment size, firm size, industry, etc). 
Hourly pay 16 for individual i in time period" t and employer j, is expressed in log- 
linear form as: 
w; ti = x; 6'(3 + zn'y 
t=1, .., T 
j=j(i, t)=1, .., m. 
Where, w is log hourly pay, x the vector of worker characteristics, z the vector of 
employer characteristics, e the conformable error term with mean zero and constant 
variance, and 0 and y the vectors of parameters to be estimated. 
More precisely, quadratics in potential experience and job tenure are 
included to capture the effects of general labour market experience and firm specific 
skills, respectively. Years of schooling and the highest academic qualification capture 
the returns to general human-capital investment, and potentially signalling. Gender, 
race, and occupation are entered as variables that potentially determine both the 
own wage within the workplace, and the wage an individual can earn outside their 
current establishment. Industry and region are added as variables that determine the 
alternative wage. 18 Together these variables are also thought to capture any 
16 Hourly pay is here defined as gross weekly pay divided by overtime adjusted hours: 
wi, = In (PAY/[HS+ 1.5 *HOT]). 
where PAY is usual gross pay (deflated to 1991 values), HS is standard hours, and HOT overtime 
hours. Alternative overtime corrections yielded similar results. 
17 Where, t=1991,1994 for the linked BHPS-DB data. 
18 Industry controls are entered at the one-digit level. Whilst more disaggregation would be 
preferred, with only 387 individuals (observed twice) such an approach is not, here, feasible. 
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autoregression in earnings as, given the limited time span of these data, explicit 
dynamics in wages are not here possible. 
Employer effects upon wages are captured by firm profitability (profits per 
employee), firm size (log firm employment), the firm's capital use (log capital to 
labour ratio), and establishment size. Firm profits are obtained from published 
company accounts in the interview year. '`' In 54 percent of cases the company 
accounts date pre-dates the individual survey date, with the remainder company 
reports published at the end of the year. All monetary variables are deflated to 1991 
paces. 
Models are also estimated which account for the potential unobserved 
heterogeneity of employees and employers, by including person-specific (f; ) and 
firm-specific (g) effects upon wages that are assumed constant over time. No 
assumptions are made regarding the distribution of these effects and we allow for 
potential correlation with regressors. 
wih - xin + fi + gi+ ei, (9) 
(For ease of analysis we subsume employer characteristics into x. ) Implicitly this 
assumes a common market return to unobserved worker skill, f;, and that the 
difference in wages of any two workers in the same firm is solely attributable to 
individual characteristics. 
In the presence of both unobserved person and firm heterogeneity, 
estimation is slightly more complicated than is standard (see Abowd and Kramarz, 
1999). Analysing within-person variation implies the (unobserved) firm effect 
remains for those individuals who move between firms. Examining within-firm 
19 Fisher and McGowan (1983) criticise the use of accounting profits as being a misleading 
measure of economic rates of return. Mayer (1988), on the other hand, suggests examination of 
accounts data can provide information upon economic profits. The latter view is here favoured, 
and we assume accounting profits are a, potentially noisy, signal of economic returns. Controlling 
for firm fixed effects, and examining changes over time, may also solve some of these problems. 
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effects consigns individual effects to the error term (as deviations from the firm 
mean person-effect). A natural solution is to estimate the wage equation including 
an indicator variable for each worker and firm. To identify firm effects (g). requires 
multiple individuals to be observed within any one firm. Table 2.3 reveals this is not 
here the case. Some 82 percent of firms are associated with a single employee. These 
single worker-firm pairs also account for 56 percent of employees. 
To separately identify unobserved worker and firm heterogeneity is then 
not, here, possible. Instead we form person-firm groups (h), that is a unique 
indicator for each individual and each employer they are observed working for. 
wjn=x; n1 +h; j+Eit (10) 
The model is estimated by taking first differences (subtracting lagged values) within 
the worker-firm group20: 
(11) (Wiry - Wit-1) - (Xitj - Xit_1 J+ (Eitb - eit_1) 
Awjn = Axi ß+ Aci, i 
(12) 
This removes all individual and firm heterogeneity, both observed and unobserved, 
that remains constant over time and inference is driven by time-varying 
characteristics. 
2.5.3 Further Econometric Issues 
The estimation of wage equations, such as (8) or (12), where firm profitability is an 
explanatory variable, faces further potential pitfalls. First, from (7), the rent-sharing 
parameter may be expected to vary across firms. Second, there may be measurement 
error in using accounting, rather than economic, profits. Third, there may be 
20 The sample is then conditional upon observing the worker for at least two consecutive periods 
(1991 and 1994) in the same firm. 
33 
Rent-Sharing 
endogeneity bias. Firm profitability will be decreasing in worker wages, other things 
being equal. It is then desirable to instrument firm profitability. 
Two approaches are here pursued. The first examines the effect of past 
profitability, in this case one and two-year lags, upon pay. The linked sample 
includes only two waves of firm data, whilst the BHPS has followed the same 
individuals throughout the 1990s. The estimation strategy is then to examine how 
profitability (in 1991 and 1994) affects worker wages in subsequent years, for those 
workers who do not change employer. 21 Past values of firm profitability can be 
thought of as pre-determined variables that are correlated with current profitability, 
but not directly related to the current wage. They should then be robust to potential 
reverse causality. Nevertheless, they cannot be thought of as an exogenous shock to 
the firm's revenue, and in models with no controls for unobserved heterogeneity 
may be correlated with person or firm fixed-effects. 
The second approach is to instrument UK firm profitability by US industry 
profits and price levels. These variables are assumed to capture exogenous variation 
in profits, via international product market shocks, to demand or competition. For 
these to be suitable instruments, they should be independent of the error term in 
the wage equation. It is not clear a priori why US profits or prices should be, directly, 
correlated with wages within the UK, especially once we control for unobserved 
worker heterogeneity. Implicitly this assumes the behaviour of UK wages and firms 
does not significantly impact upon US prices and output. Movements in US prices 
and profits are then viewed as external shocks to UK industry, independent of 
worker and firm behaviour. Estimation is by Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) and 
tests are presented for instrument validity. 
21 This restriction may upward bias the rent-sharing coefficient due to omitting low pay 
`outsiders', who may be more likely to quit. 
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2.5.4 Profits per employee, Worker skill and Worker wages 
The preceding discussion suggested the importance of controlling for a potential 
correlation between worker skill and firm profitability. It then seems natural to 
examine what impact observed worker skill has upon the estimated rent-sharing 
parameter. Column one of Table 2.4 presents OLS estimates where the wage is 
regressed upon employer variables, column two adds job and person characteristics, 
whilst column three adds education variables. Parameter estimates generally match 
standard earnings equation predictions and attention is here focussed upon the 
effect of employer variables. 
In each case profits per head enters positively and statistically significantly, 
despite the potential downward bias due to the endogeneity of wages and profits. 
Moving from column one to column two of Table 2.4, the estimated rent-sharing 
coefficient increases from 0.042 to 0.055. Moving from column two to three the 
parameter then falls to 0.045. The rent-sharing parameter is then relatively stable as 
controls are introduced. Results suggest more profitable firms employ workers with 
lower wage earning characteristics with respect to occupation, tenure and 
experience. Yet, conditional upon these characteristics, more profitable firms hire 
more able (educated) employees. This matches the intuition displayed in the sample 
means. Given observed worker skill is positively associated with firm profitability, it 
then may also be the case for unobserved worker heterogeneity. 
With respect to other firm characteristics, the coefficient upon the log 
capital to labour ratio falls from 0.075 to 0.049 when moving from column one to 
column three, though it remains statistically significantly different from zero. More 
capital intensive firms, here, employ more skilled labour. With respect to log firm 
employment, coefficient estimates, whilst generally positive, are not well 
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determined. In contrast, establishment size enters positively and (jointly) statistically 
significantly in all cases. 
The estimates, in column three of Table 2.4, imply an elasticity of wages 
with respect to profits per employee (evaluated at the mean) of 0.02.22Moving from 
a firm with profitability one standard deviation below the mean to a firm with 
profitability one standard deviation above the mean is predicted to increase wages 
by 8.6 percent. This is broadly in line with the previous studies that examined lagged 
profitability, and with the figure Hildreth (1998) observed when profitability was 
entered directly in the wage equation. However, such a result is also potentially 
consistent with performance pay, frictions upon labour supply or unobserved 
worker quality differences. These hypotheses are analysed in turn. 
2.5.5 Profits per employee and Performance Related Pay 
The BHPS contains the following question regarding performance-related pay: 
`Doesyourpay ever include performance bonuses orprofrt-related pays Note: Includes an 
extra payments including performance bonuses and sales commissions, but not overtime. " 
The question then includes both profit sharing and other forms of incentive pay. A 
disadvantage of the question is that between 1992 and 1994 individuals were only 
asked to respond if they had changed employers. We may then underestimate the 
growth, within firms, of such schemes. Still, it would seem to broadly capture the 
incidence of performance pay. 
Column four of Table 2.4 examines whether the observed relationship 
between wages and profitability, in fact, captures a pay-performance correlation, by 
adding the incentive pay variable to the wage equation. The performance-related pay 




(PRP) indicator enters positively and statistically significantly, with an estimated 
wage premium of 6.2 percent. This is likely to capture greater effort, induced by 
performance pay, and worker quality effects, as more able employees are attracted 
to such schemes. Booth and Frank (1999) observe comparable estimates for the 
BHPS in this period, of 5.6 percent for females and 9.3 percent for males, though 
they include public sector employees. Nevertheless, the estimated coefficient upon 
firm profitability is largely unaffected by the introduction of the PRP variable. 
Alternative evidence is presented in Table 2.5, where wage equations are 
estimated for the sample of employees who are paid PRP (column one) and those 
who are not (column two). Whilst the coefficient upon profits per employee is 
larger in the sample paid PRP, the effect remains positive and statistically robust for 
those who are not and the difference in parameter estimates is not statistically 
significant at conventional levels. Whilst the measure of performance pay may be 
imperfect, the evidence suggests the wage-rents correlation cannot be explained by 
incentive pay schemes. 
The discussion of incentive pay models in section two suggested a weaker 
link between pay and performance in large organisations, where the measurement of 
effort is more difficult and free-rider problems, associated with group bonuses, 
more severe. Small firms may, however, find it easier to monitor worker effort and 
hence be less likely to pay PRP. These ideas are examined in columns three to six of 
Table 2.5. The returns to PRP are positive, similar, and well determined in small 
and large firms. In contrast, the coefficient upon PRP is close to zero and 
insignificant amongst establishments with 200 or more employees, but positive and 
well determined in small workplaces. The problems of measuring performance and 
free-rider behaviour may then limit PRP to small workplaces. However, some care 
must be taken with interpretation due to the relatively small number of 
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observations. The effect of profits per head upon pay seems more pronounced in 
large firms, where the problems of group incentives should be greatest. This last 
finding runs counter to the evidence of Rayton (1996) but matches that of Nickell, 
Vainiomaki and Wadhwani (1994). 
Together these results suggest performance pay does not provide a 
satisfactory explanation of the rent-wage correlation. 
2.5.6 Is rent-sharing limited to the union sector? 
Given the model of unionised bargaining outlined, in section two, rent-sharing may 
be expected to be limited to the union sample. This is investigated in columns one 
and two of Table 2.6a, where wage equations are estimated for unionised and non- 
unionised workplaces respectively. Firm profitability enters positively in both cases, 
with parameter estimates of 0.038 and 0.026. This difference is relatively small and 
is not statistically significant at the 5 percent level. One issue with these estimates is 
that union plants are associated with higher mean levels of profits per employee 
(0.54 compared to 0.25 for non-union plants). This should not be surprising, unions 
can only extract a wage mark-up where rents exist. Yet if the degree of rent-sharing 
is positively related to the rents to be shared estimates may in part reflect the 
different levels of profitability. 
This is examined in column three, where the wage equation is estimated for 
the entire sample and union recognition interacted with profits per employee. (This 
constrains the remaining coefficients to be the same for both union and non-union 
workplaces. ) The interaction term is estimated to be negative, suggesting that, for 
the same level of profits per employee, rent-sharing is grrater amongst non-union 
employers. The effect is not, however, statistically significantly different from zero. 
38 
Rent-S 
The evidence then suggests rent-sharing is, here, not limited to the unionised sector. 
Hildreth and Oswald (1997) document similar evidence, for company panel data. 
2.5.7 Is the rent-wage correlation a result of short-run competitive frictions? 
Were the rent-wage correlation to be explained by a competitive model with short- 
run frictions upon labour supply, one may expect the correlation between profits 
and wages to be strongest within `thin' labour markets. This proposition is analysed 
in Table 2.6b, and wage equations estimated for samples of workers by occupation. 
Column one examines professional occupations (managerial, professional, 
associated professional and technical occupations), column two all remaining 
occupations and column three manual workers (personal and protective, machine 
operatives and other manual occupations). In all cases the estimated rent-sharing 
parameter is positive and statistically well determined. Within professional 
occupations the coefficient upon profits per worker is estimated to be 0.066. This is 
over twice as large as that estimated for all other occupations, at 0.031. However, 
when we examine manual occupations, where jobs are relatively unskilled and 
labour shortages unlikely, we observe a rent-sharing parameter of 0.069. This would 
seem to run counter to the competitive friction hypothesis. Moreover, in the sample 
period (1991 and 1994) the labour market was relatively depressed and hiring 
problems, particularly for unskilled labour, should have been less important. 
2.5.8 The effect of lagged profitability 
The evidence suggests the observed correlation between profitability and pay 
cannot, here, be explained by performance pay or by a competitive model with slow 
adjustment. However, the rent-sharing parameter may still be downward biased. An 
increase in wages will reduce profits, other things being equal. Table 2.7 examines 
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the effect of past profitability upon pay. Lagged profits per employee are pre- 
determined variables that are correlated with current profitability but not, directly, 
related to current pay. Estimates should then be robust to potential reverse 
causality. The employer data includes just two waves of firm information, whilst the 
BHPS has followed the same individuals throughout the 1990s. To maintain the 
signal in the model we examine the impact of profitability, in 1991 and 1994, upon 
wages in subsequent years, for those workers who do not change employer. 23 
Column one of Table 2.7 restates the basic estimates for the years 1991 and 
1994. Column two estimates the wage equation for those individuals observed to 
work for the same employer in the subsequent year 24 The coefficient upon profits 
per employee is estimated to be similar, at 0.045 and 0.044 respectively, and 
statistically significantly different from zero in both cases. Column three then 
examines the effect of firm profits in 1991 and 1994 upon wages in 1992 and 1995. 
The estimated coefficient upon profits per employee, lagged once, is then slightly 
smaller, at 0.031, and on the border of statistical significance. For those workers 
who do not change employers within two years, the estimated, current, rent-sharing 
coefficient is 0.038. When we instead examine the two-year lag of profits per 
worker, and wages in 1993 and 1996, the parameter estimate is 0.030. In both cases, 
coefficients are statistically robust. 
The effect of lagged profitability upon wages is then positive and statistically 
well determined. This runs counter to the suggestion that the rent-wage correlation 
reflects a form of labour demand curve - under certain functional forms it is 
relatively easy to generate a positive profit-pay correlation - as the lags on profits 
per employee make it difficult to believe causality runs from pay to profitability. The 
23 Defined as individuals who remain in the same employer and do not change job, or who change 
jobs but remain within the same organisation. 
44 This sample is unbalanced. 
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labour demand interpretation also does not square with the fact that total firm 
profits were found to enter wages positively and statistically significantly. In 
contrast, along a demand curve, wages and total profits are negatively related. 
Whilst results may be explained by unobserved worker skill, if more profitable firms 
employ more able workers, they do not seem to fit the labour demand interpretation 
well. 
2.5.9 Firm profitability and US Product Market Influences 
Whilst lagged profits are likely to be pre-determined they are unlikely to be 
exogenous. What is required is a variable that captures exogenous shocks to firm 
profitability, and that is independent of the error term in the wage equation. Such an 
instrument will allow consistent estimation of the rent-sharing parameter in the face 
of measurement error and endogeneity. If the instruments are independent of 
unobserved, worker and firm, heterogeneity in pay, they are sufficient to identify the 
causal impact of firm profitability. 
Here we instrument UK firm profitability by US industry profits and 
prices. 25 These are thought of as capturing exogenous variation in UK profits, via 
international product market shocks. An increase in US profitability, or prices, may 
reflect a preference shift or technology or cost shock that is, potentially, shared 
across nations. In this sense the US is regarded as assuming a leadership role in the 
global economy. That the UK is a relatively open economy suggests foreign product 
market shocks may be suitable instruments for domestic market conditions. 
For the US product market variables to be suitable instruments, they should 
be independent of the error term in the UK wage equation. Implicitly this assumes 
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US output and prices are not related to UK behaviour. The size of the US economy, 
relative to the UK, and its much larger domestic markets may provide some support 
for this hypothesis. Whilst it is unclear as to why US profitability should, directly, 
affect wages in the UK, there are two potential avenues for an indirect link. Firstly, 
there may be common types of technologies, within industries in both the UK and 
US, that produces a pay-profitability correlation in the absence of rent-sharing. 
Secondly, Budd and Slaughter (2000), analysing over 1000 union wage contracts 
from 1980 to 1992, have found that Canadian wages are a positive function of US 
industry profits for US owned companies. US firms then `import' US wages, and 
rent-sharing, into their Canadian enterprises. This may reflect the close geographic 
proximity and economic integration of Canada and the US, and need not follow for 
the UK. Yet if such a transmission mechanism is present in the UK, wages may be 
correlated with US profitability. These issues are examined below. In all estimates 
that follow we also include a control for the industry wage to capture the common 
industry impact of any shock. 26 
Table 2.8 compares selected sample properties for the linked data and the 
sub-sample with matched US industry data. In general, sample means are closely 
aligned. Regression evidence is presented in column one of Table 2.9a. The 
estimated rent-sharing parameter, for the sample with US data, is, at 0.045, identical 
to that observed previously. Moreover, coefficients upon the other explanatory 
variables are very similar. Column two of Table 2.9a adds a control for the industry 
25 The DB data includes US defined SIC codes, from which US industry data (obtained from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis: http: //www. bea. doc. gov) were merged in. There are some 60 (US) 
industry groups of which 51 are observed in the BHPS-DB data. 
26 These data are NES industry averages merged using UK industry codes. They are, hence, 
coded differently to the US industry data. To check whether this biased results the UK average 




wage. Results are essentially unchanged. 7 Column three analyses the direct impact 
of US profitability upon UK worker pay, and enters current, one-year, and two-year 
lags of US Industry profits per worker in the wage equation. These terms enter 
jointly, and individually, statistically insignificantly. Omitting UK firm profits per 
employee (in column four), or instead entering the US profitability terms 
individually, did not alter this conclusion. There is hence little statistical evidence 
that US profitability is correlated with the error term in the wage equation. The 
possibility cannot though be entirely discounted. 
Table 2.9b estimates wage equations by Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS), 
with the US profitability measures as instruments (the upper panel reports 
coefficient estimates from the equation of interest, the lower panel the instrumental 
variable equation). 28 In all cases the instruments are jointly statistically significant 
predictors of firm profitability. This corresponds to the rank condition for 
identification. Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995) show that 2SLS is biased towards 
OLS estimates when instruments are only weak predictors of the endogenous 
variable. The additional (adjusted) R2, that the instruments add to explaining profits 
per employee, is then also reported. US industry profits explain approximately 5 
percent of the variation in UK profitability. The instruments then appear to be 
significant predictors of firm profitability. The Sargan test of overidentifying 
restrictions is also presented. Under the null, instruments are exogenous and hence 
uncorrelated with the residuals from the wage equation, and the test statistic is 
calculated as the correlation of the residuals with the instrument matrix. In all three 
cases, where equations are overidentified, we fail to reject the null of instrument 
validity. 
Z7 Previous conclusions are robust to the inclusion of the industry wage. 
28 We later include US prices in the instrument set. Yet as price indices they have no substantive 
meaning in cross-section analysis. 
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Table 2.9b finds UK firm profitability to be increasing in the level of US 
industry profits. The long run effect of US profits per employee, upon UK profits 
per worker, is approximately 0.260 in all four cases. UK profitability is also more 
closely related to lagged, rather than current, US profits. This would fit with the 
view of the US fulfilling a leadership role in the global economy, with a lagged 
transmission to the UK. The instruments may, however, capture demand or supply 
shocks. A positive correlation between UK and US profits could reflect common 
shifts in consumer preferences, or changes in production techniques adopted 
internationally. In either case, the instruments are valid so long as they are not 
correlated with the error in the wage equation. On this point the statistical evidence 
is supportive. 
The 2SLS estimates of the rent-sharing parameter are then observed to he in 
the range 0.070 to 0.101, between one and a half and twice as large as the OLS 
estimates. This implies an elasticity of the wage with respect to profit per employee 
(at the mean) of between 0.03 and 0.04. However, the rent-sharing coefficients are 
not statistically robust (the t-statistics lie between 1.1 and 1.2). Whilst the increased 
magnitude of the point estimates suggests a more pronounced rent-sharing effect, 
the statistical insignificance of the estimates may lead one to temper this conclusion. 
Doubts may also remain that we do not capture unobserved worker-firm 
heterogeneity. The diagnostic tests, regarding instrument validity, nevertheless 
appear satisfactory and if US profitability is exogenous parameter estimates are 
consistent. 
2.5.10 Alternative Measures of Pay and Firm Prosperity 
As is common in many studies of wage determination we have, to this point, 
estimated log wage equations. The model of bargaining outlined however suggests a 
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link between the level of pay and profitability. Table 2.11a then estimates wage 
equations upon the level of hourly pay. Column one presents the base specification, 
whilst column two adds a control for industry wages. In both cases the rent-sharing 
parameter is positive and statistically well determined. Column three estimates the 
model for the sample where US data are available. The rent-sharing coefficient is of 
a similar magnitude but statistically robust only at the 10 percent significance level. 
Instrumental variable estimates are presented in columns four and five (comparable 
to columns three and four of Table 2.9b). Table 2.10 summarises the estimated 
elasticity of wages with respect to profits per employee, and the predicted wage gain 
from moving from one standard deviation below mean profitability to one standard 
deviation above. Results are very similar to those observed for the log wage 
equations. 
Table 2.11b estimates log wage equations with an alternative measure of the 
employer's `ability to pay', the log sales per employee ratio. As with profits per 
worker the log sales per employee ratio enters positively and statistically significantly 
in OLS regressions, with an estimated elasticity of 0.077. (This elasticity is not 
directly comparable to that with respect to firm profitability. ) Nevertheless, the 
predicted wage gain from a two standard deviation increase in firm sales is broadly 
comparable to that observed for firm profitability, and results substantially similar 
for both measures of firm wealth. 
2.5.11 Worker-Firm Fixed Effects 
Whilst the results above suggest firms share rents with their employees, estimates 
may be contaminated by unobserved worker and firm fixed effects. More profitable 
firms may employ more skilled employees. If so, the estimated rent-sharing 
parameter will be biased upwards. That we observe more educated employees to 
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be, here, employed in more profitable firms offers some support for this hypothesis. 
Yet workers in such firms are also, on average, less experienced and have lower 
levels of job tenure. The direction of any bias is not then clear. 
Table 2.12 estimates wage equations with controls for unobserved worker 
and firm heterogeneity. Column one estimates the wage equation, transformed into 
within person-firm first differences (three-year changes), by OLS. The estimated 
rent-sharing parameter is now 0.013, compared to 0.045 in the cross-section, and no 
longer statistically robust. 2" The elasticity, at the mean, is estimated to be 0.006, and 
moving from one standard deviation below mean profitability to one standard 
deviation above is predicted to increase worker wages by approximately 2.2 percent. 
These effects are quite small and seem to suggest previous estimates were, to a large 
degree, capturing unobserved worker-firm differences. 
The coefficient upon profitability is, nevertheless, likely to be downward 
biased, due to the endogeneity of profits and pay and any measurement error in 
accounting profits. Columns two to five then instrument the change in firm 
profitability, between 1991 and 1994, by current and lagged changes in US profits 
and prices (using the same three year gap). In all four cases the instruments are 
(jointly) statistically significant predictors of the change in firm profitability. For 
columns two to four we cannot reject the test of over-identifying restrictions at 
conventional levels, but for column five the null of exogeneity can be rejected at the 
5 percent level. The long run effect of the change in US industry profits, upon the 
change in UK firm profitability, is estimated to lie between 0.160 and 0.285. As was 
the case previously, UK profits per worker are more closely correlated with lagged, 
rather than current, US profits. Faster growth in US prices, one year previously, 
29 Adopting a more parsimonious approach, and dropping variables statistically insignificant in 
the first difference regression, left results essentially unchanged. 
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predicts an increase in UK profits, but the current and two-year lagged growth in 
US prices predict falling UK profitability. The resulting (2SLS) parameter estimates 
upon profits per employee are, however, incorrectly signed, but statistically 
insignificantly different from zero. 
One concern with estimates is that the instruments rely on within-industry 
time variance for their power, and hence may be weak predictors of firm 
profitability. The evidence of Table 2.12, however, suggests the instruments capture 
significant variation in firm prosperity. Movements in UK profitability, in response 
to US industrial prosperity, may, nevertheless, reflect demand or supply shocks. For 
example, growth in UK profits may reflect common international demand shifts, or, 
changes in working practices that are diffused globally over time. In both cases US 
profitability is a valid instrument if it is not directly related to UK pay. Statistical 
tests are generally supportive of this assumption. 
There are, nevertheless, two potential weaknesses of the approach followed 
here. First, the use of accounting profits, in conjunction with industry instruments, 
may introduce noise into estimates. Rents are defined as profits to the firm in excess 
of the market return. A common industry shock can then raise accounting profits 
for all firms in an industry, but leave the economic rate of return largely unaltered. 
We may then overestimate any increase in rents, and subsequently underestimate the 
rent-sharing parameter. Firm-specific shocks to profitability would be preferred but 
were, here, not available. ' Secondly, rent-sharing may occur through annual 
bonuses" and non-pecuniary benefits, or pay may adjust sluggishly to changes in 
market conditions. In both cases we may underestimate the gains associated with 
rent-sharing by examining current pay. 
30 Ideally we would also analyse the effect of firm profitability at a relatively disaggregated level. 
31 These are thought of as separate to the performance bonuses discussed earlier. 
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Where firms face a positive product market shock one may, potentially, 
expect an increased intensity of work. Table 2.13 examines the effect of firm 
profitability per worker upon weekly, rather than hourly, pay. This approach also 
avoids the likely measurement error in reported hours of work adding noise to the 
regression. The rent-sharing parameter is estimated to be 0.057 in the cross-section 
and 0.026 in first differences, and is in both cases statistically significantly different 
from zero, despite potential endogeneity bias. These effects correspond to an 
estimated elasticity of pay with respect to profits per employee of 0.025 and 0.011. 
The increase in pay associated with a two standard deviation increase in firm 
profitability is 9.8 and 4.0 percent, respectively. The fixed-effects estimates then 
suggest a moderate, but non-negligible, degree of rent-sharing upon pay. 
For hourly pay the rent-sharing parameter is estimated to be 0.045 in the 
cross-section and 0.013 in first differences. Only the former is statistically well 
determined. Together with the results upon weekly pay this suggests profitability 
and the hours of work may, here, be positively correlated. We may then overstate 
the degree of rent-sharing in the labour market where controls for the hours of 
work are absent. Examining the instrumental variable estimates with respect to 
weekly pay, the rent-sharing parameters are larger, but again are insignificantly 
different from zero. The larger point estimates, compared to hourly pay, suggest the 
instruments capture, in part, the effect of increased hours of work. If pay adjusts 
slowly to shocks to profitability, and changing hours, the instruments may then 
predict falls in hourly pay. 'Z This may help to explain the negative coefficients 
observed in Table 2.12. Table 2.14 then repeats the analysis in Table 2.12 for 
profitability lagged one period, where pay adjustments are likely to have occurred. 
32 The change in US profitability was found to positively predict the change in hours, the effect 
was not, however, well determined. 
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OLS estimates of the rent-sharing parameter are here negative, 2SLS estimates 
positive, neither are though statistically different from zero. As with Table 2.9b 
instrumentation increases the point estimates but results are not statistically robust. 
In summary, the estimates, which include worker and firm fixed effects, 
offer support for a moderate degree of rent-sharing with respect to weekly pay. Yet, 
there is no statistically robust evidence for rent-sharing upon hourly earnings. 
2.6 Conclusions 
This chapter has used new UK employer-employee data to examine the effect of 
firm profitability upon pay. OLS estimates of the elasticity of wages with respect to 
(current) firm profits per employee are approximately equal to 0.02, and moving one 
standard deviation below the mean of firm profitability to one standard deviation 
above is predicted to increase wages by 8 percent. 
The effect of formal incentive pay schemes upon the pay-profitability 
correlation are extensively examined, and whilst performance pay enters wages 
positively and statistically significantly the rent-sharing parameter is largely 
unperturbed. Moreover, the coefficient upon firm profitability is positive and well 
determined for the sample of workers with no formal performance-pay. Were a 
competitive model with slow adjustment to explain the rents-wage correlation the 
effect of firm profitability upon wages should be largely observed within `thin' 
labour markets. Yet, the coefficient upon profits per employee remains positive and 
well determined for low-skill employees where hiring difficulties should be least 
likely. Competitive frictions and performance pay do not then seem to offer a 
sufficient explanation for the rents-wage correlation. Evidence is also presented that 
rent-sharing is not limited to the unionised sector. 
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The chapter adopts the novel approach of using cross-country comparisons 
to instrument firm profitability. International shocks to product demand are here 
captured by the correlation of UK firm profitability with US industry profitability. 
Instrumental variable estimates of the rent-sharing parameter then increase by 
between 50 and 100 percent, relative to OLS. Coefficients are not, however, 
statistically well determined. 
When controls for worker and firm fixed effects are added, OLS estimates 
of the rent-sharing parameter are attenuated from 0.045 to 0.013 and are no longer 
robust. In comparison when weekly, rather than hourly, pay is the dependent 
variable OLS estimates are, respectively, 0.057 and 0.026, and in both cases are 
statistically significantly different from zero. When UK profits are instrumented by 
US profitability the resulting coefficient estimates are, both for weekly and hourly 
pay, incorrectly signed or statistically insignificantly different from zero. Examining 
lagged profitability, and allowing for a longer adjustment process on pay, increases 
the estimated rent-sharing coefficients, but they remain statistically insignificant. 
After controlling for observed worker skill and unobserved worker and firm 
fixed effects, we then find some moderate evidence for rent-sharing upon weekly 
earnings. Yet, these estimates may capture a possible positive correlation between 
the hours of work and firm profitability. When instead we examine hourly wages, 
and thus control for the intensity of work, we can find no robust positive rent- 





Sample Means (1991 & 1994) 
A comparison of the Linked data and the BHPS sample 
Variable BHPS BHPS-DB 
Hourly Pay 5.72 (3.58) 6.24 (3.19) 
Potential Experience 19.68 (11.72) 22.59 (11.32) 
Job Tenure 5.02 (5.72) 6.24 (5.77) 
Years of Schooling 11.23 (2.68) 10.93 (2.50) 
Degree 0.09 (0.28) 0.07 (0.25) 
Ethnic minority 0.03 (0.16) 0.03 (0.16) 
Male 0.56 (0.50) 0.58 (0.49) 
Union recognised plant 0.39 (0.49) 0.63 (0.48) 
Performance related pay 0.38 (0.49) 0.47 (0.50) 
Workplace Size 25 plus 0.67 (0.47) 0.85 (0.36) 
Profits per employee 0.43 (0.95) 
Capital-labour ratio 3.08 (7.21) 
Firm employment 29.65 (48.72) 
Industry 
Agriculture 0.02 (0.13) 
Energy 0.03 (0.17) 
Extraction 0.05 (0.23) 
Metal Goods 0.16 (0.37) 
Other Manufacturing 0.15 (0.35) 
Construction 0.03 (0.18) 
Distribution 0.25 (0.43) 
Transport 0.06 (0.23) 
Banking 0.19 (0.39) 
Other Services 0.06 (0.24) 
Occupation 
Managers 0.15 (0.35) 
Professional 0.06 (0.24) 
Associated Professional 0.08 (0.28) 
Clerical 0.23 (0.42) 
Craft & related 0.15 (0.36) 
Personal & Protective 0.05 (0.22) 
Sales 0.09 (0.29) 
Plant Operative 0.14 (0.35) 
Other 0.05 (0.21) 
Number of Firms 
Number of Individuals 1751 























" Standard deviations are in parentheses. Pay is deflated to 1991 values. 
  Profits per employee and the capital-labour ratio are measured in L0,000's per worker. Firm 
employment is measured in 000's of employees. 
  The BHPS sample is the sample of all private sector employees in the BHPS in 1991 and 1994. 
  The BHPS-DB sample is the sample of all private sector employees in the BHPS in 1991 and 




BHPS-DB Sample Means (1991 & 1994) 
Above and below median Profits per employee 
Variable 
<Median 
Profits per employee 
> Median 
Pro rtr per employee 
Profits per employee -0.09 (0.65) 0.96 (0.93) 
Capital-labour ratio 1.04 (1.51) 5.13 (9.67) 
Firm employment 17.15 (32.18) 42.15 (58.34) 
Hourly Pay 5.69 (2.75) 6.80 (3.49) 
Potential Experience 22.87 (11.98) 22.31 (10.63) 
Job Tenure 5.86 (5.51) 6.63 (6.00) 
Years of Schooling 10.79 (2.45) 11.07 (2.54) 
Degree 0.05 (0.23) 0.09 (0.28) 
Ethnic minority 0.02 (0.15) 0.03 (0.17) 
Male 0.58 (0.49) 0.58 (0.49) 
Union recognised plant 0.54 (0.50) 0.72 (0.45) 
Performance related pay 0.43 (0.50) 0.51 (0.50) 
Workplace Size 25 plus 0.87 (0.34) 0.83 (0.38) 
Number of Firms 194 156 
Number of Individuals 257 257 
Number of Observations 387 387 
  Standard deviations are in parentheses. Pay is deflated to 1991 values. 
  Profits per employee and the capital-labour ratio are measured in L0,000's per worker. Firm 
employment is measured in 000's of employees. 
  The BHPS-DB sample is the sample of all private sector employees in the BHPS in 1991 and 
1994 with matched data. 
TABLE 2.3 
Number of Worker-Firm Groups in the Linked (BHPS-DB) Data 
Workers per Firm Number of Individuals Percent Number of Firms Percent 
1 220 56.9 220 82.4 
2 44 11.4 22 8.2 
3 36 9.3 12 4.5 
4 20 5.2 5 1.9 
5 15 3.9 3 1.1 
7 7 1.8 1 0.4 
9 18 4.7 2 0.8 
12 12 3.1 1 0.4 
15 15 3.9 1 0.4 
Total 387 100 267 100.0 
  To calculate the total number of observations associated with the number of 




The Effect of Firm Profitability upon Pay (BHPS-DB) 
The Impact of Controlling for Worker Skill 
Dependent Variable: Ln(wage) 






Profits per employee 
Ln(capital-labour ratio) 
Ln(firm employment) 
Performance related Pay 
Workplace Size: 10-49 
Workplace Size: 50-199 
Workplace Size: 200-999 
Workplace Size: 1000+ 






Union recognised workplace 
Individual characteristics 
Observations 
Number of Firms 
Number of Individuals 


























































































No Yes Yes Yes 
267 267 267 267 
387 387 387 387 
774 774 774 774 
0.28 0.56 0.59 0.60 
All equations are estimated by OLS. Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust to 
arbitrary heteroscedasticity and the repeat sampling of individuals within firms. 
All equations include controls for industry (SIC code at the one-digit level), region, and time 
period. Individual characteristics include quadratics in potential experience and job tenure, and 
controls for occupation (SOC code at the one-digit level), temporary job, gender, race, and 
marital status. Parameter estimates are not reported. 
The workplace size coefficients are with respect to the omitted category, 1-2 employees. 
Capital and profits are in £10,000s (1991 values). Mean value profits per head is 0.434, standard 
deviation 0.954. 




The Effect of Firm Profitability upon Pay (BHPS-DB) 
Is it Performance-Related Pay? 










Profits per employee 0.075 0.039 0.020 0.053 0.059 0.034 
(0.020) (0.017) (0.019) (0.021) (0.019) (0.025) 
Performance related Pay 0.061 0.076 0.094 -0.002 
(0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.037) 
Ln(capital-labour ratio) 0.067 0.035 0.042 0.052 0.016 0.059 
(0.027) (0.015) (0.022) (0.017) (0.021) (0.016) 
Ln(firm employment) 0.013 0.008 -0.025 -0.009 0.008 0.012 
Observations 
(0.011) (0.009) (0.018) (0.022) (0.011) (0.010) 
Number of Firms 134 174 186 86 193 133 
Number of Individuals 196 218 196 196 254 192 
Number of Observations 365 409 387 387 449 325 
Adjusted R2 0.63 0.59 0.52 0.70 0.57 0.68 
Mean Profits per worker 0.47 0.40 0.24 0.62 0.42 0.45 
(Std. Deviation) (0.79) (1.08) (0.79) (1.06) (1.00) (0.89) 
1. All equations are estimated by OLS. Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust to 
arbitrary heteroscedasticity and the repeat sampling of individuals within firms. 
2. All regressions also include quadratics in potential experience and job tenure, and controls for 
temporary job, workplace size, education, gender, race, union recognition, occupation (SOC 
Code at the one-digit level), industry (SIC code at the one-digit level), region, marital status, and 
time period. Parameter estimates are not reported. All equations are estimated by OLS. 
3. Capital and profits are in £10,000s (1991 values). 
4. PRP denotes performance-related pay. A small firm is defined as one with employment less 
than, or equal to, median employment. Large firms have employment above the median. Small 
establishments are defined as those with less than 200 workers, large establishments those with 
200 employees or more. 
5. The last row represents the wage gain from moving one standard deviation below mean profits 




The Effect of Firm Profitability upon Pay (BHPS-DB) 
Rent-sharing and Unionisation 
Dependent Variable: Ln(waee) 
NON- 
Regressor UNION UNION ALL 
Profits per employee 0.038 0.026 0.064 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Profits per employee * Union -0.032 
(0.026) 
Union recognised workplace 0.009 
(0.038) 
Performance related Pay 0.019 0.067 0.059 
(0.035) (0.048) (0.029) 
Ln(capital-labour ratio) 0.047 0.034 0.050 
(0.013) (0.024) (0.015) 
Ln(firm employment) 0.015 -0.000 0.005 
(0.010) (0.012) (0.008) 
Observations 
Number of Firms 151 129 267 
Number of Individuals 246 145 387 
Number of Observations 488 286 774 
Adjusted R2 0.61 0.66 0.60 
Mean profits per worker 0.54 0.25 0.43 
(Std. Deviation) (0.94) (0.96) (0.95) 
1. See notes to Table 2.5. Union denotes a union recognised workplace (worker defined). 
TABLE 2.6b 
The Effect of Firm Profitability upon Pay (BHPS-DB) 
Results by Occupation 
Dependent Variable: Ln wa e 
Regressor PROFESS OTHER MANUAL 
Profits per employee 0.066 0.031 0.069 
(0.023) (0.015) (0.021) 
Performance related Pay 0.095 0.065 0.028 
(0.048) (0.031) (0.056) 
Ln(capital-labour ratio) 0.060 0.042 0.050 
(0.021) (0.016) (0.018) 
Ln(firm employment) -0.001 0.007 0.014 
(0.014) (0.008) (0.014) 
Observations 
Number of Firms 104 210 88 
Number of Individuals 124 294 102 
Number of Observations 217 557 179 
Adjusted R2 0.52 0.48 0.54 
Mean profits per worker 0.39 0.45 0.32 
(Std. Deviation) (0.88) (0.98) (1.02) 
1. See notes to Table 2.5. 
2. Professional occupations (PROFESS) include managers, professionals, associate professionals 
and technical occupations. Other occupations (OTHER) include all groups of workers. Manual 





The Effect of Lagged Firm Profitability upon Pay (BHPS-DB) 
Dependent Variable: Ln(waQe) 
ALL LAG I LAG I LAG2 LAG2 
Re ressor 1991194 1991194 1992/95 1991194 1993/96 
Profits per employee, 0.045 0.044 0.038 
(0.014) (0.016) (0.017) 
Profits per employee,., 0.031 
(0.016) 
Profits per employee, -, 
0.030 
(0.014) 
Ln(capital-labour ratio), 0.049 0.052 0.060 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) 
Ln(capital-labour ratio), -, 
0.051 
(0.014) 
Ln(capital-labour ratio), -, 
0.067 
(0.014) 
Ln(firm employment), 0.006 0.005 0.004 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Ln(firm employment), -, 
0.007 
(0.008) 
Ln(firm employment)t_2 -0.000 
(0.008) 
Observations 
Number of Firms 267 265 265 261 261 
Number of Individuals 387 384 384 376 376 
Number of Observations 774 699 699 636 636 
Adjusted R2 0.59 0.58 0.54 0.57 0.57 
1. All equations are estimated by OLS. Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust to 
arbitrary heteroscedasticity and the repeat sampling of individuals within firms. 
2. All regressions also include quadratics in potential experience and job tenure, and controls for 
temporary job, workplace size, education, gender, race, union recognition, occupation (SOC 
Code at the one-digit level), region, marital status, and time period. These controls are recorded 
at the BHPS interview date. Employer variables, profits per employee, the capital-labour ratio, 
firm employment and industry (SIC code at the one-digit level), are derived from firm data 
(1991 and 1994). Parameter estimates are not reported. 
3. Capital and profits are in £10,000s (1991 values). 
4. ALL denotes the complete BHPS-DB linked sample. LAG1 denotes the sample of employees 
who are working within the same employer in year t+ 1, where one-year lagged firm information 
is available. The 1991/1994 sample then regresses current wage on current firm variables for 
this sample. The 1992/1995 sample then estimates a wage equation upon one-year lagged firm 





BHPS-DB Sample Means (1991 & 1994) 
A Comparison of the Complete Sample and the Sub-sample with non-missing US Industry Data 
Variable ALL US 
Hourly Pay 6.24 (3.19) 6.15 (3.18) 
Profits per employee 0.43 (0.95) 0.43 (0.86) 
Total profits 1.93 (4.67) 2.08 (4.71) 
Sales per worker 11.21 (14.02) 10.37 (12.89) 
Ln(sales net worker) 2.09 (0.75) 2.05 (0.71) 
" Standard deviations are in parentheses. Monetary values are deflated to 1991 values. 
  Profits per employee and sales per employee are measured in £0,000's per worker. Total profits 
are measured in L100milhon. 
" ALL is the complete BHPS-DB sample, US the sub-sample matched to US industry data. 
TABLE 2.9a 
The Effect of US Industry Profitability upon Pay (BHPS-DB) 
Sample: Non-missing US Industry Data 











US Industry Profits per employee, 
US Industry Profits per employee, -, 
US Industry Profits per employeet_2 
Observations 
Number of Firms 
Number of Individuals 
Number of Observations 
Adjusted R2 
US US US US 



































252 252 252 252 
362 362 362 362 
724 724 724 724 
0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 
1. See notes to Table 2.5. 
2. US denotes the sample where non-missing US industry data are available. US industry profits 
per employee are measured in $10,000s (1991 values). 




Instrumental Variables (IV) estimates of Rent-Sharing (BHPS-DB) 
US Product Market Shocks as Instruments 
Dependent Variable: Ln(wage) 
US US US US 
Regressor 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 





Number of Firms 
Number of Individuals 
Number of Observations 
Adjusted R2 
0.070 0.082 0.069 0.101 
(0.063) (0.074) (0.063) (0.084) 
0.036 0.035 0.036 0.034 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
0.272 0.271 0.272 0.269 
(0.142) (0.142) (0.142) (0.142) 
252 252 252 252 
362 362 362 362 
724 724 724 724 
0.59 0.59 0.59 0.58 
Instruments 
US Industry Profits per employee, 
US Industry Profits per employee, 











F-test instruments 23.41 29.84 34.79 56.79 
[p-value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Test of over-identifying restrictions 1.33 1.08 1.24 
[p-value] [0.52] [0.30] [0.27] 
Additional Adiusted R2 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.04 
1. 
2. 
See notes to Table 2.9a. 
The additional (adjusted) R2 represents the change in the adjusted R2 as a result of adding the 
instruments to the second stage equation. 
TABLE 2.10 
The effect of the Firm's `Ability to Pay' upon Worker Wages 
A Comtarison of Estimates 
Dependent 
Variable 
Firm Ability to Pay' 







Ln(wage) Profits per employee Elasticity (at the mean) 0.019 0.030 0.043 
% Wage gain +/-1 std. dev 0.077 0.119 0.174 
Hourly Pay Profits per employee Elasticity (at the mean) 0.016 0.025 0.045 
% Wage gain +/-1 std. dev 0.066 0.100 0.180 
Ln(wage) Ln(sales per employee) Elasticity 0.077 0.152 0.151 
% Wage gain +/-1 std. dev 0.109 0.216 0.214 
1. See notes to Table 2.9a. All estimates include the standard controls and the industry wage. 
2. Column 1 records the OLS estimates. Column 2 the 2SLS estimates with US Industry profits 
per worker dated t-1 and t-2 as instruments (column 3, Table 2.9b). Column 3 the 2SLS 




IV estimates of Rent-Sharing (BHPS-DB) 
US Product Market Shocks as Instruments 
Dependent Variable: Hourly Wane 
ALL ALL US US US 
Re ressor OLS OL5 OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Profits per employee, 0.253 0.205 0.235 0.356 0.643 
(0.108) (0.101) (0.124) (0.472) (0.638) 
Ln(capital-labour ratio), 0.309 0.272 0.226 0.220 0.206 
(0.095) (0.094) (0.114) (0.114) (0.116) 
Ln(firm employment), 0.022 0.013 0.006 0.003 -0.005 
(0.053) (0.052) (0.055) (0.053) (0.053) 
Industry wage, 0.279 0.227 0.220 0.202 
(0.119) (0.156) (0.158) (0.157) 
Observations 
Number of Firms 267 267 252 252 252 
Number of Individuals 387 387 362 362 362 
Number of Observations 774 774 724 724 724 
Adjusted R2 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.57 
Instrument Set None None None Full Restricted 
F-test instruments 33.14 51.94 
[p-value] [0.00] [0.00] 
Test of over-identifying restrictions 1.64 
[p-value] [0.20] 
Additional Adjusted R2 0.06 0.04 
TABLE 2.1lb 
IV estimates of Rent-Sharing (BHPS-DB) 
US Product Market Shocks as Instruments 
Depend t nVariable: Ln wa e 
ALL ALL US US US 
Regressor OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Ln(sales per employee)t 0.104 0.087 0.077 0.152 0.151 
(0.022) (0.024) (0.027) (0.134) (0.134) 
Ln(capital-labour ratio), 0.023 0.021 0.018 0.001 0.002 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.031) (0.031) 
Ln(firm employment)t 0.017 0.015 0.014 0.020 0.020 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013) 
Ln(Industry waget 0.243 0.219 0.101 0.103 
(0.137) (0.162) (0.268) (0.269) 
Observations 
Number of Firms 252 252 237 237 237 
Number of Individuals 387 387 328 328 328 
Number of Observations 685 685 635 724 635 
Adjusted R2 0.62 0.62 0.60 0.60 0.60 
Instrument Set None None None Full Restricted 
F-test instruments 4.74 9.37 
[p-value] [0.01] [0.00] 
Test of over-identifying restrictions 0.08 
[p-value] [0.77] 
Additional Adiusted R2 0.03 0.03 
1. See notes to Table 2.9b. 
2. The Full instrument set includes US Industry profits per worker dated t-1 to t-2 (column 3, 





The Effect of Profitability upon Pay (BHPS-DB) 
Worker-Firm Fixed Effects and Instrumental Variables Estimation 
US Product Market Shocks as Instruments 
Dependent Variable: Ln wa e 
US US US US US 
Regressor 01-V 2ST _S' 2SI _S 2SIJ 2SLS 




Number of Firms 
Number of Individuals 
Number of Observations 
0.013 -0.039 -0.063 -0.036 -0.061 
(0.010) (0.038) (0.059) (0.040) (0.062) 
0.006 0.013 0.017 0.013 0.016 
(0.021) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) 
0.023 0.017 0.014 0.017 0.014 
(0.060) (0.059) (0.061) (0.059) (0.061) 
252 252 252 252 252 
362 362 362 362 362 
362 362 362 362 362 
Instruments 
US Industry Profits per employee, 
US Industry Profits per employee,., 
US Industry Profits per employee, -, 
US Industry Prices, 
US Industry Prices, 
_, 















0.335 -0.852 0.302 













F-test instruments 5.57 2.46 7.96 3.82 
[p-value] [0.00] [0.05] [0.00] [0.02] 
Test of over-identifying restrictions 5.38 4.15 4.83 3.83 
[p-value] [0.37] [0.25] [0.18] [0.05] 
Additional Adjusted RZ 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.04 
1. All variables are measured in First Differences (1994 values - 1991 values). 
2. Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust to the repeat sampling of individuals within 
firms. 
3. All equations include controls for potential experience, job tenure, occupation, workplace size, 
temporary job and marital status. Time invariant characteristics drop out of the equation. 
Parameter estimates are not reported. 
4. Capital and profits are in L10,000s (1991 values). 
1. US denotes the sample where non-missing US industry data are available. US industry profits 
per employee are measured in $10,000s (1991 values). 
2. The industry wage is included but not reported. 
3. The additional (adjusted) R2 represents the change in the adjusted R2 as a result of adding the 




The Effect of Profitability upon Pay (BHPS-DB) 
Worker-Firm Fixed Effects and Instrumental Variables Estimation 
US Product Market Shocks as Instruments 








Profits per employee, 0.026 -0.004 0.041 
(0.012) (0.041) (0.063) 
Ln(capital-labour ratio), 0.009 0.013 0.006 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.026) 
Ln(firm employment), 0.039 0.036 0.041 
(0.066) (0.066) (0.066) 
Observations 
Number of Firms 252 252 252 
Number of Individuals 362 362 362 
Number of Observations 362 362 362 
Instrument Set None Full Restricted 
F-test instruments 7.96 3.82 
[p-value] [0.00] [0.02] 
Test of over-identifying restrictions 2.34 0.38 
[p-value] [0.50] [0.54] 
Additional Adiusted R2 0.09 0.04 
1. See notes Table 2.12. 
2. The Full instrument set includes US Industry variables dated t-1 to t-2 (column 4, Table 2.12). 
The restricted instrument set includes variables at time t-1 (column 5, Table 2.12). 
TABLE 2.14 
The Effect of Lagged Profitability upon Pay (BHPS-DB) 
Worker-Firm Fixed Effects and Instrumental Variables Estimation 
US Product Market Shocks as Instruments 







US US US 
Regressor OLS 2SIS 2SLS 
Profits per employeet_1 
Ln(capital-labour ratio), -, 
Ln(firm employment), -, 
Observations 
Number of Firms 
Number of Individuals 













216 216 216 
302 302 302 




Test of over-identifying restrictions 
[p-value] 
Additional Adiusted RZ 
See notes Table 2.13. 








APPENDIX 1: Non-response and Attrition Bias in the BHPS 
As we link company accounts data to worker responses, it seems natural to examine 
whether the employee data has remained representative over time. The BHPS is a 
nationally representative sample of more than 5,000 British households, containing 
over 10,000 adults. Respondents are interviewed annually. If an individual leaves 
their original household all adult members of their new household are also 
interviewed. Children are interviewed once aged 16. Together these should ensure 
the sample remains representative of the British population. 
Nathan (1999) has undertaken a more systematic analysis of the effects of 
attrition. The BHPS is compared to Census data, the General Household Survey 
(GHS) and the Family Expenditure Survey (FES), with respect to age, sex, marital 
status, socio-economic group, ethnicity, employment status and some household 
characteristics. The author concludes that cumulative attrition in the BHPS is 
limited and does not lead to serious bias in inference. 
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APPENDIX 2: Sample Selectivity within the BHPS-DB Linked Data 
The process by which the DB firm data are merged with the BHPS employee data 
may produce a non-random sample. Individual response rates, to the question 
regarding company name, may differ, and, large organisations are more likely to be 
observed in the DB database. 
The summary statistics in Table 2.1 show that workers within the linked data 
are more likely to work in large or unionised workplaces and to be paid 
performance-related pay. They are also more likely to work in manufacturing 
industries, yet differences are here small. With respect to occupation, gender and 
race, the composition of the linked sample is comparable to that for the BHPS as a 
whole. Finally, workers with accompanying firm data are slightly less educated, 
though they have greater job tenure and potential experience. 
Table Al estimates hourly pay equations for the sample with linked firm 
data (column two), and compares parameters to those obtained for the BHPS as a 
whole (column one). Equations include as explanatory variables: firm and 
establishment size, occupation, industry and education. To account for potential 
variation in coefficients, by observed characteristics, standard errors are robust to 
arbitrary heteroskedasticity and the non-independence of errors within the same 
firm. " The sample with firm data predicts lower returns to tenure and a weaker 
effect of workplace size. Remaining coefficient estimates are, however, comparable, 
and substantive conclusions hold for both samples. Results suggest that the 
estimated parameters upon individual and workplace variables do not suffer unduly 
from selection bias. 
33 Ignoring the clustering of individuals within firms can, potentially, significantly underestimate 
standard errors (see Moulton, 1986). 
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An issue with the analysis carried out in this chapter is that, by examining 
the panel of workers within the same firm, we omit company switchers and those 
respondents observed once. This seems the most natural way to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity, in these data. Yet by focussing upon large and well- 
established firms, for whom we observe repeat observations, and workers who 
remain in the same firm, who may be more likely to be `insiders', we may overstate 
the returns to firm profitability. Wage equations, including firm variables, are then 
estimated, and compared, for the balanced worker-firm data (column three), for the 
unbalanced data (column four) and for the balanced data including company 
movers (column five). 
Within the balanced worker-firm data the estimated coefficient upon profits 
per employee is 0.045, for the balanced data that includes firm mobility 0.038, and 
for the unbalanced data 0.029. In all three cases the rent-sharing effect is 
statistically significantly different from zero. These estimates, whilst qualitatively 
similar, suggest the balanced worker-firm sample may overstate the returns to firm 
profitability. Controls for worker and firm heterogeneity may though be hoped, in 




A Comparison of Estimates from the BHPS sample and the Linked data 
Dependent Variable: Ln(wave) 












Potential Experience 0.024 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.024 
(0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Potential Experience2/100 -0.042 -0.033 -0.032 -0.036 -0.036 
(0.005) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) 
Job tenure 0.007 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.000 
(0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Job tenure2/100 -0.014 -0.002 -0.000 0.000 0.007 
(0.011) (0.030) (0.029) (0.025) (0.027) 
Years of schooling 0.017 0.015 0.014 0.022 0.016 
(0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) 
Workplace Size: 10-49 0.150 0.112 0.092 0.130 0.088 
(0.022) (0.060) (0.061) (0.049) (0.058) 
Workplace Size: 50-199 0.213 0.088 0.065 0.132 0.067 
(0.025) (0.059) (0.061) (0.051) (0.057) 
Workplace Size: 200-999 0.236 0.086 0.062 0.111 0.076 
(0.025) (0.061) (0.064) (0.050) (0.060) 
Workplace Size: 1000+ 0.315 0.232 0.188 0.268 0.201 
(0.030) (0.068) (0.069) (0.054) (0.065) 
0-levels 0.079 0.043 0.045 0.048 0.060 
(0.020) (0.041) (0.039) (0.032) (0.036) 
A-levels 0.111 0.089 0.080 0.089 0.098 
(0.025) (0.050) (0.048) (0.040) (0.045) 
HND, HNC 0.180 0.203 0.207 0.191 0.215 
(0.038) (0.073) (0.073) (0.058) (0.069) 
Degree 0.296 0.320 0.278 0.248 0.290 
(0.040) (0.086) (0.085) (0.070) (0.081) 
Higher Degree 0.336 0.567 0.564 0.432 0.491 
(0.114) (0.176) (0.173) (0.154) (0.144) 
Female -0.225 -0.197 -0.204 -0.188 -0.187 
(0.017) (0.037) (0.036) (0.027) (0.031) 
Union recognised workplace 0.056 0.049 0.002 0.034 0.017 
(0.016) (0.036) (0.037) (0.029) (0.033) 
Profits per employee 0.045 0.029 0.038 
(0.014) (0.012) (0.014) 
Ln(capital-labour ratio) 0.049 0.042 0.048 
(0.015) (0.011) (0.014) 
Ln(firm employment) 0.006 0.001 0.002 
(0.008) (0.006) (0.007) 
Observations 
Number of Firms 267 267 501 333 
Number of Individuals 1751 387 387 679 434 
Number of Observations 3502 774 774 1113 868 
Adiusted R2 0.55 0.57 0.59 0.57 0.59 
1. See notes for Table 2.4. All estimates are by OLS. All equations include controls for temporary 
employment, occupation (SOC code at the one-digit level), industry (SIC code at the one-digit 
level), region, time period, race and marital status. 
2. The firm-balanced sample includes all workers observed in the same firm in 1991 and 1994. The 
worker-balanced sample includes workers observed in different firms in 1991 and 1994. The 
unbalanced sample includes all workers observed linked to the firm. 
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Chapter Three 
Employer Size, Wages and Worker Well-being 
Employer Site 
Abstract 
This chapter tests competing hypotheses for the famous positive relationship 
between employer size and wages. The addition of more refined controls for firm 
characteristics (the capital to labour ratio, the intensity of monitoring, and firm 
profitability) leaves the establishment size-wage premium largely unperturbed. 
Whether the size-wage relation reflects a compensating differential is tested using 
worker well-being data. Whilst job satisfaction is observed to be higher within small 
employers there is little difference in satisfaction scores between medium-sized and 
large plants. Worker distaste for employer size is then found not to offer a good 
explanation of the relationship between establishment size and pay. Instead 
correlates of worker skill and person fixed-effects, find most favour in explaining 
the establishment size-wage differential, capturing up to half of the observed 
relationship. A large unexplained wage premium, to those employees working in the 




The finding of an unexplained positive relationship between establishment size and 
worker pay, even after the inclusion of standard human capital and industry 
controls, is a pervasive regularity in studies of wage determination. The recent 
fording of an employer size differential in recorded job satisfaction levels has, 
however, been less well documented. It is probably not yet widely known among 
labour economists. A persuasive consensus upon the source of these effects has yet 
to come to the fore. 
This chapter uses three sources of data, the British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS), the Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS) and the National Child 
Development Study (NCDS), to attempt to distinguish between competing 
hypotheses for the existence of a size-wage relationship. The first has the advantage 
of being a nationally representative panel survey, allowing controls to be made for 
unobserved worker heterogeneity. The second benefits from the linking of 
establishment data to employee responses, permitting a more comprehensive 
examination of the role of employer characteristics. Finally, the NCDS is a 
representative cohort study that includes measures of childhood ability, providing 
more robust controls for worker skill. 
The elasticity of wages with respect to workplace size, in the private sector, 
is here estimated to be approximately 0.04. The role of unobserved labour 
productivity differences is analysed in two ways. Firstly, correlates of worker skill, 
such as childhood test scores, the use of IT, and the skill of the workforce, are 
added to wage equations, and are found to capture up to 15 percent of the 
establishment size-wage premium and up to 30 percent of the firm size-wage 
premium. Secondly, fixed effect models are analysed. These remove unobserved 
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heterogeneity that remains constant over time. The estimated effect of workplace 
size upon wages is then reduced by over a half, compared to cross-section estimates. 
Nevertheless, wages are still observed to be significantly greater in large workplaces. 
One of the contributions of the chapter is to design a novel test as to 
whether the employer size-wage relation reflects a compensating differential (that 
large plants offer inferior working conditions compensated by higher pay). Evidence 
is found in support of the model's underlying assumption. Small workplaces are 
associated with higher levels of job satisfaction. Yet observed dissatisfaction is felt 
predominantly when moving from small to medium-sized plants, with little 
difference in recorded well-being levels between large and medium-sized 
establishments. Employee preferences for very small workplaces may then help to 
explain the lower wages in these plants but, on this evidence, do not explain why 
wages are observed to monotonically increase with establishment size, even 
amongst relatively large establishments. Moreover, establishment size is found not 
to exert a robust independent influence upon job satisfaction once we hold constant 
the size of the firm. Whilst this may support a compensating differential with 
respect to firm size, it does not support one with respect to workplace size. 
Alternative institutional explanations are also examined. Models of 
monitoring costs and rent-sharing are, here, found to offer poor explanations of the 
size-wage correlation. The unobserved productivity hypothesis, where workers in 
large plants are for some reason more productive, instead appears to offer the most 
convincing avenue from which to explain the plant size-wage differential. 
The plan of the chapter is as follows. Section two outlines potential 
rationales for an observed employer size-wage differential. Section three documents 
the evidence of previous studies. The data are discussed in section four and 
regression results presented in section five. Finally, section six concludes. 
69 
Employer Site 
3.2 The Employer Size-Wage Relation: Theories and Explanations' 
The existence of a positive relationship between employer size and pay is a well- 
documented empirical regularity. Explanations for its existence are, however, more 
contentious. Wages determined within the competitive paradigm are assumed to 
fully reflect workers' opportunity costs of employment. An observed size-wage 
correlation then captures unobserved differences, in productivity (large employers 
hire more able individuals) or working conditions (a compensating differential to 
inferior conditions in large workplaces). 
Institutional explanations have taken four main forms. The first suggests the 
size-wage premium captures a trade off between monitoring and paying efficiency 
wages. The second a payment to prevent unionisation. The third the sharing of firm 
rents with their employees. Finally, in the presence of labour market frictions, 
counter to the competitive model, labour supply may not be perfectly elastic to any 
one firm, but rather upward sloping in the short run. The size-wage profile may 
then map out the labour supply curve. These explanations are discussed in more 
detail below. ' 
3.2.1 Differences in Productivity 
For unobserved skill differences to explain the relationship between employer size 
and wages, large employers must hire more able employees. Possible avenues for 
such behaviour are here discussed. 
Worker ability may be an input in production complementary with physical 
capital (Hamermesh, 1993) or the skill of capital (Reilly, 1995). If so plants with 
1 The term employer size will be used to denote applicability to either firm or plant size. 
2 For a review of the literature regarding the relationship between employer size and wages see Oi 
and Idson (1999) and Troske (1999). 
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greater capital usage, or more sophisticated technology, will hire more able 
employees. As large employers have greater output over which to amortise fixed 
costs and are liable to face lower input prices (via bulk purchase discounts) they are 
likely to be the more intensive users of capital, and hence hire more able employees. 
The use of capital may itself raise employee productivity, independent of any worker 
selection effect. 
Kremer (1993) builds a model explicitly assuming joint production and team 
working. Output (Y) is a multiplicative function of capital (K) and the labour inputs 
of the N team members (q). 
1N ß 
Y=AK af qi = AKa (glq2q3... 9 N 
)ß (1) 
j=l 
For a given team size, N, output is increasing in mean worker quality, and 
decreasing in its variance. It is then profitable for employers to match or segregate 
employees by skill. If teamwork is more prevalent in large plants or there are large 
fixed costs associated with hiring high wage employees (e. g. more formal 
recruitment process), large plants are more likely to select a high skill workforce. 
These models offer avenues by which large plants or firms may hire more 
able employees. Yet where the researcher has good controls for worker ability such 
sorting should not contaminate results. Oi and Idson (1999) propose that equally 
able workers are more productive in large establishments, either due to greater 
effort levels, or, for the service sector, the presence of increasing returns. In the 
latter case it is suggested the number of consumers (C per period) is an essential 
input in the firm's production function, Y= f(N, K, C). Minimum manning 
requirements create a reserve pool of labour for which utilisation rates and 
efficiency increase as C rises. 
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3.2.2 A Compensating Differential 
The compensating differential model (for a comprehensive discussion see Rosen, 
1986) extends the basic intuition that labour is a bad to allow the disamenity of 
employment to vary between jobs. Workers choose between bundles of 
employment characteristics including, pay, hours, the pace of work, etc. For 
simplicity, we restrict attention to wages and a composite term measuring the 
disamenity of all other aspects of employment (D). Utility for an employed 
individual is defined by U= u(C, D), where C is a composite consumption good 
and we assume U(. >O and UD<O. Finally, we define two types of job, small 
disamenity, Dti, and large disamenity, DI., where Dti < D1,. 
For an individual to work in the high disutility job their level of welfare must 
be at least as great as that from working in the alternative occupation. The individual 
is just compensated when utility levels are equalised: 
u(C5, DS) = u(C,,, D, ) (2) 
Hence Z=C, - Cs, defines the extra income the individual requires to work in a 
high disamenity plant, the shadow price. Let W,, - Ws be the actual wage 
differential. An individual will work in the L plant only if, WL - Ws > Z. Then, for 
equally able individuals, preferences, embodied by Z, define labour supply and 
equilibrium is established by wage adjustments where labour demand equals supply. 
For the model to explain the relationship between wages and establishment 
size, small plants must offer superior working conditions. The greater regimentation 
of production, lower levels of autonomy, and more impersonal working conditions 
within large employers may provide support for such a hypothesis. In equilibrium, 
however, workers with the smallest distaste for large plants will be matched to these 
workplaces. If there are a sufficiently large number of workers with little or no 
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distaste for large employers, even if working conditions are inferior to some, there 
will be no compensating wage differential. 
3.2.3 Institutional Explanations 
In many situations any one individual's contribution to production may be only 
imprecisely observed (e. g. within teams of workers). Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) 
assume that, equally able, workers are able to exert less effort than is optimal for the 
employer. To deter shirking firms face a trade off between, more intensive 
monitoring of worker performance, or, raising wages and firing those caught 
shirking. 
In a simplified version of the Shapiro-Stiglitz model a worker receives utility, 
U=W-e, where W is the wage and e the effort level. If they shirk (provide zero 
effort) they are detected with probability p. Upon detection they are immediately 
fired and receive the outside option V. The `No Shirking Condition' is then the 
wage that makes workers indifferent between shirking and providing effort. ' 
W-e= pV + (1-p)W (3) 
rearranging terms: 
ýXl=e +V (4) 
P 
Wages are then an increasing function of the required effort level and a decreasing 
function of the monitoring intensity. If large employers face higher monitoring 
costs, the greater wages in such establishments reflect a trade off for less intensive 
supervision. 
Alternative mechanisms do exist to counter the shirking problem. Deferred 
compensation schemes, where employees receive higher pay upon proof of non- 
3 Expected utility is equalised. We assume that when indifferent, effort is provided. 
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shirking behaviour, also provide workers with incentives to supply effort. The 
enforcement of such schemes is bedevilled by moral hazard and reputation 
problems, yet these seem less applicable to large employers. 
An alternative institutional explanation of the size-wage differential concerns 
union avoidance. Unions seek to bargain up wages, improve working conditions and 
regulate disciplinary procedures, and so raise labour costs. Employers then have an 
incentive to prevent union recognition. Assume Wu is the wage that would prevail if 
a union were recognised and c the cost per employee of running a campaign to 
obtain that recognition. Non-union firms can then pay a wage just sufficient to 
prevent unionisation, W= Wu, - c. If unions' costs of organising an workplace 
exhibit decreasing returns to scale, and these costs decline at a faster rate than firms' 
costs of opposition, then unions will optimally target large plants, who will pay 
higher wages to deter recognition. Within the UK, since the 1984 Trade Unions 
Act, ' there is no legal compulsion to recognise a union. Thus, whilst a union can still 
mount a campaign for recognition, the firm's cost of opposition would appear 
much reduced. 
Mellow (1982) hypothesised that the size-wage relation reflected the greater 
product market power and rents enjoyed by large firms. For reasons of union 
bargaining, insider power, or gift exchange, these rents are shared with employees in 
the form of higher wages. A simple relationship between wages (W) and profits (H) 









Where W* is the alternative wage and S the rent-sharing parameter. The observed 
size-wage relationship is then an artefact of failing to control for firm profitability. 
As of yet models have assumed frictionless job mobility and perfect 
information. These assumptions are now relaxed and the model of Burdett and 
Mortensen (1998) examined. Search frictions here take the form of lags in the arrival 
of information regarding job offers. The authors assume there exist a large fixed 
number of identical workers and firms and all jobs are identical apart from the wage 
paid. Job offers arrive at random intervals and employees are assumed to search 
randomly amongst employers. The unemployed accept any wage offer at least as 
large as their reservation wage, and the employed any offer in excess of their current 
wage. Equilibrium is achieved, subject to these search conditions, where firms are 
profit maximising and profits are equalised amongst all firms. 
The authors then show that any steady state equilibrium must be 
characterised by a non-degenerate distribution of wage offers, if the arrival rate of 
jobs is positive and finite. Intuitively, if all firms offer the same wage, W, any 
employer offering a slightly higher wage will attract a significantly larger labour force 
with only slightly diminished profits per worker. Competitive logic suggests such 
profitable deviations will occur until the wage is bid up to the marginal product and 
profits are zero. Yet it is then profitable to deviate to a lower wage, as the search 
frictions imply an employer will retain a positive labour force with positive profits. 
A unique wage is, hence, not profit maximising, and the non co-operative 




3.3 Existing Empirical Evidences 
3.3.1 Differences in Productivity 
Possibly the most influential study as to the source of the size-wage differential is 
that of Brown and Medoff (1989), who use two individual level data sets, the May 
1979 CPS and the 1972-77 QES panel, and three plant level surveys to examine 
alternative hypotheses. The effect of log workplace size upon wages is estimated to 
between 0.015 and 0.038 for the individual data, and 0.008 and 0.032 for the plant 
data. Whether these results reflect unobserved productivity differences is tested in 
two ways. 
First, the establishment size-wage relationship is examined for narrowly 
defined occupations, where there is less scope for productivity differences. 
Parameter estimates upon workplace size are essentially unchanged. Second, the 
authors estimate a fixed-effects model of the change in wages upon the change in 
establishment size, between 1972 and 1977. This removes all unobserved individual 
heterogeneity that remains constant over time. The estimated parameter upon log 
establishment size declines from 0.038 to 0.021, but remains statistically significant. 
The potential inconsistency caused by measurement error and the self-selection of 
job changers is investigated, by including dummies for job changers and voluntary 
job changers, but results are not affected. 
Idson and Fester (1990) examine unobserved ability differences using a 
Heckman type selectivity model. Using the May 1979 CPS, for males, the worker 
choice of establishment size is identified by whether the individual is, separated, 
never married, or a veteran. These are assumed to determine matching decisions, 
but not the wage, and are used to construct correction terms for worker selectivity, 
5 Unless otherwise stated studies examine US evidence. 
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added to wage regressions for each size category. Results predict selection inversely 
related to establishment size. That is the most able, with regards unobserved 
characteristics (education is held constant), exhibit a preference for small 
establishments. " Unobserved productivity differences would then imply the size- 
wage differential observed in the cross-section understates the true relationship. In 
contrast, for the UK, Main and Reilly (1993) identify the worker's choice of 
establishment by the number and age of dependent children, but find no evidence 
of non-random sorting of workers across plant size. 
Troske (1999) uses the Worker Establishment Characteristics Database 
(WECD), which matches census data to the employing workplace, to investigate 
four avenues for a positive correlation between employer size and worker quality. 
The complementarity of worker skill with physical capital, the skill of the manager, 
the skill of capital, and the skill of co-workers are examined. Only the skill of capital 
(new investment in IT) and the skill of the workforce (mean experience, proportion 
skilled and proportion with a degree) exert any substantive effect upon the size- 
wage correlation. The skill of the labour force accounts for 20 percent of both the 
establishment and firm size-wage premiums. The addition of the skill of capital 
implies they, together, explain some 45 percent of the firm size elasticity. 
Nevertheless, substantial wage variation by plant and firm size remains. 
Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) use a large French data set of workers 
and firms to examine fixed effect estimates. The authors suggest a weakness of 
Brown and Medoff (1989), and other similar first difference models, is the lack of 
controls for the employer. Inference is then consistent only if size is orthogonal to 
the omitted firm fixed effect (conditional on the person fixed effect). Models are 
estimated with controls for both person and firm unobserved heterogeneity. Abowd 
6 Idson and Fester propose this reflects a taste for independence. 
77 
Employer Sitie 
et al find the firm size-average (estimated) person fixed effect is a more powerful 
predictor of the firm size-wage relationship than is the firm size-average (estimated) 
firm fixed effect. Nevertheless, the employer effect is an important and non- 
negligible factor in explaining the size-wage correlation. 
Two criticisms remain. First, the worker and firm fixed-effects are identified 
under the assumption of exogenous worker mobility. The self-selection of 
individuals who change employers may then bias results. Second, as Hamermesh 
(1999) has pointed out, with limited controls for worker characteristics such an 
estimation procedure may place too much emphasis upon unobserved individual, 
rather than employer, heterogeneity. 
Finally, Winter-Ebmer and Zweimuller (1999) use the Swiss Labour Force 
Survey (SLFS) to identify the extent of bias that endogenous mobility causes in 
fixed effects estimates. Following a methodology similar to Murphy and Topel 
(1987), they examine what proportion of the cross-section wage differential workers 
actually capture when they move between workplace size categories. If the cross- 
section coefficients capture worker ability, wage changes will be unrelated to 
employer size and the proportion of the predicted differential captured zero. In fact, 
43 percent of the wage gains predicted, by cross-section estimates, are realised. 
Endogenous mobility may bias results if the wage gains from moving to larger 
plants far outweigh the losses from moving to a smaller establishment. The 
evidence, though, suggests approximately symmetric effects. 
The studies documented suggest individual heterogeneity, does explain a 
portion of the size-wage relationship. Yet it does not seem to provide a single 
complete argument for its existence. 
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3.3.2 A Compensating Differential 
Brown and Medoff (1989) examine whether variations in working conditions can 
explain the relationship between establishment size and wages using the 1972-77 
QES data. The authors characterise 42 working conditions, of which only 21 are 
identified as inferior in large plants. Moreover, the addition of these variables to the 
wage equation has little impact upon the estimated coefficients upon workplace size. 
The authors then analyse quit rates and employer tenure, as indicators of well-being. 
Large establishments are estimated to have a lower rate of quits and greater years of 
tenure, holding wages constant, suggesting large plants offer superior working 
conditions. This may, in part, capture the effect of higher rates of internal mobility 
within large establishments. Indeed when job, as opposed to employer, tenure is 
analysed plant size enters positively but is not statistically well determined. 
Idson (1990) offers an alternative examination of whether large plants offer 
inferior working conditions, though this is not related to wage determination. The 
author hypothesises that within large plants there exist more formalised and 
regimented working practice. Using the 1977 QES Idson demonstrates for a range 
of measure of work rigidity that establishment size does indeed exert a positive and 
statistically significant effect. In addition employer size is estimated to have a robust 
negative effect upon job satisfaction, net of wages and fringe benefits. Adding the 
measures of work rigidity captures some of the size-satisfaction correlation, 
attenuating the coefficient by over a third, but the plant size effect remains 
statistically robust. 
For the UK, Green et al (1996) find that 67 percent of respondents in the 
1989 British Social Attitudes Survey would prefer to work in a small workplace. 
Furthermore, work in the largest establishments is observed to be more boring, 
dangerous, unhealthy and unpleasant, but also less physical. However, echoing 
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earlier work by Main and Reilly (1993), when these job attributes are entered in a 
wage equation they are, generally, statistically insignificant or incorrectly signed. 
The evidence as to whether working conditions are superior in small 
establishments is then mixed, with little evidence they explain the size-wage 
correlation. 
3.3.3 Institutional Explanations 
Pearce (1990) examines the relationship between tenure, unions, workplace size and 
wages using the May 1979 CPS. The estimated size-wage premium is observed to 
be larger in non-unionised plants and in lightly unionised occupations, whilst for 
non-unionised employees the industry union density exerts a well-determined 
positive effect upon wages only in the largest plants. Such evidence seems to 
support a union avoidance hypothesis. Yet, as Brown and Medoff (1989) state, that 
the size-wage relation exists in unionised plants suggests this cannot be the only 
explanation. Brown and Medoff also examine groups of workers, within industries, 
where the threat of unionisation is minimal, where union avoidance should play a 
negligible role. Estimates are very similar to those for all non-union employees. 
Green et al (1996) observe similar evidence for the UK, using the 1983 General 
Household Survey (GHS) and the 1991 wave of the BHPS. 
Troske (1999) tests the hypothesis that the size-wage relation represents a 
trade off between wages and monitoring costs, by controlling for the monitoring 
intensity (the number of supervisors per employee) within the plant. Whilst the 
monitoring intensity enters negatively and statistically significantly the estimated 
firm and establishment size parameters are essentially unchanged, and monitoring 
intensity is found to be largely uncorrelated with employer size. Troske also 
examines the impact of a plant's product market power upon the estimated wage- 
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size differential. Whilst the measures of market power (the Herfindahl index, value 
added per worker, and profits per worker) enter positively they do not disturb the 
parameters upon firm or plant size. 
Green et al (1996) suggest the model of labour market frictions of Burdett 
and Mortensen (1998) is akin to a model of dynamic monopsony. The authors 
conjecture such monopsony power will be greater, and the wage-size relation more 
pronounced, for women, than for men, and for non-union employees. ' The 
evidence from the 1983 GHS and the 1991 BHPS is generally supportive. van den 
Berg and Ridder (1998) use Dutch data to estimate the Burdett-Mortensen (1998) 
search model. Whilst the empirical model is found to provide a good fit of the 
observed wage distribution, the estimated structural parameters suggest search 
frictions are relatively small. Individuals then move quite rapidly to more highly paid 
jobs, and most wages within a segment are similar to the competitive wage. This 
would seem to limit the extent to which this model can generate a positive 
relationship between employer size and wages. Nevertheless, search frictions are 
found to explain around 20 percent of the variation in wages. 
3.4 Data 
The data used in this study come from three sources, the British Household Panel 
Survey (BHPS), the Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS) and the 
National Child Development Study (NCDS). 
The BHPS is nationally representative sample of more than 5,000 British 
households, containing over 10,000 adult individuals, interviewed late each year 
1 For this to be consistent with the model of search frictions these groups have to participate in 
segmented labour markets. 
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from 1991 to 1998 (for a further discussion see Appendix 1). These data include 
detailed information regarding earnings, education, employment characteristics, 
demographics, and job satisfaction. Attention is here restricted to those individuals 
aged less than 65 and in employment at the survey date, approximately 5,000 
respondents in any one year. 
The WERS is a cross-section survey that was completed between October 
1997 and June 1998. It is a random sample" of around 2,200 British establishments 
with ten or more employees. Within these workplaces 25 worker questionnaires 
were randomly allocated amongst the employees. For establishments with less than 
25 employees the population of workers was sampled, yielding approximately 
28,000 individual responses matched to 1,800 workplaces (for a fuller discussion of 
sampling issues see Appendix 2). The employee data includes questions on earnings, 
education, workplace characteristics and a rich source of information on worker 
attitudes. These data are augmented by a management questionnaire regarding 
establishment characteristics. 
The NCDS is a random survey of individuals born in Britain in the first 
week of March 1958. Subsequent interviews were completed when respondents 
were aged 7,11,16,23 and 33. The first three waves contains detailed data upon 
education (obtained both from the child and the school) and parental background. 
The last two waves contain data concerning earnings and employment 
characteristics. Focus is here restricted to those individuals in employment at the 
last interview date. 
e The survey population excludes establishments in the following SIC (1992) divisions: A 
(Agriculture, hunting and forestry), B (fishing), C (Mining and quarrying), P (Private households 
with employed persons), and Q (Extra-territorial organisations). 
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3.4.1 The Job Satisfaction Data 
Within the BHPS working respondents are asked to rate their level of satisfaction 
with respect to seven aspects of their employment: promotion prospects, total pay, 
relations with supervisor, job security, ability to work on own initiative, the actual 
work itself, and, the hours of work. Each of these categories is assigned a rank 
between 1 and 7,1 representing `not satisfied at all', 7 indicating `completely 
satisfied' and the numbers from 2 to 6 corresponding to intermediate levels of 
satisfaction (where 4 is `neither satisfied or dissatisfied'). ' Finally, and subsequent to 
these seven questions, a question was asked: 
`All things considered, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your present job overall using the 
same 1-7 scale? " 
The method in which the questions were asked suggests individuals 
evaluated many attributes of their job package when responding. It seems probable 
this approach will elicit responses more closely approximating satisfaction at the 
workplace, than would a simple direct question. The responses to this last question 
form the basis of analysis of job satisfaction within the BHPS. 
Unfortunately there is no comparable overall job satisfaction question in the 
WERS. There are, however, analogous prelimianry questions, with respect to 
influence over the job, total pay, sense of achievement, and, the respect received 
from supervisors. Each of these questions was answered on a1 to 5 scale, where 1 
corresponded to the highest level of satisfaction and 5 the lowest. For ease of 
comparison with the BHPS this scale was reversed, so 1 represents the lowest level 
of well-being (very dissatisfied), 5 the highest (very satisfied) and 2 to 4 intermediate 
9 In wave one the categories 1,4 and 7 are given the descriptions outlined, whilst 2,3,5 and 6 are 
left unlabeled. From wave two onwards all values were given a label, with the descriptors 




values. Analysis within the WERS then focuses upon these four satisfaction 
questions. "' 
3.4.2 Comparison of Satisfaction Responses: Interpersonal and over time 
Job satisfaction reflects both objective circumstances, working conditions, and 
subjective factors, aspirations and expectations. This subjectivity has led some 
economists to be sceptical of the concept's worth. Scores may be random draws and 
interpersonal comparisons meaningless. Yet one may then not expect to observe the 
systematic patterns of correlation, between job satisfaction and observed events and 
actions, that have been documented. Satisfaction has been found to influence 
subsequent labour market behaviour. It is a significant predictor of quits (Freeman, 
1978) and is negatively related to absenteeism, non- and counter-productive work. 
Furthermore, it is related, in the expected direction, with other indicators of well- 
being: poor mental health, length of life and coronary heart disease (see Clark and 
Oswald, 1996). Such a pattern of results can probably not be reconciled with a 
purely idiosyncratic variable. 
A more rigorous argument in favour of the ability of the researcher to make 
use of satisfaction data is found in Kahneman et al (1997) who argue that functions 
that relate subjective intensity to physical variables are similar for different types of 
people. They suggest the well-being of any event have a basic scale, pleasant, 
neutral, and unpleasant. Other scales may expand the positive or negative categories 
to a finer degree but the neutral case is a constant. It is argued the distinctiveness of 
this neutral value provides a focal point that allows some confidence in matching 
subjective experiences across time for a given individual and to support 
interpersonal comparisons. 
10 For an alternative discussion and approach to the satisfaction data see Rose (2000). 
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Whilst it has been suggested that satisfaction data do capture well-being, 
have descriptive power and can be compared between individuals and over time, 
they are nevertheless imperfect. They are qualitative, not quantitative, often banded 
and there remains considerable potential for measurement error, though this would 
be less easily handled if satisfaction were to be used as an independent variable. 
3.5 Results 
The measures of employer size adopted here are the number of employees within 
the establishment and the number of employees within the employing firm. To 
examine the impact of firm size upon wages it seems natural to focus upon private 
sector organisations and results that follow restrict attention to that sample. 
3.5.1 Summary Statistics 
The properties of the data sets are investigated in Tables 3.1a to 3.1c, and summary 
statistics presented. We define a small employer as an establishment with less than 
25 employees for the BHPS and WERS, and less than 26 employees for the NCDS. 
Within the BHPS, employees within small establishments are, on average, 
lower paid, " and have slightly lower levels of potential experience (age - years of 
schooling - six) and job tenure. Employees in large plants are more educated and 
more likely to have a degree or vocational qualification. At least with respect to 
observed characteristics, large workplaces are observed to be more skilled. Workers 
within large establishments are also more likely to be male, and to be working in a 
union recognised plant. 
Where hourly pay is defined as weekly pay divided by overtime adjusted hours, H+1.50T. 
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The WERS samples establishments with ten or more employees, so there is 
likely to be a bias towards large employers in these data. This is reflected in the very 
high percentage of individuals working in plants with 25 or more employees. 
Results are, however, substantially similar to those for the BHPS. Workers in large 
establishments are, on average, more highly paid, have greater tenure, are slightly 
more experienced (here measured by age), and are slightly more educated. 
Employees in large plants are again more likely to be male, and to be working in a 
union recognised plant. 
Table 3.1c examines the NCDS cohort when aged 33. The patterns in 
sample means are comparable to those for the BHPS, with interpretation as before. 
Large establishments employ individuals who receive higher wages, who are more 
educated and have greater levels of tenure, and who are more likely to be unionised. 
3.5.2 Estimation strategy 
To investigate issues in more detail we turn to regression analysis. Wages are here 
modeled as a function of personal characteristics (such as education, experience, 
gender and race) and employer characteristics (e. g. establishment size, firm size, 
industry, etc). Hourly pay12 for individual i in time period" t and employer j, is then 
expressed in log-linear form as: 
wh=7{-hß+zny+E; n i=1,..., n (6) 
t=1, .., T 
j=j(i, t)=1, .., m. 
12 The WERS pay data are observed only as a grouped variable. Here mid-points are taken and 
pay approximated as continuous. Estimates of pay equations using these mid-point and the more 
robust Grouped regression method of Stewart (1983a) yield practically identical predictions. 
Results were found not to be sensitive to alternative corrections at the upper tail. 
13 Respectively, t=1 for the NCDS and for the WERS, and t=1, ..., 8 
for the BHPS. 
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Where, w is log hourly pay, x the vector of worker characteristics, z the vector of 
employer characteristics, 6 the conformable error term with mean zero and constant 
variance, and 0 and y the vectors of parameters to be estimated. 
For the BHPS, models are also estimated which account for the, potential, 
unobserved heterogeneity of employees, by including a person-specific effect upon 
wages (f) that is constant over time and potentially correlated with observed 
characteristics: 
wit=x'1 +f; +E; c (7) 
(For ease of presentation we subsume employer characteristics into x and drop the j 
subscript. ) Implicitly this assumes a common market return to unobserved skill. The 
model can then be estimated by taking first differences (subtracting lagged values): 
(Wit 
- wit-, 






AWit = AXit 
F' 
+ AF-j, (9) 
This methodology removes all, observed and unobserved, individual heterogeneity 
that remains constant over time and inference is driven by time-varying 
characteristics. 
3.5.3 Employer Size and Wages 
The effect of employer size upon wages is examined in Tables 3.2,3.3 and 3.4, for 
the BHPS, WERS and NCDS respectively. Estimates generally match standard 
earnings equation predictions and attention is here restricted to the coefficients 
upon employer size. 
For the BHPS, workplace size is identified by a banded categorical variable. 
The regression evidence, in Table 3.2, suggests hourly pay rises monotonically with 
establishment size, and all coefficients are observed to be statistically significantly 
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different from zero. Moving from a workplace with one or two employees to one 
with 1000 or more is predicted to increase wages by some 44 percent. 14 The 
comparable figure estimated by Green et al (1996) for the first wave of the BHPS 
was 54 percent. 
Estimates for the WERS instead enter workplace size as a continuous 
variable, in natural logarithms. The coefficient upon log workplace employment is 
estimated to be 0.036. When the workplace size bands in the BHPS were replaced 
by a continuous proxy (using mid-points) the coefficient estimate was 0.041.15 
When attention is restricted to the WERS sampling frame the estimate, for the 
BHPS, is 0.035, suggesting comparable estimates between the data sets. 
Within the WERS data the size of the employing organisation is also 
known. " The addition of this variable to the regression equation (column two, 
Table 3.3) attenuates the plant size coefficient, from 0.036 to 0.031, but the 
parameter remains statistically robust. The relationship between wages and firm size, 
holding constant plant size, is here estimated to be concave, with pay highest in 
medium size firms and statistically insignificantly different between the largest and 
smallest companies. The firm size-wage premium here peaks at 4.8 percent for 
employees working in firms with between 1,000 and 10,000 workers. 
3.5.4 Comparability with previous evidence 
How do these estimates compare with other UK and US evidence? For the UK, 
Green et al (1996) estimated the coefficient on log workplace size to lie in the range 
14 Calculated as: percentage effect = exp ((i) - 1. 15 The use of employee responses and mid-points may introduce measurement error into the plant 
size variable, and hence cause attenuation bias. Albak et al (1998) investigate this issue using 
Scandinavian data, and find any bias to be negligible. This is due to the, observed, negative 
correlation of the error with true plant size. This mean reversion acts to offset attenuation bias. 
16 Both workplace size and firm size are employer reported. 
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0.037 to 0.053, using the 1990 WIRS establishment-level survey. " For the US, 
Brown and Medoff (1989) observed a range of estimates lying between 0.008 and 
0.038, whilst the comparable estimate for Troske (1999) is 0.047. An alternative 
comparison is to examine the predicted wage for a worker moving from a plant with 
log employment one standard deviation below the mean to a plant with log 
employment one standard deviation above the mean. For the WERS data"this 
wage gain is predicted to be approximately 10 percent. Brown and Medoff (1989) 
estimated a wage gain of between 6 and 15 percent for the US. Estimates then 
seem comparable to previous UK and US evidence. 
With respect to results concerning the size of the firm, Brown and Medoff 
(1989) also observe a more muted firm size effect upon wages, compared to the 
establishment size-wage premium. The parameter upon log firm size is estimated to 
be between 0.01 and 0.013 and in around half the cases is not statistically different 
from zero. 
3.5.5 Labour Quality Differences: Correlates of Productivity 
Along observed dimensions large workplaces employ more skilled - educated - 
workers (see Tables 3.1a to 3.1c). Whether the addition of a richer set of skill 
variables can then eliminate the size-wage correlation is investigated in Table 3.4, for 
the NCDS. Scores from reading and maths tests when respondents where aged 
seven and eleven (normalised to a percentage score) are assumed to capture aspects 
of worker ability. Test scores at age seven may reflect innate ability. Those at age 
eleven, the effects of social background upon schooling. An alternative correlate of 
r This is the predecessor survey to the WERS, but does not include employee data and sampled 
only plants with at least 25 employees. Worker hours information is poor and the authors 
estimates equations upon weekly pay. 
18 Weighted mean of log workplace size equals 4.97. Standard deviation equals 1.57. 
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worker ability, whether the respondent was an IT user in 1991, is also examined. 
These controls are in addition to education qualification dummies. 
The first two columns of Table 3.4 report estimates for the sample of all 
private sector employees, the next three columns those respondents with non- 
missing test scores. Coefficients with respect to workplace size and IT use are 
comparable in both samples. Workers in the largest size category are predicted to 
earn 36 percent more than otherwise comparable individuals working in a plant with 
less than ten workers. When we control for computer use this falls to 33 percent, 
but the establishment size coefficients remain robust. IT use itself is associated with 
a statistically significant wage premium of 12 percent. This is likely to combine both 
returns to new technology and labour quality variations. 19 
Test scores, both at age 7 and at age 11, enter with the expected sign. Wages 
are estimated to be 12 percent higher for those who answered all maths questions 
correctly at age 7, relative to those with zero scores. This effect is statistically 
significantly different from zero. The wage gain to reading ability at age 7 is 2 
percent and not well determined. The effect of mathematics and reading scores at 
age 11 are both statistically insignificant at conventional confidence levels, with 
wage gains of around 5 and 7 percent respectively. Conditional upon education, 
childhood test scores appear to be uncorrelated with plant size, as parameter 
estimates upon workplace size are essentially unaffected, and if anything increase, 
after their introduction. 20 This remains true when we do not condition upon IT use. 
Three potential correlates of labour quality are examined for the WERS in 
Table 3.5, the skill of co-workers, the use of technology, and the (average) time 
required for a worker to become proficient at the job. The skill of the workplace is 
19 The evidence of Entorf et al (1999) favours the latter view. 
20 When education is not included in the regression, test scores are correlated with establishment 
size and IT use in the expected way. 
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measured by the proportion of the sampled employees, within the plant, with 
degrees, with A or O-levels, with five years or more tenure, and aged 40 or more. As 
these are sample means we restrict attention to workplaces with at least 15 worker 
responses. All of these measures bar the age term enter the wage equation with a 
positive and statistically robust effect. The impact of these variables upon the 
establishment size parameter is to reduce it by some 15 percent, from 0.026 to 
0.022, though it remains well determined. The estimated firm size coefficients are 
attenuated by around 30 percent, suggesting they, partly, capture the effect of 
worker skill. 
The measure of technology use adopted is whether the respondent has 
access to email at work. As with the NCDS, this enters the wage equation positively 
and statistically significantly, with an associated premium of 10 percent. The 
workplace size parameter is attenuated by approximately 13 percent, but remains 
robust. The estimated firm size coefficients fall by some 30 percent, but remain 
jointly statistically significant. The time required for job proficiency is derived from 
the WERS manager questionnaire, and records the length of time, on average, it 
takes a new worker (entering the most common occupation) to reach the 
proficiency levels of an incumbent employee. Whilst earnings are, here, increasing in 
the length of time to proficiency, the coefficients upon plant and firm size are, in 
essence, unaffected. 
The correlates of labour quality examined, here, then provide some support 
for the unobserved productivity hypothesis. 
3. S. 6 Labour Quality Differences: Fixed Effects Estimates 
An alternative method of investigating the role of unobserved worker skill is to 
analyse how wages change over time. Such a technique removes unobserved 
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heterogeneity that is time invariant. This approach is followed in Table 3.6 for the 
BHPS. Column one estimates the wage equation for the sample of private sector 
employees observed in two consecutive periods - the unbalanced panel. Results are 
virtually identical to previously. Column two estimates the model transformed into 
first differences. The establishment size parameters are now considerably 
attenuated, and the largest size category is associated with an hourly pay premium of 
5 percent. This is, however, statistically significantly different from zero at the five 
percent confidence level. This suggests unobserved person heterogeneity may be the 
major determinant of the establishment size-wage differential. 
Measurement error may, however, contaminate estimates. Coefficients are 
identified by the change in wages of those individuals who change size category. 
Observed `false' size changes then reduce the signal to noise ratio and attenuate 
coefficient estimates. In columns three and four of Table 3.6, attention is restricted 
to workers who have changed jobs and whose response (at time t) regarding the size 
of establishment in the previous year (t-1) matches their actual response at that time. 
For these individuals, it is proposed, an observed size change is more likely to be 
true. Cross-section parameter estimates, for this sample, are presented in column 
three and are comparable to those in column one. When the model is estimated in 
first differences (column four) the estimated plant size-wage effect is, however, 
nearly three times as large as that observed for the unbalanced panel (column two). 
A worker in the largest size category is predicted to earn a wage premium of 14 
percent, relative to the smallest establishments. Coefficients are, however, not 
statistically well determined. 
Whilst these estimates seem to indicate the importance of accounting for 
measurement error, endogenous job mobility may bias results. If voluntary job 
mobility is predominantly characterised by individuals moving successively from 
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small to large workplaces for higher pay, which reflects productivity differences, 
estimates will overstate the return to employer size. Yet where voluntary job 
mobility occurs both into small and large employers, the direction of any bias is 
uncertain. 
The impact of controlling for firm heterogeneity is examined in Table 3.7. 
For a sub-sample of respondents in the BHPS, in 1991 and 1994, we are able to link 
the employee (via the company name) to their employing organisation's company 
accounts data. 21 These data are potentially biased toward older and larger 
employers, though not necessarily establishments, for whom company accounts 
data are available (see chapter 2, section 4). Given a relatively small number of 
observations, approximately 400 individuals, the establishment size dummies are 
consolidated into a smaller number of categories. u Furthermore, as these data are 
limited to two periods, attention is restricted to the balanced panel. 
Column one of Table 3.7 estimates wage equations for the BHPS, for the 
years 1991 and 1994, column two of Table 3.7 for the sub-sample with linked 
employer data. The linked sample is found to exhibit lower, but still substantial and 
statistically significant, returns to workplace size. The role of unobserved firm 
heterogeneity upon pay is examined in column four, and a firm fixed effect entered 
in the wage equation. This is assumed common to all workers within the 
organisation and captures all effects of the firm, upon pay, that remain constant 
over time, and also the mean person effect within the firm. 2' Parameter estimates 
suggest the higher pay in the very largest plants, in the linked sample, do partially 
capture an employer effect. In the cross-section, plants with 1000 or more workers 
21 Data made available by Andrew Hildreth. The company accounts data were originally obtained 
from the Dun and Bradstreet files and are thus not restricted to publicly listed companies. 
22 Industry is, here, coded at the one-digit level, for all other equations the two-digit level. 
23 This is particularly problematic for these data as for 56 percent of observations only 1 person is 
observed within the firm. 
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are predicted to pay wages 27 percent higher than establishments with less than ten 
employees. This figure falls to 17 percent when firm effects are added. Whether this 
reflects the mean skill of workers or a pure employer differential cannot, here, be 
ascertained. Nevertheless, the effect of workplace size upon wages remains sizeable 
and statistically well determined suggesting it is, here, robust to firm heterogeneity. 
Controls for unobserved person heterogeneity are added in columns five 
and six of Table 3.7. Column five displays the result of estimating a first difference 
model for the BHPS between 1991 and 1994. Examining the change in wages over 
a longer time span has increased - or rather lessened the decline of - the estimated 
response of wages to workplace size, compared to Table 3.6. The wage premium 
associated with working in the largest plants, relative to the smallest, is estimated to 
fall by approximately a half, from 37 percent in the cross-section estimates, to 19 
percent once the model is estimated in first differences. Results remain statistically 
significant. This may be due to observing a greater number of true changes in 
workplace size, and more changes in size within the same workplace, increasing the 
signal in the model. 
Column six controls for unobserved heterogeneity of both workers and 
firms, in the sample with employer data. It specifies a worker fixed effect specific to 
each worker-firm pair, and examines how an individual's wages change over time 
within the same employer. This does not eliminate the possibility that endogenous 
mobility contaminates results, though it must now be associated with internal 
mobility or with exiting and rejoining the employer within the three-year period. 
The addition of controls for person, as well as firm, heterogeneity further weakens 
the predicted size-wage relation, which is no longer statistically well determined. The 
wage premium in the largest establishments is, however, still observed to be non- 
negligible at around 10 percent. 
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The evidence is then supportive of the hypothesis that the relationship 
between wages and establishment size captures, to some degree, unobserved worker 
quality differences. A significant unexplained effect does, however, remain. 
3.5.7 Alternative Explanations of the Employer size-wage Correlation 
Alternative explanations for a positive relationship between employer size and 
wages are investigated in Table 3.7 and Table 3.8. 
Table 3.7 examines the BHPS sub-sample for which employer data are 
available. The addition of more refined controls for firm characteristics, the firm's 
capital to labour ratio and profits per employee, attenuates the estimated 
establishment size coefficients by around 25 percent, but they remain sizeable and 
statistically significant. The coefficient upon firm employment is, here, estimated to 
be weak and statistically insignificantly different from zero. Experimentation with 
non-linear terms did not alter this conclusion. The log capital-to-labour ratio is 
found to exert a well-determined positive effect upon wages, with an estimated 
parameter of 0.053. Profits per worker enters pay positively and statistically 
significantly with an estimated parameter of 0.05024, despite the potential downward 
bias due to the simultaneity of wages and profits. This is consistent with behaviour 
observed, for individual data, by Hildreth (1998) and Troske (1999). 
Column five of Table 3.7 adds controls for firm heterogeneity, by including 
a firm fixed effect upon pay. The parameter upon firm profitability is driven to zero 
whilst the coefficient upon the capital-to-labour ratio is just over a third of that 
observed previously. Both are statistically insignificant. As noted in the previous 
section, the workplace size parameters are here largely robust to the inclusion of 
firm, but possibly not worker, fixed effects. The size-wage relation then largely 
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remains after conditioning upon firm characteristics, and rent-sharing does not seem 
to offer a convincing explanation for the establishment size-wage differential. 
The monitoring hypothesis is analysed in Table 3.8 using the WERS data. 
The establishment's monitoring intensity is here measured by the proportion of 
supervisors amongst non-managerial staff (as defined by the manager), and attention 
is restricted to employees within non-managerial and non-professional occupations. 
The plant's monitoring intensity is found to enter the wage equation negatively and 
statistically significantly. In line with results observed for the US (Troske, 1999), 
more intensive supervision predicts lower pay. However, the coefficients upon 
establishment and firm size are largely unchanged, and indeed slightly increase. The 
monitoring hypothesis does not then appear, here, a convincing avenue by which to 
explain the relationship between employer size and pay. 
The union avoidance hypothesis is here largely discounted, as the 
establishment size-wage differential was observed as positive and statistically well 
determined in the union sample. Moreover, robust positive effects were observed 
amongst non-unionised workplaces within industries with a very low union intensity 
(the wholesale and retail trades, hotels and catering), where union threat effects 
should be negligible. " The search model of Burdett and Mortensen (1998) cannot 
here be directly analysed, as we lack good measures of search costs or monopsony 
power. However, existing evidence is not necessarily consistent with such a model 
explaining the relationship between employer size and wages. The estimates of van 
den Berg and Ridder (1998) suggest search frictions, which generate employers' 
monopsony power and the positive size-wage profile, are small. Brown and Medoff 
(1989) also find no evidence of a weaker size-pay relationship where the employer is 
24 The estimated elasticity of wages with respect to profitability, at the mean, is then 0.022. 
25 These results were found both for the WERS and BHPS data, and match the earlier findings of 
Brown and Medoff (1989) and Green et al (1996). 
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small relative to the hiring pool, where monopsony power would be expected to be 
smaller. 
3.5.8 Job satisfaction and Worker Well-being 
The potential for compensating differentials to explain the relationship between 
employer size and wages is now examined using job satisfaction data. 
Worker well-being is modeled as a function of personal characteristics (such 
as education, experience, gender and race), employer characteristics (e. g. 
establishment size, firm size, industry, etc) and variables associated with the labour 
contract (income, hours of work, occupation). Job satisfaction for individual i in 
time t and employer j, is then expressed: 
s*; n=y; ncp+x;, ßß+zny+u; n i=1,..., n (10) 
t=1, .., T 
i=j(i, t)=1,..., m. 
Where, s* is the satisfaction variable, y the vector of pay and hours variables, x the 
vector of worker characteristics, z the vector of employer characteristics, u the 
conformable error term with mean zero and constant variance, and cp, 0 and y the 
vectors of parameters to be estimated u' 
The BHPS and WEBS satisfaction data are observed as ordered categorical 
responses (on a scale 1,2, ..., K). These map latent well-being (s*) into discrete 
scores (s) as below: 
s;, j=k ifµA_, <s*<_µkVk=1,..., K (11) 
Estimation is then by the Ordered Probit technique of McKelvey and Zavoina 
(1975). This imposes the restrictions; g.: 5 µ, <_ ... <_ µK; µo = -C*; µK = 00; and the 
26 As with all models of job satisfaction this implicitly assumes responses are cardinal. 
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normalisation µ, =0 and QL = 1. The probability of observing a response within a 
category, k, is then: 
Pr (s = k) = (1)(K, - Ytt; (P - Xi; ß-Z,, Y) - (D( ; -I - Y1ý; (p - xi,; 
ß-z 'Y) (12) 
Where, c(. ) is the standard normal distribution function and parameters are 
estimated by maximum likelihood. Positive coefficients indicate higher levels of 
satisfaction are more likely. 
Table 3.9a estimates job satisfaction equations for the BHPS data. Column 
one reports that levels of overall of job satisfaction in large plants are statistically 
significantly lower than within establishments with one or two employees. The 
relationship exhibits a moderate u-shape, with satisfaction lowest in medium-sized 
plants. 27 Table 3.9b reports the marginal effects of the estimates. Compared to 
working in a plant with 1 to 2 employees, an employee working in a plant with 
between 100 and 199 workers is predicted to be 1.6 percent more likely to respond 
with the lowest level of satisfaction and -9.4 percent less likely the highest. For 
employees in the largest plants, 1000 workers or more, the comparable figures are 
1.2 percent and -7.9 percent respectively. 
Column two of Table 3.9a demonstrates that the higher levels of pay in large 
plants do mitigate some of this dissatisfaction, when pay is omitted the size- 
satisfaction profile flattens but remains statistically well determined. 
The job characteristic's with which dissatisfaction, within large plants, is felt 
most strongly is examined in Table 3.10. In column one overall satisfaction is the 
dependent variable. In columns two to eight, the item-specific satisfaction 
questions. In all cases there is a negative effect of workplace size upon satisfaction, 
which is nearly always most pronounced in medium size establishments. Only with 
27 If we instead estimate the model for the years 1992 to 1997, omitting the 1991 survey, very 
similar results are produced. 
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respect to job security does workplace size exert a negligible and statistically 
insignificant effect. The effects upon satisfaction with hours and promotion 
prospects are, however, less pronounced. Dissatisfaction within large plants is here 
most conspicuous with respect to aspects of employment that can be broadly 
related to the degree of worker freedom - the use of initiative and the work itself. 
The WERS satisfaction data are examined in Table 3.11 a. Satisfaction with 
respect to influence over the job and the sense of achievement both exhibit the 
negative and statistically significant effect of workplace size observed for the BHPS. 
For satisfaction with pay and the respect of management, the establishment size 
coefficient is negative, but not well determined. This in part reflects the WERS 
exclusion of workplaces with less than 10 employees. For the BHPS (Table 3.10), 
satisfaction with respect to pay is relatively flat as we move from a plant with 10 to 
24 workers to an establishments with over a 1000 employees. 
Table 3.11b examines the influence of firm size upon satisfaction. All four 
columns show a marked, and jointly statistically significant, negative effect of firm 
size upon satisfaction. The estimates also suggest a considerable part of the 
dissatisfaction associated with large plants, in Table 3.11a, is actually attributable to 
the size of the parent firm. For both satisfaction with influence and satisfaction with 
achievement, after holding firm size constant, the establishment size parameter is 
attenuated by over a half and is no longer statistically significantly different from 
zero. For satisfaction with pay and satisfaction the respect of management, the 
effect of plant size is indeed now positive, though not statistically well determined. 
Alternative measures of well-being are analysed, for the WERS, in Table 
3.12a. Respondents were asked to state their degree of agreement with four 
statements regarding their job; whether it required hard work, whether they lacked 
time, whether they felt secure in the workplace, and whether they worried about 
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their job. Estimation is by the Ordered Probit technique and positive coefficients 
signify agreement is more likely. Conditions appear, if anything, superior in large 
plants. Employees in large plants are statistically significantly less likely to agree that 
they lack time or worry, and more likely to feel secure. Results with respect to hard 
work, whilst negative, are, however, not robust. The effect of firm size is again to 
reduce well-being, as employees are more likely to agree they worry, feel their job 
requires hard work, or lack time and disagree that they feel secure. Results are, 
however, statistically well determined only in the last two cases. 
Table 3.12b examines the extent of worker influence over the job. Again 
equations are estimated by Ordered Probit. Positive coefficients represent greater 
worker influence. Complementary to the evidence for the BHPS, in Table 3.10, 
large employers allow less influence over the range of tasks, the pace of work, and 
the method by which work is done. Whilst the coefficient upon workplace size is 
robust only with respect to influence over the job tasks, the firm size effects enter 
negatively and statistically significantly in all three cases. 
The evidence suggests firm size exerts a marked, and statistically significant, 
negative effect upon worker well-being, whilst establishment size exerts a rather 
weaker influence. Possible rationales for such a fording may lay in more 
prescriptive, rigid, and bureaucratic working practices in large organisations. These 
may facilitate centralised management of a large organisation, but potentially may 
also lead to diminished levels of involvement and status. Some evidence consistent 
with this hypothesis is observed in Table 3.12b, large firms allow significantly less 
worker influence over the job. Furthermore, the addition of the worker influence 
variables to the job satisfaction equations attenuated the coefficients upon firm size, 
but there remained a large, and statistically significant, negative firm size effect. A 
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complete explanation of the source of this firm size effect is, nevertheless, not here 
possible. 
3.5.9 Can employee dissatisfaction explain the employer size-wage 
premium? 
Within both the BHPS and WERS, large employers are associated with lower levels 
of worker well-being for otherwise comparable individuals. Yet it is doubtful, given 
the evidence here, that a compensating-differential-for-size theory can explain the 
establishment size-wage differential, though it may help to explain the firm size- 
wage premium. 
For the BHPS, we observe a u-shaped relationship between workplace size 
and job satisfaction, with well-being lowest in medium-sized plants. Indeed, overall 
satisfaction scores are relatively flat amongst plants with more than 50 employees. 
In contrast wages increase monotonically with establishment size. The 
compensating differential explanation may then have a role in explaining the lower 
wages observed for the very smallest plants, but seems limited in its ability to 
explain the positive relationship between wages and plant size observed for 
medium-sized and large establishments. 
The WERS samples workplaces with 10 or more employees, and so omits 
the very smallest establishments were satisfaction is highest. Nevertheless, within 
these medium-sized and large workplaces, worker well-being is shown to be lower 
in large plants. Yet once we condition upon firm size no independent, and 
statistically robust, effect of establishment size is observed. There is then little 
evidence, in these data, of employee distaste for working in large workplaces, 
independent of the size of the parent organisation. In contrast, wages are observed 
to be statistically significantly greater in large plants, holding firm size constant. 
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Employee distaste for employer size, as captured by job satisfaction, does 
not then, here, appear to explain the relationship between workplace size and pay. 
The finding of a robust negative effect of firm size upon job satisfaction is, 
however, consistent with employee distaste for working within large companies, and 
may then help to explain the pay premium earned by workers in large firms. 
How do these findings, regarding worker satisfaction and employer size, fit 
with alternative explanations of a positive correlation between plant size and wages? 
The models of rent-sharing and search frictions imply large employers pay higher 
wages for equally productive employees. The size-wage premium then represents a 
rent to workers and one may expect a satisfaction premium in large plants. The 
evidence, here, contradicts this is in virtually all cases. There is, however, some weak 
evidence that satisfaction with pay may be greater in large plants, relative to 
medium-sized establishments. If wages solely reflect worker productivity then pay, 
and job satisfaction, should be independent of employer size. Yet if large firms or 
establishments select more ambitious employees then, for similar working 
conditions, well-being may be observed to be lower. Alternatively, if large employers 
recruit high achieving employees, satisfaction may be observed to be greater. 
Predictions concerning satisfaction, with regards unobserved worker skill 
differences, are then ambiguous. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined four explanations for the observed positive relationship 
between employer size and worker pay: unobserved productivity differences, 
compensating differentials, rent-sharing and differences in monitoring intensity. 
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The model of unobserved productivity differences finds most favour in explaining 
the establishment size-wage premium. 
The elasticity of wages with respect to workplace size, in the private sector, 
is estimated to be approximately 0.04. Correlates of worker skill, such as the use of 
information technology and the skill of the establishment's labour force, are found 
to explain up to 15 percent of the plant size-wage differential, and up to 30 percent 
of the firm size-wage premium. Both the establishment size and firm size 
parameters, however, remain robustly positive. Controlling for unobserved 
individual heterogeneity reduces the estimated wage gain of moving from a plant 
with one or two employees to one with 1000 workers or more, from 47 percent to 5 
percent. When account is taken of measurement error this estimate rises to 15 
percent. Alternatively, when wage changes over a three-year period are examined, 
where a higher prevalence of true changes in workplace size are likely, the estimated 
effect is larger still, and statistically significant. Hence, whilst worker skill accounts 
for a significant share of the size-wage relation a non-trivial unexplained effect 
remains. Workers in large establishments do apparently earn more in the UK. 
Using employer-employee data we observe a concave positive effect of firm 
size upon worker wages, holding constant the size of the establishment. The firm's 
capital to labour ratio and profits per head are found to enter the wage equation 
positively and statistically significantly, yet their influence upon the workplace size 
coefficients are limited. Whether large employers pay higher wages to economise on 
the costs of supervision is tested using measures of monitoring intensity. These 
enter wages with the expected negative sign, and are statistically well determined, 
but do not perturb the parameter upon workplace size. There is hence no strong 




Job satisfaction data are used to test whether the relationship between 
employer size and wages reflects a compensating differential. For the BHPS and 
WERS, job satisfaction levels are statistically significantly higher in small plants. 
Whilst this is supportive of lower levels of well-being in large workplaces, it does 
not seem to offer a complete explanation of the behaviour of wages. For the BHPS, 
job satisfaction is markedly superior in the smallest plants. Yet differences in 
satisfaction between medium-sized and large establishments are not pronounced, 
whilst wages are substantially higher. On this evidence, employee distaste for 
establishment size does not seem to offer a convincing route as to why pay is 
greater in the largest plants, relative to medium-sized establishments. 
The WERS data also demonstrate that much of the dissatisfaction 
associated with workplace size is attributable to the size of the parent company, 
holding constant firm size we observe no robust independent influence of 
establishment size upon job satisfaction. This is, potentially, consistent with a 
compensating differential with respect to firm size, but does not explain the 
observed relationship between workplace size and pay. 
Unobserved productivity differences, here captured by correlates of worker 
skill and person fixed-effects, then find most favour in explaining the establishment 
size-wage premium, capturing up to half of the observed differential. 
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TABLE 3.1 a 
BHPS Sample Means (1991-1998) 
Private Sector Emblovees 
SMALL LARGE 
Hourly Pay 4.71 (3.78) 6.15 (4.01) 
Potential Experience 19.21 (12.50) 19.52 (11.80) 
Tenure 4.32 (5.72) 4.67 (5.71) 
Years of Schooling 11.15 (2.59) 11.35 (2.71) 
Qualification: HND 0.03 (0.18) 0.07 (0.25) 
Qualification: Degree 0.08 (0.26) 0.11 (0.31) 
Male 0.48 (0.50) 0.60 (0.49) 
Temporary job 0.06 (0.24) 0.05 (0.22) 
Union Recognised at workplace 0.17 (0.38) 0.46 (0.50) 
Number of Individuals 3122 4163 
Number of Observations 8086 14441 
  Small denotes workplaces with less than 25 employees, large plants with 25 workers or more. 
  Standard deviations are in parentheses. Pay is deflated to 1991 values. 
  Total number of individuals in sample = 5866. 
TABLE 3.1b 
WERS Sample Means (1998) 
Private Sector Em lo eer 
SMALL LARGE 
Hourly Pay 5.65 (5.62) 6.85 (4.67) 
Age: 40 or more 0.43 (0.50) 0.44 (0.50) 
Tenure: 5 years or more 0.38 (0.49) 0.47 (0.50) 
Qualification: Degree 0.16 (0.36) 0.17 (0.37) 
Male 0.42 (0.49) 0.58 (0.49) 
Temporary job 0.10 (0.29) 0.05 (0.21) 
Union Recognised at workplace 0.16 (0.36) 0.50 (0.50) 
Number of Workplaces 159 952 
Number of Observations 1337 14281 
  Small denotes workplaces with less than 25 employees, large plants with 25 workers or more 
" Standard deviations are in parentheses. Statistics 
. 
use WERS sample weights. 
TABLE 3.1 c 
NCDS Sample Means (1991 - Age 33) 
Private Sector Em /o ees 
SMALL LARGE 
Hourly Pay 5.63 (4.92) 7.65 (5.51) 
Tenure 4.67 (4.79) 6.65 (5.54) 
Qualification: Degree 0.09 (0.29) 0.13 (0.34) 
Male 0.45 (0.50) 0.65 (0.48) 
Temporary job 0.04 (0.17) 0.04 (0.20) 
Union member 0.14 (0.34) 0.37 (0.48) 
Number of Individuals 1056 1960 
  Small denotes workplaces with less than 26 employees large plants with 26 workers or more. 





Workplace Size and Wages (BHPS) 
Private Sector Employees 
Dependent Variable: Ln(wage) 
REGRESSOR ALL 
Workplace Size: 3-9 0.113 
(0.025) 
Workplace Size: 10-24 0.193 
(0.026) 
Workplace Size: 25-49 0.218 
(0.027) 
Workplace Size: 50-99 0.272 
(0.027) 
Workplace Size: 100-199 0.273 
(0.027) 
Workplace Size: 200-499 0.295 
(0.027) 
Workplace Size: 500-999 0.329 
(0.028) 







Panel Total 22528 
Adjusted R2 0.55 
All regressions also include quadratics in potential experience and job tenure, and controls for 
temporary job, education, gender, race, union recognition, occupation (SOC Code at the one- 
digit level), industry (SIC code at the two-digit level), region, marital status, and time period. 
Parameter estimates are not reported. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and the repeat 
sampling of individuals over time. 




Employer Size and Wages (WERS) 
Private Sector Employees 
Dependent Variable: Ln(waee) 
REGRESSOR ALL A LL 
Ln(workplace size) 0.036 0.031 
(0.006) (0.006) 
Firm Size: 100-999 0.028 
(0.019) 
Firm Size: 1,000-9,999 0.048 
(0.020) 
Firm Size: 10,000+ 0.045 
(0.023) 
Firm Size: 50,000+ 0.005 
(0.025) 
Observations 
Workplaces 1111 1111 
Individuals 15618 15618 
Adjusted R2 0.62 0.62 
1. All regressions also include controls for age, tenure, temporary job, education, gender, race, 
union recognition, occupation (SOC Code at the one-digit level), in dustry (SIC code at the two- 
digit level), region and marital status. Coefficients are not reported. 
2. Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and the repeat 
sampling of individuals within establishments. 
3. The firm size coefficients are with respect to the omitted category, 1-99 employees. 




The Effect of Worker Skill (NCDS Age 33) 
Private Sector Employees 
Dependent Variable: Ln(wage) 
TEST TEST TEST 
REGRESSOR ALL ALL SCORES SCORES SCORES 
Workplace Size: 11-25 0.137 0.134 0.129 0.126 0.130 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Workplace Size: 26-99 0.176 0.167 0.178 0.168 0.173 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Workplace Size: 100-499 0.236 0.220 0.231 0.215 0.224 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Workplace Size: 500+ 0.304 0.284 0.304 0.282 0.288 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
IT 0.117 0.121 0.113 
(0.018) (0.021) (0.020) 
Math Score Age 7 0.114 
(0.038) 
Math Score Age 11 0.046 
(0.051) 
Reading Score Age 7 0.021 
(0.042) 
Reading Score Age 11 0.067 
(0.069) 
Other Qualification 0.042 0.027 0.036 0.021 0.007 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
O-Level 0.116 0.092 0.098 0.075 0.042 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.024) (0.026) 
A-Level 0.196 0.171 0.179 0.156 0.111 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.028) (0.030) 
Other Higher 0.310 0.272 0.293 0.255 0.206 
(0.030) (0.030) (0.034) (0.034) (0.036) 
Degree 0.458 0.418 0.433 0.393 0.314 
(0.033) (0.034) (0.037) (0.038) (0.043) 
Observations 3016 3016 2388 2388 2388 
Adjusted R2 0.58 0.58 0.56 0.57 0.58 
1. All regressions also include a quadratic in job tenure, and controls for, temporary job, education, 
gender, race, union membership, occupation (SOC Code at the one-digit level), industry (SIC 
code at the two-digit level), region and marital status. Parameter estimates are not reported. 
2. Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity. 




Proxies for Worker Skill (WERS) 
Private Sector Employees 
Dependent Variable: Ln(waee) 
REGRESSOR 15 PLUS 15 PLUS ALL ALL ALL ALL 
Ln(workplace size) 0.026 0.022 0.030 0.026 0.030 0.031 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Firm Size: 100-999 0.043 0.021 0.028 0.018 0.028 0.029 
(0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) 
Firm Size: 1,000-9,999 0.068 0.046 0.053 0.042 0.052 0.053 
(0.024) (0.022) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) 
Firm Size: 10,000+ 0.068 0.051 0.052 0.038 0.049 0.048 
(0.027) (0.026) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) 
Firm Size: 50,000+ 0.040 0.028 0.008 -0.002 0.009 0.008 
(0.030) (0.028) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Proportion Degree 0.533 
(0.044) 
Proportion O/A-Level 0.324 
(0.048) 
Proportion Tenure 5yr+ 0.122 
(0.035) 




Proficiency: 1 week-1 month 0.092 
(0.030) 
Proficiency: 1-6months 0.119 
(0.028) 
Proficiency: 6months-lyear 0.102 
(0.030) 
Proficiency: 1 year+ 0.165 
(0.038) 
Observations 
Workplaces 677 677 1109 1109 1095 1095 
Individuals 12098 12098 14344 14344 15397 15397 
Adiusted R2 0.63 0.64 0.62 0.63 0.62 0.62 
1. See notes to Table 3.3 
2. The workplace proportions are based upon the employee sample data so attention is restricted 
to those workplaces where we observe 15 non-missing responses. 
3. Email refers to whether the respondent has access to email. 
4. Proficiency is a manager derived variable and measures the length of time for a new employee, 
in the largest occupational group, to become proficient at their job (the omitted category is less 




Controlling for Unobserved Worker Fixed-Effects (BHPS) 
Private Sector Employees 












Workplace Size: 3-9 0.114 0.004 0.071 0.081 
(0.029) (0.020) (0.058) (0.069) 
Workplace Size: 10-24 0.201 0.017 0.149 0.086 
(0.031) (0.021) (0.059) (0.070) 
Workplace Size: 25-49 0.223 0.016 0.165 0.082 
(0.031) (0.022) (0.059) (0.071) 
Workplace Size: 50-99 0.280 0.017 0.245 0.121 
(0.032) (0.022) (0.060) (0.075) 
Workplace Size: 100-199 0.275 0.016 0.233 0.124 
(0.032) (0.022) (0.062) (0.080) 
Workplace Size: 200-499 0.299 0.023 0.290 0.128 
(0.031) (0.022) (0.060) (0.081) 
Workplace Size: 500-999 0.329 0.021 0.298 0.088 
(0.033) (0.023) (0.064) (0.090) 
Workplace Size-1000+ 0.371 0.051 0.369 0.142 





4041 4041 1245 1245 
19733 15278 3177 1703 
0.56 0.02 0.58 0.05 




The Role of Firm Characteristics in the Linked Worker-Firm Sample (BHPS-DB) 
Private Sector Employees 
Dependent Variable: Ln wa e/ ALn wa e 
OLS OLS OLS OLS FD FD 
RF, GRESSOR BHPS FIRM FIRM FIRM BHPS FIRM 
Workplace size: 10-49 0.150 0.134 0.108 0.142 0.094 0.112 
(0.022) (0.057) (0.060) (0.057) (0.033) (0.074) 
Workplace size: 50-199 0.216 0.106 0.073 0.090 0.102 0.041 
(0.025) (0.055) (0.059) (0.058) (0.034) (0.079) 
Workplace size: 200-999 0.238 0.098 0.064 0.125 0.094 0.044 
(0.025) (0.058) (0.062) (0.063) (0.036) (0.085) 
Workplace size: 1000+ 0.316 0.239 0.183 0.158 0.172 0.096 
(0.030) (0.065) (0.067) (0.069) (0.041) (0.089) 
Profits per employee 0.050 0.004 0.006 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.010) 
Log(Capital Labour Ratio) 0.053 0.020 0.017 
(0.014) (0.022) (0.015) 
Log(Firm Employment) 0.007 0.006 0.037 
(0.008) (0.050) (0.052) 
Firm Effects No No No Yes No Yes 
Observations 
Firms - 267 267 267 - 267 
Workers 1755 387 387 387 1755 387 
Panel Total 3510 774 774 774 1755 387 
R2 0.55 0.57 0.60 0.78 0.05 0.01 
1. See notes for Table 3.2. 
2. The BHPS estimates refer to the sample of private sector employees in 1991 and 1994. This is 
the comparable sample, to the Linked Employer-Employee data. 
3. The BHPS first difference model captures a person fixed effect, the matched model a worker- 
firm fixed effect. 
4. Capital and profits are in £000s (1991 values). 




Monitoring and the Employer Size-Wage Relationship (WERS) 
Private Sector Employees 






Ln(workplace size) 0.029 0.031 
(0.006) (0.006) 
Firm Size: 100-999 0.030 0.032 
(0.020) (0.020) 
Firm Size: 1,000-9,999 0.055 0.057 
(0.020) (0.020) 
Firm Size: 10,000+ 0.058 0.056 
(0.023) (0.023) 
Firm Size: 50,000+ 0.013 0.013 
(0.026) (0.026) 
Supervisors per worker: 1-19% -0.050 
(0.026) 
Supervisors per worker: 20-39% -0.069 
(0.027) 
Supervisors per worker: 40% + -0.057 
(0.030) 
Observations 
Workplaces 1104 1104 
Individuals 11909 11909 
R2 0.50 0.51 
1. See notes to Table 3.3. 
2. Managerial employees here includes managers and administrators (SOC major group), and other 
(SOC group 2). The remaining SOC groups are then present in the sample. 
3. The number of supervisors per worker refers to the proportion of non-managerial employees 
that have job duties that involve supervising other employees. This includes line-managers and 




Workplace Size and Worker Well-being (BHPS) 
Private Sector Employees 
Dependent Variable: Overall Tob Satisfaction 
REGRESSOR ALL ALL 
Workplace Size: 3-9 -0.118 -0.107 
(0.077) (0.077) 
Workplace Size: 10-24 -0.236 -0.211 
(0.079) (0.079) 
Workplace Size: 25-49 -0.237 -0.206 
(0.081) (0.080) 
Workplace Size: 50-99 -0.350 -0.313 
(0.081) (0.080) 
Workplace Size: 100-199 -0.357 -0.320 
(0.082) (0.081) 
Workplace Size: 200-499 -0.351 -0.311 
(0.082) (0.080) 
Workplace Size: 500-999 -0.343 -0.298 
(0.086) (0.085) 





Individuals 5127 5127 
Panel Total 16723 16723 
Log-L -26189.7 -26202.6 
Pseudo RZ 0.087 0.085 
1. See notes for Table 3.2. Additionally normal hours are controlled for. 
2. All columns are estimated by the Ordered Probit technique. 
3. Consistent Job satisfaction data cover only the period 1991-1997. 
4. The Pseudo R2 is calculated using the method of McKelvey and Zavoina (1975). 
TABLE 3.9b 
Mareinal Effects uuon Overall Tob Satisfaction 
Variable 1 2 
Overall Satirfaction Score 
345 6 7 
Workplace Size: 3-9 0.004 0.004 0.009 0.011 0.016 -0.009 -0.035 
Workplace Size: 10-24 0.009 0.009 0.019 0.022 0.030 -0.023 -0.066 
Workplace Size: 25-49 0.009 0.009 0.019 0.022 0.030 -0.024 -0.066 
Workplace Size: 50-99 0.015 0.015 0.030 0.032 0.042 -0.042 -0.093 
Workplace Size: 100-199 0.016 0.015 0.031 0.033 0.042 -0.043 -0.094 
Workplace Size: 200-499 0.015 0.015 0.030 0.032 0.042 -0.042 -0.093 
Workplace Size: 500-999 0.015 0.015 0.030 0.032 0.041 -0.040 -0.091 
Workplace Size: 1000+ 0.012 0.012 0.024 0.027 0.036 -0.032 -0.079 
Ln(nav) -0.005 -0.005 -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 0.015 0.025 
1. Marginal effects are based upon column one of Table 3.9a above. 
2. Marginal Effects for the workplace size dummies are calculated as the difference in the 
predicted probability, of satisfaction score k, of that size category relative to the omitted base. 
3. Marginal effects for In(pay) are calculated as the change in predicted probability associated with 
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TABLE 3.11 a 
Employer Size and Worker Well-being (WERS) 
Private Sector Employees 








Respect of Boss 
ALL 
Ln(workplace size) -0.029 -0.007 -0.019 -0.008 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
Ln(pay) 0.147 0.595 0.142 0.091 
(0.027) (0.033) (0.026) (0.026) 
Observations 
Workplaces 1111 1111 1111 1111 
Individuals 15087 15087 15087 15087 
Log-L -19317.7 -20787.9 -19523.0 -20978.6 
Pseudo RZ 0.082 0.132 0.092 0.083 
1. See notes for Table 3.3. Additionally normal hours are controlled for. 
2. All columns are estimated by the Ordered Probit technique. 
3. The Pseudo R2 is calculated using the method of McKelvey and Zavoina (1975). 
TABLE 3.11 b 
Employer Size and Worker Well-being (WERS) 
Private Sector Employees 








Respect of Boss 
ALL 
Ln(workplace size) -0.011 0.014 -0.003 0.004 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
Firm Size: 100-999 -0.087 -0.158 -0.078 -0.073 
(0.038) (0.043) (0.039) (0.041) 
Firm Size: 1,000-9,999 -0.115 -0.140 -0.082 -0.068 
(0.039) (0.043) (0.040) (0.043) 
Firm Size: 10,000+ -0.194 -0.148 -0.198 -0.124 
(0.046) (0.057) (0.048) (0.054) 
Firm Size: 50,000+ -0.219 -0.207 -0.175 -0.135 
(0.048) (0.058) (0.052) (0.055) 
Ln(pay) 0.151 0.602 0.146 0.094 
(0.026) (0.032) (0.026) (0.026) 
Observations 
Workplaces 1111 1111 1111 1111 
Individuals 15087 15087 15087 15087 
Log-L -19302.8 -20770.5 -19509.1 -20972.2 
Pseudo R2 0.084 0.135 0.094 0.084 




Employer Size and Worker Well-being (WERS) 
Private Sector Employees 










Ln(workplace size) -0.009 -0.045 0.042 -0.047 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.011) 
Firm Size: 100-999 -0.058 0.080 -0.126 0.011 
(0.041) (0.038) (0.047) (0.035) 
Firm Size: 1,000-9,999 0.033 0.200 -0.206 0.034 
(0.041) (0.041) (0.049) (0.036) 
Firm Size: 10,000+ 0.029 0.221 -0.251 0.018 
(0.053) (0.051) (0.064) (0.044) 
Firm Size: 50,000+ 0.094 0.357 -0.161 0.061 
(0.056) (0.059) (0.072) (0.051) 
Ln(pay) 0.141 0.158 -0.025 0.159 
(0.027) (0.026) (0.029) (0.026) 
Observations 
Workplaces 1108 1108 1108 1108 
Individuals 14441 14441 14441 14441 
Log-L -16095.0 -19776.4 -19236.9 -20543.6 
Pseudo R2 0.083 0.120 0.131 0.114 
1. See notes for Table 3.11a. 
2. All columns are estimated by the Ordered Probit technique. Positive coefficients signify (greater) 
agreement with the statement. 
Ln(workplace size) -0.025 -0.017 -0.008 
(0.011) (0.010) (0.012) 
Firm Size: 100-999 -0.025 -0.003 -0.058 
(0.039) (0.036) (0.038) 
Firm Size: 1,000-9,999 -0.108 -0.092 -0.167 
(0.039) (0.037) (0.038) 
Firm Size: 10,000+ -0.157 -0.127 -0.189 
(0.047) (0.045) (0.047) 
Firm Size: 50,000+ -0.150 -0.105 -0.163 
(0.053) (0.049) (0.053) 
Ln(pay) 0.322 0.178 0.324 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.027) 
Observations 
Workplaces 1111 1111 1111 
Individuals 15195 15195 15195 
Log-L -18760.6 -19018.4 -15934.2 
Pseudo RZ 0.193 0.081 0.143 
TABLE 3.12b 
Employer Size and Worker Well-being (WERS) 
Private Sector Employees 
Dependent Variables: Influence over Job 
Task Pace Methods 
REGRESSOR ALL ALL ALL 
See notes for Table 3.12a. 
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APPENDIX 1: Non-response and Attrition Bias in the BHPS 
The BHPS is a nationally representative sample of more than 5,000 British 
households, containing over 10,000 adults. Respondents are interviewed annually. If 
an individual leaves their original household all adult members of their new 
household are also interviewed. Children are interviewed once aged 16. Together 
these should ensure the sample remains broadly representative of the British 
population. 
Nathan (1999) undertakes a more systematic analysis of the effects of 
attrition. The BHPS is compared to Census data, the General Household Survey 
(GHS) and the Family Expenditure Survey (FES), with respect to age, sex, marital 
status, socio-economic group, ethnicity, employment status and some household 
characteristics. The author concludes that cumulative attrition in the BHPS is 
limited, and does not lead to serious bias in inference. 
This issue was further examined by estimating models using the BHPS 
longitudinal survey weights. These weights restrict attention to the sample of 
individuals observed in every wave, and then adjust for differential probabilities of 
response in the panel. Sample properties should then match those of the 
population. The resulting coefficient estimates are compared to the unweighted 
estimates in Table Al below. 
Whilst the potential endogeneity of any non-response, and the use of 
income in the construction of weights, makes them of doubtful usefulness in the 
current setting, it is reassuring that the effect of workplace size upon wages is 
estimated to be very similar, to the unweighted estimates. 
Overall, this suggests any bias due to attrition in the BHPS is limited. 
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APPENDIX 2: Sample Selectivity within the WERS 
The WERS survey is a cluster stratified random sample, where the sampling fraction 
is increasing in establishment size and varies by industry code. Large establishments 
are then over-sampled. Secondly, the sampling strategy of interviewing a maximum 
of 25 workers per establishment implies that a plant with 25 employees can 
(potentially) contribute the same number of employee data points as a workplace 
with 100 or 1000 staff. Hence, within the sample of WERS plants, the individual 
data exhibits over-sampling of respondents within small establishments. The data 
then suffers from sample selectivity in two, opposite directions. Yet, since the chief 
selection mechanisms, establishment size and industry, are explanatory variables in 
all analyses it is not clear a priori as to why results should be biased. 
As a check to whether coefficients suffer from any selection bias they are 
compared to estimates using the WERS sample survey weights (see Airey et al, 
1999, and Cully et al, 1999). DuMouchel and Duncan (1983) provide a discussion 
as to the merits and use of sample survey weights. Weighting is unnecessary where 
the model holds independent of the stratification. That is, where parameters are the 
same for each stratum, or where we are able to include amongst the explanatory 
variables the variables upon which selection is based, then intuitively we control for 
selection. In this case, both weighted and unweighted estimates are consistent and 
the use of sample weights should be avoided, weighting the variance covariance 
matrix, when unnecessary, inflates standard errors and introduces random variation 
in coefficients. 
Table A2 estimates hourly pay equations using standard and sample 
weighted methods. Qualitative interpretation of results is consistent in both sets of 
estimates. Estimates using sample survey weights predict a slightly more marked 
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establishment size-wage premium and a marginally weaker firm size effect. 
Substantive conclusions, however, hold both for weighted and unweighted 
estimates. 
As a further check results are compared to those from the BHPS. The 
BHPS categorical workplace size variable is replaced by a continuous proxy (using 
mid-points) and regressions run for the analogous sample and time period as the 
WERS. Log establishment size is estimated to enter the wage equation with a 
coefficient 0.035.28 The comparable estimates for the WERS data are observed in 
columns one and three of Table A2 where, as with the BHPS, there are no controls 
for firm size. The estimated parameter is 0.036 for the unweighted estimates, and 
0.044 for the weighted. 
These estimates suggest that the unweighted estimates do not suffer unduly 
from selection bias. The estimation strategy adopted is to include establishment size 
and industry as control variables in all regressions and to estimate by standard 
techniques. To account for potential variation in the coefficients, by observed 
characteristics, all standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. The 
non-independence of errors within the same plant is also corrected for, as ignoring 
the clustering of individuals within plants can potentially significantly underestimate 
standard errors (see Moulton, 1986). 
28 The same coefficient estimate was obtained when the workplace size categories were instead 




A Comparison using Longitudinal Sample Weights (BHPS) 
Private Sector Employees 
Dependent Variable: Ln(waae) 
REGRESSOR UNWEIGHTED WEIGHTED 
Workplace Size: 3-9 0.113 0.135 
(0.025) (0.031) 
Workplace Size: 10-24 0.193 0.224 
(0.026) (0.033) 
Workplace Size: 25-49 0.218 0.250 
(0.027) (0.033) 
Workplace Size: 50-99 0.272 0.304 
(0.027) (0.034) 
Workplace Size: 100-199 0.273 0.289 
(0.027) (0.033) 
Workplace Size: 200-499 0.295 0.315 
(0.027) (0.033) 
Workplace Size: 500-999 0.329 0.350 
(0.028) (0.035) 
Workplace Size: 1000+ 0.362 0.382 
(0.029) (0.036) 
Observations 
Individuals 5866 3013 
Panel Total 22528 15317 
Adjusted RZ 0.55 0.56 
1. See notes Table 3.2. 
TABLE A2 
The Impact of Sample Weights upon the WERS 
Private Sector Employees 






Ln(workplace size) 0.036 0.031 0.044 0.041 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Firm Size: 100-999 0.028 0.023 
(0.019) (0.023) 
Firm Size: 1,000-9,999 0.048 0.043 
(0.020) (0.020) 
Firm Size: 10,000+ 0.045 0.036 
(0.023) (0.024) 
Firm Size: 50,000+ 0.005 -0.001 
(0.025) (0.026) 
Observations 
Workplaces 1111 1111 1111 1111 
Individuals 15618 15618 15618 15618 
Adjusted R2 0.62 0.62 0.60 0.60 
1. See notes to Table 3.3. 
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Race, Wages and Worker Well-being 
Race 
Abstract 
This chapter investigates the role of the employer in explaining racial differentials in 
pay and job satisfaction. Ethnic minority workers are found to earn higher wages in 
plants with a smaller non-white employment share. White wages, in contrast, are 
only weakly related to the racial composition of the plant. The racial wage gap is 
then greater in establishments with a higher proportion of non-white staff. 
Establishments that employ more minority staff are also associated with lower levels 
of job satisfaction. The evidence is consistent with workplaces with a large 
proportion of minority workers offering inferior working conditions. Moreover, 
non-white workers are found to be less satisfied with their pay, compared to 
otherwise similar white workers, even when pay is held constant. Non-white men 
are -4.2 percent less likely to respond as satisfied or very satisfied with their pay, 
than white males, non-white women -6.0 percent less likely than white females. This 




The fording of an unexplained wage differential between white and ethnic minority' 
employees is a pervasive regularity in studies of wage determination. The finding of 
a racial differential in recorded job satisfaction levels has, however, been less well 
documented. In both cases, for the UK at least, a persuasive consensus upon the 
source of these differentials has not yet come to the fore. 
This paper uses two sources of data, the Quarterly Labour Force Survey and 
the Workplace Employee Relations Survey, to attempt to distinguish between the 
competing hypotheses to explain the racial wage gap's existence. The first has the 
advantage of being a large national survey, where the sample of ethnic minority 
respondents should be representative of that in the population. Data regarding 
worker attitudes and the employer are however limited. The second benefits from 
the linking of establishment information to employee responses. The role of the 
employer upon the relationship between race, pay and job satisfaction can then be 
more fully analysed. 
The effect of the establishment's ethnic composition upon pay is extensively 
examined. Non-white employees are observed to earn lower wages in plants with a 
higher proportion of ethnic minority co-workers. White wages are, however, only 
weakly related to the racial composition of the plant. The racial wage differential is 
then greatest in workplaces that hire a larger proportion of minority workers. The 
estimated racial differential in wages was further found to be robust for workers 
within the same occupation and establishment. The primary avenue for the racial 
1 The terms non-white, minority and ethnic minority will be used to denote any member of a non- 
white racial group. The term black refers solely to individuals of Afro-Caribbean descent. 
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wage gap is then not that ethnic minority workers are employed in low-pay plants 
but, rather, they are paid less well in any given workplace. 
Job satisfaction data are used to provide a new analysis of racial 
disadvantage in the labour market. Establishments that employ more non-white 
individuals are observed to be associated with lower levels of job satisfaction for 
white males, white females and for ethnic minority women. Results are, however, 
mixed for non-white men. The plant's rates of quits, separations, and absenteeism, 
are also positively related to the ethnic minority employment share. 
The evidence suggests workplaces with a large proportion of minority staff 
are, here, associated with inferior working conditions. Nevertheless, this is 
consistent with, both, discrimination and unobserved worker quality differences, 
where non-white workers are, for some reason, less productive. Ethnic minority 
employees are, however, found to be less satisfied with their pay, compared to 
otherwise similar white workers, even when pay is held constant. This provides new 
evidence that appears consistent with discrimination. 
The outline of the chapter is as follows. Section two examines rationales for 
the finding of a racial wage differential. Section three documents the evidence of 
previous UK and US studies. The data are discussed in section four and regression 
results presented in section five. Finally, section six concludes. 
4.2 The Racial Wage Differential: Theories and Hypotheses 
The finding of a racial differential in pay is a pervasive empirical regularity? 
Explanations for its existence are, however, more contentious and are found in four 
2 For an excellent review of studies of discrimination see Altonji and Blank (1999). 
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principal areas. The first suggests it captures differences in productivity, possibly 
due to pre-labour market or historical discrimination. On this view, the observed 
wage differential is an artefact of the researcher's inability to fully control for worker 
ability. Secondly, theories originating from Becker (1957) model wages as being 
shaped by the prejudicial preferences of white labour market participants. 
Thirdly, in a variant of the prejudicial tastes and unobserved productivity 
models, minority employees may be `crowded' into low-pay occupations. Finally, 
where firms have limited information regarding worker skill they have an incentive 
to use correlates of worker productivity to differentiate between employees. 
Employers may then statistically discriminate between workers on the basis of race. 
These explanations are discussed in more detail below. 
4.2.1 Differences in Productivity 
The explanation for the racial wage gap that has come to the fore in the US is that it 
reflects unobserved productivity differences. Whilst not, in general, suggesting 
inherent ability differences (see Neal and Johnson, 1996), the authors propose a 
lower quality of schooling due to racial or economic segregation prior to entering 
the labour market. Whilst this may reflect discrimination, wages themselves are non- 
discriminatory and reflect worker skill. 
4.2.2 Taste based models of discrimination 
Within this class of model, a subset of white labour market participants (employers, 
employees, or consumers) are assumed to hold prejudicial preferences against 
interacting with non-white workers. In a static model of discriminating employers, 
firms are assumed to maximise a value function (V) equal to profits adjusted for the 
(money metric) disutility of hiring a non-white employee: 
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Firm j max V, = pf(na + nb) - Wana - Wbnb - djnb (1) 
Where p is the output price, f(. ) the production function, ng employment of group g 
within the firm, wg the corresponding wage level, g= {a, b} the racial group 
indicator (a white, b non-white), and d, the disutility of hiring a minority employee 
in firm j (dj >_ 0). 
A firm will then hire an ethnic minority worker only if non-white wages fall 
sufficiently below white pay to offset the discrimination parameter, Wa - Wb > d. 
This yields the prediction that workplaces will be completely segregated according 
to the intensity of the employer's prejudice. By itself this does not generate a racial 
wage differential. Unprejudiced firms hire non-white employees and competitive 
forces amongst these firms bid wages to the marginal product. Only if the number 
of prejudiced firms is sufficiently large, to negate these forces, can wage 
discrimination exist. Even this situation cannot persist in the long run. Unprejudiced 
firms will enter the market and earn rents from hiring non-white workers, drive 
prejudiced firms out of the market, and bid up minority wages until the competitive 
wage is restored. 
A model of employee discrimination assumes prejudiced white employees 
dislike working alongside non-white co-workers. White workers must then be 
compensated, with higher pay, whenever they work in a racially mixed plant. Yet, 
colour-blind profit maximising employers would never choose to have an integrated 
workforce, as this necessitates paying white workers a compensating differential 
when no more productive than non-white employees. Instead, workers are 
completely segregated according to race. Furthermore, employee prejudice cannot, 
by itself, generate a racial wage differential between equally skilled workers. Firms 
hire whichever labour is cheaper, and competition for labour equalises wages 
between segregated plants. 
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A model of consumer discrimination assumes prejudiced white customers 
derive less utility if they purchase goods or services from a minority worker. White 
consumers will then only purchase goods from a non-white worker when the price 
falls sufficiently to offset their discrimination. A racial wage differential then 
requires a sufficiently large number of prejudiced consumers, and that it is not 
possible to costlessly substitute minority workers into jobs with no customer 
contact. 
Black (1995) extends Becker's (1957) model of employer discrimination to 
incorporate search frictions. Information concerning potential employment 
opportunities is costly to obtain and workers search, on-the-job, amongst 
employers. Search costs here afford the employer a degree of monopsony power in 
setting wages. Unprejudiced firms then offer non-white workers lower wages, as they 
take into account the reduced set of employment opportunities for minority 
workers in the presence of discrimination. 
Workers are assumed to be equally productive, have the same preferences 
over leisure, and have identical search costs (c per period). Employers are 
prejudiced, p, or unprejudiced, u, with labour market proportions (0,1-0). This 
distribution is common knowledge. Prejudiced firms hire only type a workers at 
wage rate w, ''. Unprejudiced firms hire type a and b employees and pay wages, w, " 
and wb" respectively. Employees derive utility, per period, U= w' + a, where w' is 
the wage in firm j and cc a match specific random variable capturing the non- 
pecuniary benefits of the job, known prior to the job acceptance decision. ' 
3 Constant returns to scale technology and profit maximisation implies wages are equalised, 
across firms, for each group of workers. The match quality component, a, is then the sole source 
of heterogeneity in individual utility. 
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Workers and firms meet once each period and employees accept offers with 
utility above some reservation level: 
wý+cc >u; g= {a, b} (2) 




wwP + a, Ua) + (1-O)Emax 
lwau 
+ a, Ua} 
-C 
(3) 
For minority workers: 
Ub = OUb + (1-O)Emax{Wbu + aý Ub} -C 
(4) 
where 0 is the probability of meeting a prejudiced employer. ' 
The presence of prejudiced firms increases the likelihood of a minority 
worker encountering an unproductive match, and thus raises their expected search 
costs. This reduces non-white reservation wages and, hence, paid wages in 
equilibrium. This result holds given the presence of any prejudiced employer (a non- 
zero 0), and the wage differential is increasing in the number of prejudiced firms. 
The racial differential in pay does fall, however, as the size of the minority 
population increases. A larger non-white labour force raises the profits of 
unprejudiced employers, reducing the number of prejudiced firms who survive in 
equilibrium, and hence raises minority wages. 
Can the racial wage gap persist in the long run? Black assumes an exogenous 
distribution of entrepreneurial ability for all (potential) firms in the economy. 
Echoing Becker's earlier logic, low-ability prejudiced firms are driven out of the 
market by unprejudiced employers. High-ability prejudiced firms, however, can 
trade off some of their rents to exercise a preference for discrimination. Yet, if the 
assumption of an exogenous distribution of firm ability is relaxed, competition again 
4 For the full solution to the model see Black (1995). 
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eliminates the racial wage differential. Unprejudiced high-ability firms expand at the 
expense of high-ability prejudiced and low-ability unprejudiced employers. 
4.2.3 Statistical Discrimination 
Employers, in general, have only limited information regarding the true skill of job 
applicants. There is then an incentive to use indicators of worker quality to 
differentiate, statistically discriminate, between workers. In a simple static model we 
assume employees are equally productive, and that productivity is normally 
distributed; v- N(µ, au2). Whilst population productivity is common knowledge, 
the actual productivity of any one individual is unknown and the employer observes 
a noisy signal of ability, s, where s=v+E; and 6 is a normally distributed random 
error term, E- N(0, (Y) 
In a competitive labour market with risk-neutral employers, wages are equal 
to expected productivity, conditional on the observed signal: 
w= E(U/s) _ 
ýF 22+ ýv2 
z 
(5) 
Qu + or, au + a, 
If non-white qualifications are, for some reason, less informative signals of ability 
(oo>aEb>(YE, >O) minority workers experience lower returns to human capital 
investment, s, and have less incentive to invest in education. Returns to population 
productivity, µ, are, however, greater and on average there is no racial pay gap. 
Implicitly this assumes education does not increase productivity. If this is relaxed, 
the lower levels of education predicted for minority workers may induce lower 
levels of productivity, and hence pay. Alternatively, if match quality is increasing in 
the precision of the ability signal, and productivity is itself determined by match 
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quality, non-white wages will be lower. These mechanisms may generate a racial 
differential in pay despite the same distribution of innate ability. ' 
Oettinger (1996) extends this framework to incorporate a job-matching 
model, along the lines of Jovanovic (1979). Individuals live for two periods (t=1,2), 
work in both, and maximise the expected value of lifetime earnings. Each period 
workers receive a single job offer, with match productivity v, -- N(µ, ßu). This 
distribution is common knowledge and identical for both racial groups, but 
individual productivity is observed only as a noisy signal. 
The first period wage is defined as the weighted sum of the expected and 
true productivity values (the latter achieved by piece rate pay): 
w, = iv, ` + (1-ti) v, where vt` = E(l), /s) (6) 
Where i is the weight upon ex ante expected productivity in first period pay. After 
the first period the true productivity of the worker is revealed to both parties. In the 
second period, the worker will move to a new job if the expected wage exceeds their 
certain wage in the current job. Second period pay is then: 
W2: - v, if v, >_ UZe "stayers" (7a) 
w2 = 'CU2c + (1-t) v2 if v, < u2C "movers" (7b) 
The model then offers predictions regarding how minority wages evolve over time, 
relative to white workers. As their signals are noisier, non-white employees are more 
likely to be erroneously viewed as low ability. Minority wages will then, on average, 
grow more slowly with general labour market experience but more quickly within 
jobs, where true productivity is revealed over time. 
s The model's predictions become starker if minority workers are, on average, less productive. 
6 Essentially there is random assignment in the first period. The probability of switching jobs in 
the second period, for a given wage gain, is assumed the same for white and minority employees. 
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4.2.4 Occupational Crowding 
Some authors have suggested the racial wage gap reflects a lack of occupational 
attainment of minority workers (e. g. Stewart, 1983b). This may reflect prejudicial 
tastes that are more severe in certain jobs, historical constraints upon worker access, 
differences in worker skills, or worker choice. This hypothesis is then less a model 
than a manifestation of discrimination. 
Johnson and Stafford (1998) examine the effects of discrimination and skill 
differences upon occupation and pay. Whilst they study discrimination on grounds 
of gender, the model can straightforwardly be applied to racial discrimination. The 
economy is assumed to produce one good using two occupations in identical firms. 
Job I is predominantly white and non-white workers are `crowded' into job 2. 
Employment in each race-occupation group is ngA where g= {a, b} and 1=1,2. The 
productivity of type b workers, relative to type a workers in job' is k (= vb// )IA) 
and non-white workers enjoy a comparative advantage in the second job (X, < X). 
Discrimination is modelled as a prejudicial taste (8) which is more 
pronounced in the white occupation (S1>S, ). 7 To abstract from issues of 
segregation or long-run sustainability all firms have identical preferences. Firms 
profit maximise and wages are equal to the marginal product adjusted for the 
disamenity of hiring a minority worker: 
Wai = v, Wbl = (1-61)Xlu1 (8a) 
W= 1)2 Wb2 (8b) 
Rearranging terms implies, in equilibrium, the ratio of white to non-white wages, the 
racial wage differential, will be greater in the white occupation (wal/wbl > wa2/wO. 
7 This discrimination coefficient is a transformation of the earlier term: d1= %1.8141-8t). 
131 
Race 
This follows from the comparative advantage of white workers and the greater 
degree of discrimination. Johnson and Stafford then demonstrate, as minority 
workers enter `white' jobs, as the degree of discrimination (S1) falls and as non-white 
workers become more proficient in the first occupation, white wages fall and 
minority wages rise. We examine a modified version of this framework, where non- 
white individuals are crowded into low-pay establishments. 
4.3 Existing Empirical Evidence 
4.3.1 UK Evidence 
The UK evidence has, to date, principally documented the existence of a racial wage 
differential using the Oaxaca (1973) mean wage decomposition methodology. 
Stewart (1983b), in one of the earliest UK studies, uses data from the National 
Training Survey of 1975 to examine the occupational attainment (defined by mean 
earnings in reported occupation) of male ethnic minority immigrants. The author 
finds statistically significant evidence of a racial differential on occupational wages 
of around -12 percent. When actual wages are examined the figure rises to -17 
percent, suggesting two thirds of the wage gap is attributable to a lack of 
occupational attainment. Both the productivity and discrimination based 
explanations are, however, consistent with such a result. 
These estimates combine the effects of race and immigration. The latter 
potentially affects wages independently of race through, discrimination, differing 
language skills, the quality of schooling in the country of origin, and the unobserved 
heterogeneity of immigrants. Shields and Wheatley-Price (1998) find non-white 
immigrants experience lower returns to schooling than UK-born ethnic minorities. 
Education received abroad is less valued than that received in the UK, especially 
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where it is likely English is not the first language. To make inferences concerning, 
purely, racial discrimination is then difficult where first generation migrants form a 
large proportion of the ethnic minority population. As the non-white population of 
Britain is predominantly a result of post-war immigration, and only a third of non- 
white individuals of working age are UK born (source Labour Force Survey, 1997), 
most UK samples will suffer from this bias to some extent. This caveat must be 
borne in mind when examining British data. 
Differences in pay between racial groups are unlikely to have remained static 
in the last 20 years, with changes in attitudes and the composition of the ethnic 
minority population, and with the passing of the Race Relations Act in 1976. 
Blackaby et al (1994) examine how the male racial wage differential changed over 
the 1970s and 1980s using pooled General Household Survey data. For the period 
1973-1979 the authors estimate a differential, after controlling for observed 
characteristics and immigrant status, of -12 percent. For the period 1983-1989 the 
comparable figure is -19 percent. Blackaby et al (1998) offer more contemporary 
evidence, using the Quarterly Labour Force Survey of winter 1992. The male racial 
wage differential is estimated to be -11 percent. This result is, however, shown to 
mask asymmetries between ethnic groups. The earnings gap is -10 percent for both 
Black and Indian workers and -16 percent for those of Pakistani origin. 
4.3.2 US Evidence 
Possibly the most influential US study is that of Neal and Johnson (1996). The 
studies chief contribution is to examine the impact of a racially unbiased ability 
score. Using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) a single measure of 
skill is considered, scores from the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) when 
respondents were aged 18 or below. Parsimonious wage equations are estimated, 
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upon race, age and test score, when individuals are in their late 20s. The AFQT 
score is found to enter positively and statistically significantly and to explain a 
considerable proportion of the observed wage differential. Upon its introduction 
the estimated black-white wage differential falls from -24 to -7 percent for males 
and from -16 to +4 percent for females, and is no longer statistically significantly 
different from zero in the last case. This provides strong evidence, for the US at 
least, that lower black wages to a large extent reflect differences in basic skills 
acquired prior to entry to the labour market. 
The validity of this evidence rests upon the assumption that the AFQT is 
racially unbiased. Evidence is documented that the test predicts (military) job 
performance equally well for black and white candidates, and that the key 
determinants of scores are family background and school characteristics. Other 
evidence, however, suggests there are differential returns to components of the test, 
with the verbal component more important for black respondents (see Altonji and 
Blank, 1999). This does raise some issues of bias upon the test. 
Hellerstein et al (1999) arrive at a similar conclusion to Neal and Johnson, 
but via a very different approach. Using the Worker Establishment Characteristics 
Database (WECD), which matches individual data to the employing workplace, the 
authors estimate plant-level production function equations that account for the 
demographic composition of the workforce. Workers are assumed to have different 
characteristics, and potentially different marginal products, but to remain perfectly 
substitutable labour inputs. The productivity of black workers, relative to white, is 
then estimated. Plant-level wage equations are also estimated. If the relative 
productivity of black workers is significantly different from the relative wage, this 
provides evidence potentially indicative of racial discrimination. The authors discern 
no such evidence. 
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Concerns do, however, remain regarding the reliability of results. The 
composition of the workforce is likely to be endogenously related to production 
technology. Also, in contrast to the negative wage differential observed in the 
individual data, black workers are estimated to be both more productive and highly 
paid than white employees. This may reflect that estimates are identified by cross- 
plant variation and do not capture within establishment differences in pay. 
Other studies have sought to test the predictions of the models of 
prejudicial tastes. Black (1995) presents a limited test of his model using a sample of 
small businesses. Black employees are found to be significantly less likely to be 
awarded above average pay, controlling for observed skill. Yet, given the ability 
controls are a discrete approximation of true skill, unobserved productivity 
differences may remain. Also the model cannot distinguish between employer and 
statistical discrimination. 
Holzer and Ihlanfeldt (1999) examine a model of consumer discrimination 
and use a survey of employers in four major US cities (Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, and 
Los Angeles) to estimate equations for the race of the last employee hired. The 
effects of the racial composition of customers and the applicant pool, the race of 
the hiring manager, and whether the job requires customer contact, are used to test 
the consumer discrimination model. 
The number of black customers has a positive and statistically significant 
effect upon the probability of hiring a black worker, but a robust negative effect 
upon hiring a white individual. These effects are more pronounced in workplaces 
with customer contact. Whilst this is supportive of consumer discrimination, 
customer contact is not an important determinant of the race of the last hire in 
white customer establishments, but is in black consumer plants. The evidence in 
support of consumer discrimination is then mixed. 
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Recent tests of models of statistical discrimination have sought to explore 
the dynamic properties of wages, utilising the assumption that worker productivity 
is revealed to employers over time, and firms update their beliefs. 
Oettinger (1996), assuming equally productive black and white employees 
and statistically discriminating employers, predicts first period pay to be 
independent of race and, subsequently, minority wages to exhibit greater returns to 
tenure and lower returns to experience. Using the NLSY the author finds, 
consistent with the model, the male racial wage differential to be small and 
statistically insignificant on entry to the labour market, and returns to experience 
significantly larger for white men. There is, however, no evidence of a steeper wage- 
tenure profile for black employees and, inconsistent with the model, the wage gap is 
observed to grow over time. 
Altonji and Pierret (1997) assume race is negatively correlated with 
productivity. They show if employers statistically discriminate, the racial wage 
differential will not vary over time, as firms subsume the lower productivity of non- 
whites into their expectations. If firms do not statistically discriminate, they only 
learn of this relationship as productivity is revealed in the labour market, and the 
racial wage differential will grow with experience. Using a sample of non-hispanic 
males from the NLSY, and in contrast to the predictions of the model, the racial 
wage gap widens markedly with experience, again supporting a productivity 
explanation for the US. 
Carrington and Troske (1998) study the racial composition of plants using 
the WECD and a survey of small business owners, the Characteristics of Business 
Owners (CBO). Using a Gini coefficient methodology, they find no evidence of 
inter-firm racial segregation when detailed controls for region are included. 
Suggesting segregation is a geographic, rather than labour market, phenomenon. 
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Black workers are, however, disproportionately employed within firms whose 
owners, managers or customers are also black. These two seemingly contradictory 
findings are reconciled by the fact there are insufficient black employers to generate 
segregation. Establishments with large black minorities are also found not to pay 
low wages on average, white wages are here higher, but it is within these plants that 
the racial wage gap is largest. Finally, the majority of the black-white wage 
differential is attributed to individual, rather than employer, characteristics. 
4.3.3 Racial differences in worker well-being 
Bartel (1981) offers an interesting analysis of racial differences in job satisfaction. 
For a constant wage, non-white job satisfaction is predicted to be lower if, as a 
result of discrimination, minority workers are more poorly matched, or if 
discrimination occurs on non-pecuniary benefits. Yet such discrimination as exists 
may also lower black employees' aspirations and expectations, for the same wage 
satisfaction may then be higher. A priori the effect is indeterminate. For a sample of 
middle-aged American men taken in 1966,1969 and 1971 the latter effect is found 
to dominate, with satisfaction higher amongst black respondents within this cohort. 
In contrast, Blanchflower and Oswald (2000), using US General Social Surveys from 
1972 to 1998, observe blacks and other non-white ethnic minorities to report 
statistically significant lower levels of happiness for both men and women. 
Evidence for the UK is more limited. Both Clark (1996), for the British 
Household Panel Survey, and Brown and McIntosh (1998), using a sample of three 
low wage sectors, observe lower levels of ethnic minority job satisfaction. Results 
are not, however, well determined, possibly due to the small number of non-white 




The data studied in this chapter come from two sources, the Workplace Employee 
Relations Survey (WERS) and the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS). 
The QLFS is a nationally representative rolling panel survey, where each 
quarter almost 60,000 households, containing 150,000 individuals, are interviewed. 
Each household is followed for one year (five consecutive quarters) whereupon they 
exit the sample. Earnings are surveyed upon entry and exit. Attention is here 
restricted to those individuals who entered the QLFS, aged 16 to 64, between 1997 
quarter one and 1999 quarter four, with non-missing pay data. The final sample 
contains some 150,000 observations from 110,000 individuals. 
The WERS is a random sample' of around 2,200 British establishments with 
ten or more employees, completed between October 1997 and June 1998. Within 
these workplaces 25 worker questionnaires were randomly allocated amongst the 
employees, for establishments with less than 25 employees the population of 
workers was sampled. This yielded approximately 28,000 individual responses 
matched to 1,800 workplaces (see Appendix for fuller discussion). The employee 
data includes questions on earnings, education, workplace characteristics and a rich 
source of information on worker attitudes. These data are augmented by a 
management questionnaire regarding establishment characteristics. 
Given the ethnic minority population of Britain is relatively small, forming 
only 6.4 percent of the total (Regional Trends, 1999), even random samples may not 
be reliable if the number of respondents are small. This may be especially true when 
8 The survey population in fact excludes establishments in the following Standard Industrial 
Classification (1992) divisions: A (Agriculture, hunting and forestry), B (fishing), C (Mining and 




sub-samples are analysed. The WERS includes around 950 ethnic minority 
employees. The QLFS, with its larger sample size, some 5000. The QLFS is here 
assumed to be representative and used as a base from which results, using the 
WERS data, are compared. 
4.4.1 The Job Satisfaction Data 
Within the WERS all respondents are asked to rate their level of satisfaction with 
respect to four aspects of their employment: influence over the job, total pay, sense 
of achievement, and, the respect received from supervisors. Each of these questions 
was answered on a1 to 5 scale, where 1 corresponded to the highest level of 
satisfaction and 5 the lowest. This scale was reversed so 1 represents the lowest level 
of well-being (very dissatisfied), 5 the highest (very satisfied) and 2 to 4 intermediate 
values. Unfortunately there is no overall job satisfaction question within the WERS 
data, and analysis focuses upon these four questions. 
4.4.2 Comparison of Satisfaction Responses: Interpersonal and over time 
Job satisfaction reflects both objective circumstances, working conditions, and 
subjective factors, aspirations and expectations. This subjectivity has led some 
economists to be sceptical of the concept's worth. Scores may be random draws and 
interpersonal comparisons meaningless. Yet one may then not expect to observe the 
systematic patterns of correlation, between job satisfaction and observed events and 
actions, that have been documented. Satisfaction has been found to influence 
subsequent labour market behaviour. It is a significant predictor of quits (Freeman, 
1978) and is negatively related to absenteeism, non- and counter-productive work. 
Furthermore, it is related, in the expected direction, with other indicators of well- 
being poor mental health, length of life and coronary heart disease (see Clark and 
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Oswald, 1996). Such a pattern of results can probably not be reconciled with a 
purely idiosyncratic variable. 
A more rigorous argument in favour of the ability of the researcher to make 
use of satisfaction data is found in Kahneman et al (1997) who argue that functions 
that relate subjective intensity to physical variables are similar for different types of 
people. They suggest the well-being of any event have a basic scale, pleasant, 
neutral, and unpleasant. Other scales may expand the positive or negative categories 
to a finer degree but the neutral case is a constant. It is argued the distinctiveness of 
this neutral value provides a focal point that allows some confidence in matching 
subjective experiences across time for a given individual and to support 
interpersonal comparisons. 
Whilst it has been suggested that the satisfaction data do allow us to infer 
the relative well-being of different types of individuals, they nevertheless remain 
imperfect. They are qualitative not quantitative, often banded and there is 
considerable potential for measurement error, though this would be less easily 
handled if satisfaction were to be used as an independent variable. 
4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Summary Statistics 
The comparability of the data sets is investigated in Tables 4.1a and 4.1b, and 
summary statistics for white and non-white employees presented for QLFS and 
WERS respectively. 
Within the QLFS, for both males and females, the ethnic minority sample is 
observed to have lower levels of potential experience (age - years of schooling - six) 
and employer tenure, to be more likely to be in temporary employment, and to have 
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greater years of schooling. This greater schooling runs counter to the under- 
education prediction of the statistical discrimination model. If non-white individuals 
are subject to discrimination in employment this may reflect selectivity bias, only the 
most educated may acquire employment. However non-white education levels 
remain markedly higher when all individuals, including those not in paid 
employment, were examined. In the raw data, the average hourly pay of ethnic 
minority men is lower than that for white males. For women the reverse is true, 
minority pay is observed to be greater. The latter finding may reflect the greater 
education of minority workers and their concentration in, and around, London. 
Within the WERS data, and as with the QLFS, minority employees, both 
male and female, are observed with lower levels of job tenure, less general labour 
market experience (here captured by age), greater levels of education, and are more 
likely to be in temporary employment. Non-white workers in the WERS are, on 
average, more highly paid, for both men and women. Again, this may reflect the 
higher education and metropolitan location of ethnic minorities in the UK. Finally, 
non-white individuals work in establishments with more non-white co-workers. 
4.5.2 Estimation strategy 
To investigate these patterns in more detail we turn to regression analysis. Wages 
are here modeled as a function of personal characteristics (such as education, 
experience, gender and race) and employer characteristics (e. g. establishment size, 
industry and the ethnic composition of the workforce). Hourly pay for individual i 
in time period t and employer j, is then expressed in its log-linear form as: 
Wih = %ih ß+ Zh Y+ Ejh 1=1, ... ' il 
(9) 
t=1, .., T 
1=1(i, t)=1,..., m. 
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where, w is the dependent variable, log hourly pay, ' x the vector of worker 
characteristics, z the vector of employer characteristics, " E the conformable error 
term with mean zero and constant variance, and 0 and y the vectors of parameters 
to be estimated. 
For the WERS data, models are also estimated which account for the, 
potential, unobserved heterogeneity of employers, by including an establishment 
effect upon wages (f) common to all workers within a plant: 
Wig =x 11I 
+ 21, y + 1j 
+ Ey (10) 
(As the WERS data are a cross-section the time subscript is dropped. ) Implicitly this 
assumes the difference in wages between any two workers in the same 
establishment is solely attributable to individual characteristics. Parameters are then 
estimated by taking within plant mean deviations (subtracting plant averages): 
(w;; - w). = 
(x;; 
- x), 
ß + (£;; - E) (11) 
Whilst employer heterogeneity is controlled for individual heterogeneity, both 
observed and unobserved, remains as deviations from plant means. 
4.5.3 Results by Ethnic group 
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 estimate wage equations for the white and ethnic minority 
samples, by gender, for the QLFS and WERS respectively. Estimates generally 
match standard earnings equation predictions and attention is focussed upon 
examining differences between racial groups. 
9 The WERS pay data are observed only as a grouped variable. Here mid-points are taken and pay 
proxied as continuous. Estimates of pay equations using these mid-point and the more robust 
Grouped regression method of Stewart (1983a) yield practically identical predictions. 
10 Industry is coded at the one-digit level due to the limited number of non-white respondents in 
the WERS. Unless explicitly stated occupation is not included as a control variable in regression 
analysis, due to the possibility of discriminatory barriers upon occupational attainment. 
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For both males and females the returns to schooling are estimated to be 
smaller for non-whites. This is consistent with statistical discrimination, but may 
also reflect a lower quality of ethnic minority education. Within the QLFS, non- 
whites are observed to experience faster wage growth with respect to tenure and 
slower growth with respect to potential experience. Estimates may, however, be 
complicated by racial differences in the time spent outside the labour market. With 
respect to union recognition, within the WERS a positive and statistically robust 
union pay effect is observed for non-white male employees, but not for white males, 
white females or ethnic minority females. " This provides some support for the 
hypothesis that unions compress the (male) racial wage differential. 
To what extent can the differences in coefficients explain the differences in 
wages between the racial groups? Using the Oaxaca (1973) mean wage 
decomposition technique we estimate the portion of the log wage gap that cannot 
be explained by observed characteristics. This unexplained differential captures the 
effects of both discrimination and unobserved differences in characteristics. For 
the QLFS, the (mean) wage differential between ethnic minority and white workers 
is estimated to be -0.191 for males and -0.119 for females. 'Z For the WERS, the 
comparable figures are -0.207 and -0.083. " These results suggest the two data sets 
offer broadly comparable estimates of the racial differential in wages. 
4.5.4 Immigration and the wage differential 
The British ethnic minority population comprises a large number of first generation 
immigrants. Estimates may then combine the effects of race and immigration, with 
11 See Metcalf et al (2000) for an analysis of the role of unions in compressing pay differentials. 
12 The lower racial wage differential for females is itself a pervasive empirical regularity (see 
Altonji and Blank, 1999). 
13 The decomposition is calculated using WERS weighted means. 
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potentially misleading inferences. This issue is investigated in Table 4.4. 
Regressions now estimate restricted models, where coefficients arc held constant 
across racial groups, and an ethnic minority indicator captures the difference in 
wages between otherwise similar white and minority workers. 
Columns one and two estimate wage equations for men and women, the 
racial wage gap is estimated to be -0.182 and -0.112 respectively. These estimates are 
very similar to those obtained from the Oaxaca decomposition in Table 4.2. As the 
majority of non-white individuals born in the UK are aged 40 or below, attention is 
restricted to this age range in columns three and four. Parameter estimates upon the 
minority indicator are identical to those observed previously. 14 Attention is further 
restricted to individuals born in the UK in columns five and six of Table 4.4. The 
estimated non-white parameters fall by around a half, to -0.100 for males and -0.054 
for females, but remain statistically well determined. 
Immigrant status here explains approximately half of the racial pay 
differential. This may result from different language skills, a lower market valuation 
upon foreign education, the occupational choices of migrants, or discrimination. It 
is not, however, common to native-born minority workers. This should be borne in 
mind when examining estimates, as for the WERS, where no controls for immigrant 
status are available. 
4.5.5 The Ethnic composition of the workforce 
The effect of the ethnic composition of the plant (defined as the proportion of the 
workforce who are from an ethnic minority) upon pay is analysed in Table 4.5, using 
the WERS data. Coefficients are held constant across racial groups and a non-white 
14 Results are not dependent upon this age restriction. 
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indicator captures the racial differential in wages. This is estimated to be -0.199 for 
men and -0.092 for women. These estimates are comparable to those obtained using 
the Oaxaca technique, in Table 4.3. 
The establishment's ethnic minority employment share15 is entered in the 
wage equation in columns two and five of Table 4.5. For men, the non-white 
employment share enters negatively, and is statistically significantly different from 
zero, with a coefficient of -0.199. A 10 percent increase in the proportion of non- 
white workers in the establishment is predicted to reduce wages by approximately 2 
percent. " For women, the workforce ethnic composition enters negatively with a 
parameter of -0.073, but is not statistically well determined. The estimated racial 
wage differential declines from -0.199 to -0.178, for men, and from -0.092 to -0.082, 
for women. Pay is then, on average, lower in establishments with a large non-white 
presence, but this is found to explain only a small part of the ethnic wage gap. 
Columns three and six, of Table 4.5, examine whether the plant's ethnic 
composition affects white and minority pay differently, by including an interaction 
term between minority status and the non-white employment share. The wages of 
white males are observed to be lower, white females higher, within plants with a 
greater proportion of minority staff. Neither effect is statistically different from 
zero. The effect of the workplace's ethnic composition upon non-white wages, 
both male and female, is, however, both negative and statistically robust. A 10 
percent increase in the ethnic minority employment share is estimated to reduce log 
wages by -0.047 for ethnic men and by -0.049 for ethnic women, over and above 
15 Unfortunately this variable cannot be broken down by gender. 
16 Pudney (2000) finds, to the contrary, plants with a greater proportion of non-white workers pay 
higher wages. However, he has no controls for region, as present in this analysis, so picks up the 
larger presence of minority workers in the South East. Blanchflower (1984,1986) using the 
predecessor WIRS surveys found mixed evidence that typical manual pay levels were lower in 
plants with a higher proportion of non-white workers. 
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the effects observed for white males and females. " Indeed, the lower pay of non- 
white women in minority plants, here, largely accounts for the female racial pay gap. 
Similar evidence has been observed for the US. Carrington and Troske 
(1998) find white wages are increasing in the black share of plant employment, black 
wages declining. Hirsch and Schumacher (1992) observe both white and black 
wages to be declining in the proportion of black employees in the labour market 
(characterised by industry-occupation-region cells). The fording that, for some 
reason, non-white wages are lower in establishments with more minority employees 
then appears robust. The behaviour of white wages appears less clear cut. 
One concern with the estimates in Table 4.5 is that the UK's ethnic minority 
population is relatively concentrated in large metropolitan cities. Regions or plants 
where there is little or no contact with non-white employees may then drive results, 
especially for white workers. Equations are then estimated for the Greater London 
region in Tables 4.6. The non-white population here constitutes around a quarter of 
the cities total population, and approximately half of all Britain's ethnic minority 
residents (Regional Trends, 1999). The racial wage differential is estimated to be 
larger in London than for Britain as a whole, -0.306 compared to -0.199 for men 
and -0.180 compared to -0.092 for women, in a region with a much higher degree of 
racial integration than the national norm. 
With respect to the plant's ethnic composition, results for females are 
similar to those observed previously. White females suffer no penalty from working 
in plants with more minority workers whilst non-white pay is statistically 
significantly lower. The wages of white males in London are, however, found to be 
statistically significantly lower within plants with more non-white co-workers. A 10 
17 Unrestricted models, where all parameters are allowed to differ by race, yield similar results. 
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percent increase in the minority share of establishment employment is associated 
with a fall in white wages of -0.033 percent. For minority males the analogous fall 
in wages is -0.030 percent, over and above the effect upon white pay. 
" 
Finally, Table 4.7 estimates how the racial wage differential varies by the 
ethnic minority share of establishment employment. Logically, given previous 
results, the racial wage gap is estimated to be greater in plants with a higher 
proportion of ethnic minority employees. '9 
How do these results relate to the predictions of the models outlined earlier? 
Whilst not providing a complete test, the evidence does allow an extensive 
examination of the predictions of the competing theories. 
Black's (1995) model of employer discrimination predicts that as more non- 
white workers enter the (local) labour market the probability of a minority individual 
finding a good job match will rise. In turn, non-white wages increase and the racial 
wage gap falls. We observe non-white wages to be lower within workplaces with 
larger proportions of ethnic minority staff. Yet this can only test Black's model if a 
larger proportion of minority employees reflect a greater presence of non-white 
workers within the labour market. This need not be the case. An increase in the 
number of prejudiced employers will crowd minority workers into fewer 
unprejudiced firms, raising the ethnic composition of these plants, whilst reducing 
minority wages and increasing the pay gap. 
Potentially more convincing evidence is that for London, where the ethnic 
minority population is much larger, the racial wage differential is observed to be 
18 This measures the marginal effect of the plant's ethnic minority employment share upon non- 
white pay, and is relative to the effect upon white pay. The total effect is the sum of the effects 
upon white and non-white pay. For minority males, this is -0.063 in London and -0.056 for the 
national sample. 




greater than for the rest of the country. This was also observed in the QLFS, both 
for all individuals and those aged 40 and below and born in the UK. The geographic 
clustering of non-white individuals in London may lead one to expect the opposite 
result. Ethnic minority workers' job opportunities are here likely to be superior, 
hence the racial wage gap lower, due to the greater likelihood of encountering a 
non-white employer and the reduced opportunities for prejudiced firms to survive 
in equilibrium. Nevertheless, a more rigorous test would examine the change in 
wages, over time, as a region's labour force changes in ethnic composition. This is 
not possible with these data. 
A model of customer discrimination predicts white pay to be increasing in 
the plant's ethnic minority employment share, as consumer prejudice implies white 
productivity is greater in plants with more non-white staff. Non-white pay is 
expected to be lower, as minority workers have to compensate the employer for the 
lower prices necessary to attract prejudiced white consumers. The racial wage gap is 
then predicted to rise with the non-white employment share. The evidence is 
supportive as regards ethnic minority pay and the racial wage differential, but does 
not match predictions with respect to white wages. One would also expect such 
factors to be less important in London, where the larger pool of minority customers 
will act to offset the impact of prejudiced white consumers. 
A model of employee prejudice would predict white pay to be greater in 
workplaces with more non-white staff, as white workers require a compensating 
differential to work with minority co-workers. White pay is, however, observed to 
be largely unrelated to the ethnic minority employment share. Alternatively, non- 
white workers may be more likely to suffer from racial abuse in 'white' plants and 
hence require a compensating differential to work in such establishments. Yet given 
the relatively small size of the ethnic minority population in the UK, non-white 
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workers are unlikely to be compensated with higher pay than white workers. 
Instead, minority workers may trade off lower pay for working with more non-white 
co-workers. This would explain why non-white pay is higher, and the racial pay 
differential smaller, in `white' plants. Yet, if employers are unprejudiced we would 
expect them to hire whichever labour is cheaper, and for competition for labour to 
equalise wages between segregated plants. 
Plants who hire more non-white workers may be expected to have a greater 
understanding of non-white individuals' abilities. Ethnic minority workers may then 
achieve superior job matches in such establishments and, if productivity is 
increasing in match quality, earn higher wages. Alternatively, if plants with more 
ethnic minority staff have a greater awareness of minority skills, they will have less 
recourse to use race as an indicator of productivity. If we assume firms are risk 
averse, rather than risk neutral, non-white wages will then be higher in more 
ethnically mixed plants. The reverse is observed to be true. The evidence as to 
statistical discrimination explaining the racial wage gap is then, here, scant. 
The crowding model of Johnson and Stafford (1998), utilising the 
assumptions of differential discrimination and comparative advantage between jobs, 
predicts the racial pay gap to be lower within `minority' plants. The evidence above 
is not supportive. Whether the racial wage gap is due to white workers filling more 
senior positions, within the plant, is examined, in section 4.5.6, below. 
Finally, if ethnic minority workers are, for some reason, less productive, the 
plant's ethnic composition may act as an indicator of a low-skill labour force. Then 
high-skill, high-wage, non-white employees will work in establishments with fewer 
ethnic minority co-workers. This would support the finding of a negative effect of 
the non-white employment share on minority pay. One may also then expect white 
wages to be lower in such establishments. Some limited support is found for this 
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hypothesis for males, but very little for females. A true test of this hypothesis would, 
however, require a racially unbiased ability measure. Unfortunately such a measure is 
not available within these data. 
4.5.6 Occupation and Establishment Effects 
The impact of occupation upon the racial wage differential is examined in Table 
4.8.2" Column one estimates the male racial wage differential at -0.201. Controls for 
occupation are added in column three, and the estimated racial pay gap falls by 30 
percent to -0.140. For females the estimated parameter upon ethnic minority status 
falls by around 20 percent, from -0.091 to -0.072 (Table 4.8, columns five and 
seven). Occupational differences do then explain a significant proportion of racial 
differences in pay, yet whether these differences reflect worker skill, individual 
choice or discrimination remains unclear. The unexplained racial wage differential 
does, however, remain large and statistically significantly different from zero. 
The question remains to what extent the racial wage differential can be 
explained by employer characteristics, or by the matching of high-skill workers to 
high-wage firms. Table 4.8 indicates the answer is little. The addition of 
establishment effects, which capture all plant characteristics and the mean 
characteristics of employees in the workplace, reduces the estimate of the ethnic 
wage differential from -0.201 to -0.165 for men and from -0.091 to -0.086 for 
women. When controls for worker occupation are present a similar picture emerges, 
the male wage differential is estimated to decline from -0.140 to -0.126, whilst for 
women the differential increases slightly, from -0.072 to -0.082. All estimates 
remain statistically robust. Establishment effects here constitute a relatively modest 
20 Estimates are conditional upon observing at least three workers, by gender, within the plant. 
150 
Race 
contribution to the racial pay gap. Minority workers are paid significantly less than 
otherwise comparable whites in the same broad occupational group, and within the 
same workplace. 
The primary avenue for the racial wage differential is not that non-whites 
are employed in low-pay establishments, rather they are, here, paid lower wages, on 
average, in any given plant. This is apparently the first such evidence for the UK, 
and parallels that found for the US (Carrington and Troske, 1998). 
4.5.7 Job satisfaction 
Whether there exist racial differences in reported job satisfaction levels is now 
analysed. A racial satisfaction differential, holding pay constant, could reflect 
discrimination upon non-pecuniary compensation, different working conditions or 
different expectations. If discrimination occurs, and was not fully anticipated, non- 
white workers may be less satisfied than equally paid whites. Yet if discrimination 
was expected, equally paid minority employees will have surpassed expectations and 
satisfaction may be higher. 
Satisfaction is assumed a function of personal characteristics (such as 
education, experience, gender and race), employer characteristics (e. g. establishment 
size, industry, the ethnic composition of the workforce) and variables associated 
with the labour contract (income, hours of work). Job satisfaction for individual i in 
time period t and employer j, is then expressed as: 
s*; n=y; ncp+x; hß+zn'y+u; n i=1,..., n (12) 
t=1, .., T 
1-1(ýt)=1,..., m. 
Where, s* is the satisfaction variable, y the vector of pay and hours variables, x the 
vector of worker characteristics, z the vector of employer characteristics, u the 
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conformable error term with mean zero and constant variance, and cp, 0 and y the 
vectors of parameters to be estimated. 1 
The satisfaction data are observed as ordered categorical responses (on a 
scale 1,2, ..., K). These map latent well-being (s*) into discrete space (s) as below: 
s; nk ifµk_, <s*<_µk`dk=1,..., K (13) 
Estimation is then by the Ordered Probit technique of McKelvey and Zavoina 
(1975). This imposes the restrictions; µo < µ, < ... < µK; µo _ -°°; µK = °°; and the 
normalisation µ, =0 and ßu = 1. The probability of observing a response within a 
category, k, is then: 
Pr (s = k) = (D(µk - y;, (p - x; n (3 - zn'Y) - (D A_, - y; n cp - x; n (3 - zn Y) (14) 
Where, c(. ) is the standard normal distribution function and parameters are 
estimated by maximum likelihood. Larger coefficients denote higher levels of 
satisfaction are more likely. 
Table 4.9 investigates the effect of the ethnic composition of the workforce 
upon employee job satisfaction using the WERS data. For white employees, both 
male and female, working in a plant with more ethnic minority co-workers is found 
to reduce satisfaction with respect to all four measures of well-being (satisfaction 
with: pay, respect from managers, influence over job, and sense of achievement). 
However, only for satisfaction with influence for men, and satisfaction with pay and 
achievement for women, are coefficients statistically well determined. With respect 
to minority males, results are mixed. Non-white men employed in plants with more 
minority co-workers are more satisfied with their pay and the amount of influence 
they have over their job, and less satisfied with their sense of achievement and the 
respect of managers. However, no effect is statistically robust. In contrast, for non- 
21 As with all models of job satisfaction this implicitly assumes responses are cardinal. 
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white females the proportion of the plant from an ethnic minority enters negatively 
in all four cases, and effects are on the border of statistical significance for 
satisfaction with pay and satisfaction with the respect from managers. 
Plants where ethnic minority workers form a large proportion of the 
workforce are then, here, associated with lower levels of job satisfaction. This is true 
for white males, white females and ethnic minority women. Results for minority 
males are, however, mixed. ' Results appear most consistent with workplaces with 
more minority staff offering inferior working conditions. Whilst a preference for 
segregation could explain the lower levels of white satisfaction in `minority' plants, it 
cannot easily rationalise why minority satisfaction levels are not higher in such 
workplaces. In the presence of discrimination, one may further expect higher levels 
of non-white well-being in `minority' plants, given the plausible assumption that 
such employers are less prejudiced. 
Are non-white individuals less satisfied than otherwise comparable whites? 
This issue is examined in Table 4.10a. Amongst male employees, minority workers 
are more satisfied with their influence, achievement and respect from management. 
This may reflect lower expectations of non-white men, possibly due to 
discrimination in the workplace or prior to labour market entry. For the same wage, 
non-white satisfaction may then be higher. Nevertheless, effects are not statistically 
well determined. Satisfaction with pay, however, is statistically significantly lower for 
non-white men. For women, all satisfaction questions exhibit a negative race effect, 
with a statistically robust effect upon both pay and achievement. Table 4.10b 
reports the marginal effects of the estimates. Non-white men are 4.8 percent more 
likely to respond as dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with their pay and -4.2 percent 
22 Conclusions are unchanged if controls for pay are omitted. 
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less likely to be satisfied or very satisfied, than a similarly paid white male. For non- 
white women, the comparable figures are 6.2 percent and -6.0 percent respectively, 
relative to a similarly paid white female. 
Whether the relationship between satisfaction and income is similar for 
white and non-white workers is examined in Table 4.11, and the ethnic minority 
indicator interacted with income. Results are restricted to the male sample, as no 
differential effect of income upon satisfaction was observed for females. Ethnic 
minority males are found to report higher levels of well-being at low income levels, 
but as earnings rise non-white satisfaction grows at a slower rate than that for white 
men. This differential effect is, however, statistically robust only for satisfaction with 
influence and satisfaction with the respect received from management. Indeed, here 
the satisfaction of non-white males is relatively flat across the pay distribution. This 
may reflect more moderate aspirations of low-skilled non-white men, for whom 
relative achievement is greater. For more highly paid minority workers, however, 
feelings of dissatisfaction become more pronounced. In contrast, for satisfaction 
with pay very similar income effects are observed for white and non-white men. 
Whether the source of non-white individuals lower satisfaction with pay 
(Table 4.10a) occurs within or between plants is investigated in Table 4.12. Row 
one reports the racial parameter from satisfaction equations estimated by the 
Ordered Probit technique. Row two reports OLS estimates. Results are substantially 
the same. Employer specific differences in satisfaction levels are captured, in row 
three, by the inclusion of an establishment effect. For men, the addition of these 
controls leaves the estimated racial parameter upon satisfaction with pay largely 
unaltered. For women, the estimated racial differential is attenuated but remains 
statistically significantly different from zero. Satisfaction with pay is here lower for 
ethnic minority employees, both male and female, compared to otherwise similar 
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white workers in the same plant, holding pay constant. In row four of Table 4.12 
pay is omitted. For both men and women, the estimated differential in satisfaction 
with pay increases. Conditional upon observed characteristics, lower non-white pay 
accounts for over half of the male racial differential in satisfaction with pay, and 
around a quarter of the female differential. 
Interestingly, within the same plant, ethnic minority men are observed to be 
more satisfied with their sense of achievement, influence over the job, and the 
respect they receive from management. The latter two effects are also statistically 
robust. Again this may reflect lower expectations of non-white workers, and hence 
greater satisfaction. The question remains why diminished expectations should 
affect satisfaction with influence but not satisfaction with pay. A possible 
explanation is that influence over the job, the sense of achievement, and feeling 
respected by ones employer, are intrinsic concepts. In contrast, wage information is 
more readily available and directly comparable, and expectations as to ones 
comparable worth may be more quickly revised. 
In summary, ethnic minority workers are found to work within plants with 
lower levels of job satisfaction. Perhaps the most convincing evidence that this 
reflects inferior working conditions is that the plant's ethnic minority employment 
share exerts a negative influence upon the large majority of measures of job 
satisfaction, for both white and ethnic minority men and women. Results are, 
however, not always well determined. This evidence is potentially consistent with 
both discrimination (possibly related to crowding) and unobserved differences in 
worker skill. 
Are non-white workers less satisfied with their pay than observationally 
equivalent white employees? The evidence suggests so. For both men and women 
we estimate a statistically significant negative effect of race upon satisfaction with 
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pay, within the same workplace and holding pay constant. This finding is in line 
with what would be expected if non-white employees face discrimination. An 
alternative explanation is that non-white workers have higher expectations, and so 
are less satisfied for the same wage. Yet this does not seem convincing given 
widespread perceptions of racism and discrimination. More concretely, Table 4.10a 
and Table 4.12 suggest the relationship between satisfaction with pay and pay itself 
is similar for minority and white employees. Whilst a negative race effect upon 
satisfaction may be evidence of discrimination it does not necessarily imply wages 
are discriminatory. Ethnic minority workers may be subject to harassment and 
prejudice even if wages are set competitively. Yet, for this to cause the negative 
effect of race upon satisfaction with pay, we would expect similar strong negative 
effects upon the other three satisfaction measures. This is not the case. z' 
4.5.8 Turnover, Tenure and Absenteeism 
An alternative to analysing subjective measures of worker well-being is to examine 
indicators of working conditions. Using the WERS establishment-level data, which 
is representative of all plants with ten or more employees, we investigate the impact 
of the plant's ethnic composition upon quits, turnover and absenteeism. 
Columns one and two of Table 4.13 examine the determinants of the 
establishment's quit rate. In practice the distinction between quits and dismissals 
may not be clear, as there are potential benefits from a separation being in one form 
rather than the other. Individuals may face penalties, in terms of benefit eligibility, 
following a voluntary quit. Whilst employers turnover costs may be lower if they are 
able to induce quits on the part of employees, rather than resorting to dismissals. In 
23 A similar argument suggests this does not simply reflect perceptions of discrimination. 
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columns three and four, of Table 4.13, we then estimate equations upon total 
separations from the plant. 24 Turnover rates are here defined as the number of 
quits, or separations, within the last year relative to the total number employees last 
year. Rates may then exceed the unit interval, and equations are estimated by OLS. 25 
Table 4.13 shows plants with more ethnic minority employees are associated 
with statistically significantly higher rates of quits and separations. ' A 10 percent 
increase in the ethnic minority employment share is predicted to increase the rate of 
quits by 1.2 percent, the rate of separations by 1.3 percent. The proportion of full- 
time employees, within the establishment, earning less than £9,000 per annum and 
the proportion earning more than 22,000 are entered in columns two and four of 
Table 4.13, and parameters are relative to intermediate pay levels. Whilst imperfect, 
these should broadly proxy the effect of pay. 
As would be expected, the rate of quits and separations are negatively 
related to pay. 27 Turnover is increasing in the proportion of low pay workers, and 
decreasing in the proportion of employees paid 22,000 or more. This is despite the 
potential endogeneity bias, running from quits onto pay. The estimated parameters 
upon the racial composition of the plant are, however, largely unaltered. Finally, 
more skilled plants, as captured by the time it takes a new hire to become as 
proficient as an incumbent worker, are found to experience lower rates of turnover. 
The higher rate of turnover in plants with more minority workers may 
combine employer and employee effects. Minority plants may offer inferior working 
conditions, with a higher rate of quits for both white and non-white employees. Or 
24 To account for possible measurement error and outliers, observations above the 99`s percentile 
were trimmed. Results are not dependent upon this sampling condition. 
25 The (weighted) means of the quit and separation rates are respectively 0.163 and 0.228. 
26 Knight and Latreille (2000), analysing the same data set, find a higher rate of dismissals within 
plants with more ethnic minority employees. 
Weiss (1984), Leonard (1987), Campbell (1993), and Benito (1997), observe similar results. 
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plants with high rates of turnover may be more willing to hire minority workers. 28 
Alternatively, ethnic minority workers may be more likely to quit than are similar 
white employees. Here previous evidence is mixed. Weiss (1984) observes, to the 
contrary, black workers in the US to have a lower rate of quits. Zax (1989), in 
contrast, fmds a positive effect of race upon quits, once racial differences in 
responses to commuting time and local unemployment are controlled for. 
Evidence is presented in Table 4.14, for the WERS individual-level data, 
that non-white workers have lower levels of establishment tenure, compared to 
otherwise similar whites. " Results are, however, statistically significant only at the 
ten percent level. Columns two and four, of Table 4.14, examine the relationship 
between tenure, race, and the racial composition of the plant. The workplace tenure 
of white employees, both male and female, is observed to be statistically significantly 
lower in plants with a higher non-white employment share. For ethnic minority 
workers, both male and female, the reverse is true; tenure is statistically significantly 
greater in plants with a greater proportion of non-white co-workers. 30 A 10 percent 
increase in the non-white employment share is predicted to increase tenure by, on 
average, 5 months for minority men and women, compared to white employees. 
This evidence is consistent with employees expressing a preference for 
segregation; minority tenure is greater, white tenure lower, in plants with more non- 
white co-workers. The hypothesis that establishments with a larger proportion of 
minority workers are associated with inferior working conditions finds support in 
the lower levels of white tenure, but is contradicted by the higher levels of minority 
tenure. It is possible, however, that non-white employees trade off potential gains in 
28 The racial composition of the plant is observed only after turnover has taken place. 
29 Mumford and Smith (2000), using the same data, similarly find a negative effect of race upon 
job tenure. Moreover, this effect is found to occur for workers within the same establishment. 
Results are essentially the same if controls for pay are included. 
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working conditions to work with more ethnic minority co-workers. Alternatively, if 
high-skill ethnic minority employees work in `white' plants the greater non-white 
tenure in `minority' plants may reflect the reduced set of outside options of less 
skilled workers. The opposite effect is, however, observed for whites in these plants. 
Table 4.15 investigates the relationship between the plant's ethnic minority 
employment share and the proportion of days lost to absenteeism. ' As the 
dependent variable is a proportion, and bounded between zero and one, standard 
least squares analysis is inefficient (for reasons analogous to the linear probability 
model in binary data). An alternative technique, corresponding to a logit model of 
behaviour, is to transform the dependent proportion variable (p) into its log-odds 
ratio form and to estimate by weighted least squares on the transformed variable. 
Ln ( 
P. )=xi+Ej j=1,..., m. (15) 1-pj 
E(c1) =0 and V(E)) = n, A; (1-Aý) 
where, n is plant employment, A the logistic cumulative distribution function, and 
weights account for the heteroskedastic error variance (see Greene, 2000). 32 
Plants with more ethnic minority employees are found to experience 
statistically significantly higher rates of absenteeism, both with and without 
conditioning upon pay within the establishment. A 10 percent increase in the 
minority employment share is predicted to reduce the proportion of days lost due to 
absences by 0.37 percent, relative to the mean of 3.9 percent" Similar results were 
observed when equations were estimated, by OLS, on the proportions. 
31 Observations are trimmed at the 991° percentile. Results are not dependent upon this restriction. 
32 Where the proportion is zero, and the transformation undefined, a small constant is added. 
33 To calculate the marginal effect of xx on pj (i. e. apj / ax; ) multiply coefficients by p; (1-pj), 
which at the mean equals 0.0375. 
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Absenteeism is negatively related to pay. The number of days lost is 
increasing in the proportion of low pay workers, and decreasing in the proportion 
of employees paid L22,000 or more. The skill of the plant, as measured by the time 
it takes to become proficient at the largest occupation, does not, however, exert a 
statistically robust effect upon absenteeism. These results echo fmdings for the US 
(Leigh, 1983). 
Nevertheless, estimates may again capture workplace and individual effects. 
Moreover, it is not clear a priori whether the higher rates of absenteeism, in plants 
with large non-white workforces, reflects dissatisfaction or labour supply 
adjustments in the face of constraints on work time (Allen, 1981). 
4.5.9 The determinants of the ethnic composition of the workforce 
The effect of the racial composition of the workforce upon pay and well-being has 
been examined above. The determinants of the plant's ethnic minority employment 
share are now analysed using the WERS establishment data. Some 40 percent of 
plants, within the WERS, report employing no minority workers, hence estimation 
is by the Tobit technique. Table 4.16a reports parameter estimates corresponding to 
the latent variable. Marginal effects are reported in Table 4.16b. 
The effect of aptitude tests, upon the workforce's ethnic composition, is 
examined in row one. Such tests may leave less scope for individual prejudice in 
hiring decisions, and hence induce a larger stream of non-white applicants. If 
aptitude tests provide an accurate signal of worker quality they may also surmount 
the statistical discrimination problem, that qualifications of minority workers are less 
informative. 34 We would then predict more minority workers to be hired. A worker 
34 The lines of causality are here, and for the other parameters, open to debate. 
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skill explanation, however, suggests no strong relation between tests and hiring. 
Workers will be assigned to jobs commensurate with their skill, irrespective of race. 
Aptitude tests are here estimated to increase the proportion of the workforce from 
ethnic minorities by 0.9 percent, parameters are not, however, well determined. 
The statistical discrimination model is further explored by the inclusion of 
variables indicating whether an employer is especially concerned with qualifications 
or personal references when hiring. Where they are, statistical discrimination may be 
more likely. In both cases we observe a statistically significant lower proportion of 
non-white staff. Where a personal reference is important, the non-white 
employment share is estimated to be -1.9 percent lower, for qualifications the 
comparable figure is -2.1 percent. As sample statistics show the ethnic minority 
population to be more educated, it is difficult to rationalise the latter result without 
recourse to an employer belief that minority qualifications are less informative or 
inferior, or that workplaces with large minority workforces are, here, less skilled. 
As Holzer (1997) observed for the US, large establishments hire a 
statistically significant larger number of non-white employees. Whether this reflects 
differential discrimination, worker choice or other factors cannot though be 
ascertained. Finally, results are largely invariant to the introduction of controls for 
pay and skill, themselves likely to be endogenously related to workforce 
composition. 
The sensitivity of the estimates is examined in columns three and four of 
Table 4.16a. Heteroskedasticity has been observed to be a particular problem for 
the Tobit model. Johnston and DiNardo (1997) report Monte Carlo evidence that, 
in the presence of heteroskedasticity, OLS may have a smaller bias and variance. 
OLS estimates are then reported in column five. Column six follows the Censored 
Least Absolute Deviations (CLAD) procedure suggested by Powell (1984), this 
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provides consistent estimates in the face of heterokedasticity and non-normality. 
Results remain, largely, consistent for the Tobit, OLS and CLAD35 estimates. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has investigated the relationship between race, the racial composition 
of establishments, pay and job satisfaction. Ethnic minorities in Britain are observed 
to earn less than, observationally equivalent, white employees. The racial wage 
differential is estimated to be approximately -20 percent for men and -10 percent 
for women. Around half of these differentials can be attributed to immigrant status. 
Whilst this may reflect discrimination, it cannot be associated purely with race. 
Using new data, with detailed information about both the employer and the 
employee, we find non-white workers earn substantially lower wages in plants with 
more ethnic minority co-workers. White wages, on the other hand, are only weakly 
related to the racial composition of the plant. The gap between ethnic minority and 
white pay is hence larger in establishments with more non-white staff. In addition, 
the racial wage differential remains for employees in the same occupation and 
workplace. Consequently, the primary source of the observed racial wage gap is not 
that ethnic minority workers are employed in low-pay plants, rather they are less 
well paid in any given workplace. 
The evidence does not then lend strong support to the hypothesis that non- 
white workers are `crowded' into low-pay establishments. Workplace effects are 
found to explain little of the racial wage differential. The model of crowding 
predicted the racial wage gap to be smaller in plants where minority employment is 
35 Implemented in STATA by code provided in Deaton (1997). 
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greater, assuming these employers are less prejudiced. In fact, the racial wage 
differential was here larger. Occupational attainment is found to account for a 
significant proportion of the racial pay differential. Yet large unexplained, and 
statistically significant, differences in pay remain. Moreover, it is not clear whether 
racial differences in occupational status reflect discrimination or worker skill 
differences. 
Statistical discrimination is not found to offer a good explanation of the 
behaviour of wages. Employers who hire more minority workers are likely to have a 
greater awareness of the reliability of minority individuals' abilities, and less recourse 
to use race as an indicator of productivity. Yet it is in these plants where the wage 
gap is observed to be greatest. Evidence is, however, found consistent with 
statistical discrimination in hiring. The plant's non-white employment share is 
observed to be lower where qualifications are an important factor in recruitment. 
The model of employer discrimination investigated predicted a positive 
relationship between the number of non-white workers in the labour market and 
non-white pay. This is because, in the model, a larger ethnic minority labour pool 
reduces the number of prejudiced firms who can survive in equilibrium, improving 
employment opportunities for minority workers, hence raising non-white pay. The 
limited evidence here is not supportive. Within London, where ethnic minority 
residents form a much larger share of the total population than the national norm, 
the racial pay gap was estimated to be larger than for the country for as a whole. 
Job satisfaction data are used to test whether worker well-being is lower for 
non-white employees. Ethnic minority workers are observed to be less satisfied with 
their pay, even when pay is held constant. Non-white men are 4.8 percent more 
likely to respond as dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with their pay and -4.2 percent 
less likely to be satisfied or very satisfied, than a similarly paid white male. For non- 
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white women, the comparable figures are 6.2 percent and -6.0 percent respectively, 
relative to a similarly paid white female. 
Workplaces that employ more non-white staff are also found to have lower 
levels of job satisfaction, for white males, white females and for ethnic minority 
women. Results are, however, more mixed for non-white men. Other evidence, 
consistent with the hypothesis well-being is lower in `minority' workplaces, is found 
in the higher rates of quits, separations, and absenteeism in these plants. 
The lower levels of employee well-being in workplaces with a greater non- 
white employment share are, potentially, consistent with discrimination and 
crowding. More robust evidence, in favour of discrimination upon pay, is that 
ethnic minority employees are observed to be less satisfied with their pay, than 
otherwise similar white workers, even when pay is held constant. 
A preference for segregation would explain the lower levels of white 
satisfaction and tenure in `minority' plants, but then cannot easily rationalise why 
non-white satisfaction is not greater in such establishments. Prejudiced white 
employees would also be expected to demand a compensating differential, for 
working with ethnic minority co-workers, yet white wages are estimated to be 
independent or falling with respect to the plants ethnic composition. 
Alternatively, non-white workers may be more likely to encounter racism in 
a `white' plant. Ethnic minority employees may then trade off lower pay for working 
with more minority co-workers. This is consistent with the lower pay and greater 
tenure of non-white workers in plants with a greater ethnic minority employment 
share, but it cannot explain why non-white satisfaction is not higher in such plants. 
Whilst there is some evidence in support of a preference for segregation, given the 
model provides no strong rationale for the existence of a pay differential, it seems 
more likely to work in conjunction with other explanations for the racial wage gap. 
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The unobserved productivity hypothesis, that ethnic minority employees are 
for some reason less productive, offers a potentially convincing explanation for 
observed behaviour. Workplaces that hire more ethnic minority employees are, 
under this hypothesis, liable to be less skilled and to offer inferior working 
conditions, explaining the lower pay and satisfaction within these plants. The lower 
racial wage differential in plants with less minority workers would then reflect a 
positive selection of the most able minority employees to work in `white' 
establishments. Whilst this hypothesis cannot be rejected, a true test requires a 
racially unbiased ability measure. Unfortunately such a measure is not available 
within these data. 
In summary, non-white workers are, here, employed in workplaces with 
lower levels of worker well-being. This may, however, reflect discrimination or 
unobserved worker quality differences. Results are also presented which suggest 
ethnic minority employees may trade off lower pay to work with more minority co- 
workers. Nevertheless, ethnic minority employees are found to be less satisfied with 
their pay, compared to otherwise similar white workers, even when pay is held 
constant. This provides new evidence potentially indicative of racial discrimination, 









Hourly Pay 8.92 (6.22) 8.10 (4.51) 6.60 (5.06) 6.96 (4.52) 
Potential Experience 22.22 (12.21) 18.02 (10.86) 22.23 (11.92) 18.53 (10.86) 
Tenure 9.00 (9.12) 6.25 (6.49) 7.01 (7.05) 5.85 (6.49) 
Years of Schooling 11.19 (2.55) 13.01 (2.99) 11.15 (2.32) 12.50 (2.98) 
Qualification: Degree 0.18 (0.38) 0.24 (0.43) 0.14 (0.35) 0.18 (0.39) 
Workplace size 25 or more 0.72 (0.45) 0.71 (0.45) 0.63 (0.48) 0.71 (0.45) 
Temporary job 0.05 (0.22) 0.09 (0.29) 0.07 (0.25) 0.10 (0.30) 
Public Sector Employee 0.21 (0.41) 0.20 (0.40) 0.36 (0.48) 0.39 (0.49) 
Number of Individuals 55647 2487 56868 
Number of Observations 77029 3182 79302 
" Standard deviations are in parentheses. Pay is deflated to January 1997 values. 
TABLE 4.1 a 
QLFS Sample Means (1997-99) 
TABLE 4.1b 







Hourly Pay 7.88 (5.02) 8.14 (9.87) 6.03 (4.01) 7.01 (5.43) 
Proportion of Plant Ethnic 0.04 (0.08) 0.18 (0.19) 0.04 (0.08) 0.22 (0.22) 
Age: 40 or more 0.48 (0.50) 0.37 (0.48) 0.48 (0.50) 0.37 (0.48) 
Tenure: 5 years or more 0.52 (0.50) 0.38 (0.49) 0.45 (0.50) 0.39 (0.49) 
Qualification: Degree 0.21 (0.40) 0.38 (0.49) 0.19 (0.39) 0.30 (0.46) 
Workplace size 25 or more 0.90 (0.30) 0.91 (0.29) 0.84 (0.36) 0.83 (0.37) 
Temporary job 0.06 (0.24) 0.09 (0.29) 0.08 (0.27) 0.10 (0.31) 
Public Sector Employee 0.24 (0.43) 0.29 (0.46) 0.38 (0.49) 0.39 (0.49) 
Union Recognised at workplace 0.62 (0.49) 0.61 (0.49) 0.59 (0.49) 0.60 (0.49) 
Number of Workplaces 1577 3001 1591 301 
Number of Observations 11685 448 11880 508 
  Standard deviations are in parentheses. Statistics use WERS sample weights. 






Regression Results by Ethnic Group (QLFS) 








Experience 0.041 0.031 0.026 0.023 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
Experience2/100 -0.074 -0.061 -0.049 -0.046 
(0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.006) 
Employer Tenure 0.017 0.022 0.022 0.025 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) 
Employer Tenure2/ 100 -0.025 -0.021 -0.038 -0.048 
(0.002) (0.015) (0.003) (0.014) 
Workplace Size: 25 plus 0.137 0.177 0.098 0.067 
(0.005) (0.023) (0.004) (0.020) 
Years of Schooling 0.041 0.022 0.042 0.016 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) 
Other Qualification 0.077 0.137 0.090 0.096 
(0.007) (0.031) (0.006) (0.030) 
O-Level or equivalent 0.180 0.214 0.159 0.238 
(0.007) (0.033) (0.005) (0.033) 
A-Level or equivalent 0.239 0.283 0.218 0.303 
(0.007) (0.032) (0.006) (0.038) 
Other Degree 0.420 0.384 0.444 0.417 
(0.009) (0.044) (0.008) (0.038) 
Degree or above 0.552 0.581 0.576 0.659 
(0.010) (0.041) (0.009) (0.041) 
Public Sector -0.022 0.003 0.107 0.045 
(0.008) (0.037) (0.006) (0.026) 
Oaxaca Unexplained 




Individuals 55647 2487 56868 2461 
Panel Total 77029 3182 79302 3205 
Adjusted R2 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.38 
All regressions include controls for industry (SIC code at the one-digit level), region, marital 
status, temporary employment and time period. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and the repeat 
sampling of individuals. 




Regression Results by Ethnic Group (WERS) 








Age: 20-24 0.191 0.310 0.134 0.159 
(0.029) (0.161) (0.022) (0.117) 
Age: 25-29 0.383 0.363 0.301 0.311 
(0.028) (0.159) (0.022) (0.117) 
Age: 30-39 0.534 0.474 0.384 0.382 
(0.028) (0.170) (0.022) (0.116) 
Age: 40-49 0.642 0.471 0.396 0.437 
(0.030) (0.178) (0.022) (0.129) 
Age: 50-59 0.626 0.454 0.374 0.311 
(0.031) (0.182) (0.023) (0.131) 
Age: 60 or more 0.438 0.302 0.251 0.608 
(0.036) (0.213) (0.032) (0.241) 
Workplace Tenure: 1-2 years 0.007 -0.054 0.022 -0.103 
(0.016) (0.073) (0.014) (0.063) 
Workplace Tenure: 2-5 years 0.055 0.057 0.062 -0.008 
(0.014) (0.069) (0.012) (0.057) 
Workplace Tenure: 5-10 years 0.093 0.111 0.129 0.104 
(0.016) (0.081) (0.013) (0.061) 
Workplace Tenure: 10 years plus 0.145 0.131 0.174 0.092 
(0.016) (0.088) (0.013) (0.071) 
Ln(workplace size) 0.027 -0.017 0.023 0.054 
(0.006) (0.026) (0.005) (0.016) 
CSE or equivalent 0.115 0.122 0.120 0.023 
(0.014) (0.093) (0.013) (0.097) 
O-Level or equivalent 0.250 0.175 0.257 0.246 
(0.013) (0.094) (0.012) (0.091) 
A-Level 0.360 0.289 0.360 0.368 
(0.015) (0.077) (0.014) (0.098) 
Degree 0.639 0.502 0.670 0.394 
(0.016) (0.087) (0.015) (0.096) 
Post-graduate degree 0.754 0.707 0.790 0.728 
(0.021) (0.103) (0.021) (0.127) 
Public Sector -0.020 -0.083 0.093 0.090 
(0.023) (0.078) (0.022) (0.072) 
Union recognised at workplace 0.016 0.208 0.015 -0.048 
(0.018) (0.075) (0.016) (0.063) 
Oaxaca Unexplained 
Wage differential -0.207 -0.083 
Observations 
Workplaces 1577 300 1591 301 
Individuals 11685 448 11880 508 
Adjusted R2 0.49 0.32 0.45 0.41 
1. All regressions include controls for industry (SIC code at the one-digit level), single 
establishment enterprise, region, marital status and temporary employment. 
2. Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and the repeat 
sampling of employees within establishments. 
3. The education qualification variables are with reference to the omitted category, no qualification. 




The Effect of Immigration (QLFS) 










Ethnic -0.182 -0.112 -0.182 -0.112 -0.100 -0.054 
(0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.011) (0.015) (0.014) 
Observations 
Ethnic Workers 2487 2461 1683 1681 724 810 
All Individuals 58134 59329 33058 33453 30764 31017 
Panel Total 80211 82507 44050 44761 41137 41650 
Adjusted R2 0.43 0.41 0.46 0.42 0.46 0.43 
1. Rerressions includ e all the controls examined in Table 4.2 but are sunnressed in the presentation 
of results. Coefficient estimates are very similar to those for the white sample. 
2. Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and the repeat 
sampling of individuals. 
TABLE 4.5 
Wages and the Racial Composition of the Plant (WERS) 





ALL ALL ALL 
Ethnic -0.199 -0.178 -0.105 -0.092 -0.082 0.005 
(0.026) (0.023) (0.029) (0.022) (0.020) (0.026) 
Proportion of Plant Ethnic -0.199 -0.089 -0.073 0.070 
(0.092) (0.096) (0.079) (0.081) 
Ethnic * Plant Ethnic -0.472 -0.493 
(0.135) (0.116) 
Observations 
Workplaces 1588 1588 1588 1596 1596 1596 
Ethnic workers 448 448 448 508 508 508 
All Individuals 12133 12133 12133 12388 12388 12388 
Adjusted R2 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.45 0.45 0.45 
1. Regressions include all the controls examined in Table 4.3. Parameter estimates are not reported. 
2. Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and the repeat 
sampling of individuals. 
TABLE 4.6 
Wages and the Racial Composition of the Plant (WERS) 
The London Sample 
Denendent Variables: Ln(waae) 
REGRESSOR 
MALE 
ALL ALL ALL 
FEMALE 
ALL ALL ALL 
Ethnic -0.306 -0.248 -0.180 -0.180 -0.156 -0.066 
(0.043) (0.038) (0.058) (0.031) (0.030) (0.046) 
Proportion of Plant Ethnic -0.418 -0.332 -0.151 -0.017 
(0.100) (0.123) (0.099) (0.114) 
Ethnic * Plant Ethnic -0.300 -0.351 
(0.176) (0.151) 
Observations 
Workplaces 219 219 219 217 217 217 
Ethnic workers 182 182 182 256 256 256 
All Individuals 1632 1632 1632 1587 1587 1587 
Adiusted R2 0.43 0.44 0.45 0.43 0.43 0.43 




The Ethnic Wage Differential by the Ethnic Composition of the Plant (WERS) 
Dependent Variable: Ln(wage) 
MALE FEMALE 
PLANT PLANT PLANT PLANT PLANT PLANT 
<10% 10-24% 25%+ <10% 10-24% 25%+ 
REGRESSOR ETHNIC ETHNIC ETHNIC ETHNIC ETHNIC ETHNIC 
Ethnic -0.180 -0.206 -0.282 -0.004 -0.118 -0.194 
(0.032) (0.040) (0.056) (0.030) (0.034) (0.044) 
Observations 
Workplaces 736 138 75 719 146 81 
Ethnic Workers 165 125 112 167 146 165 
All Individuals 6038 981 427 5631 1123 494 
Adjusted R2 0.49 0.56 0.39 0.45 0.57 0.43 
1. See notes for Table 4.5. 
2. Plants were the manager reports there are no ethnic minority workers are here excluded. 
TABLE 4.8 
The Impact of Occupation and Establishment Effects (WERS) 
Dependent Variable: Ln wa e 
MALE FEMALE 
REGRESSOR 3 Plus 3 Plus 3 Plus 3 Plus 3 Plus 3 Plus 3 Plus 3 Plus 
Ethnic 1 -0.201 -0.165 -0.140 -0.1261 -0.091 -0.086 -0.072 -0.082 
(0.027) (0.020) (0.022) (0.018) 1(0.022) (0.019) (0.020) (0.018) 
Occupation No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Workplace No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Effects 
Observations 
Workplaces 1293 1293 1293 1293 1312 1312 1312 1312 
Ethnic Workers 425 425 425 425 488 488 488 488 
All Individuals 11703 11703 11703 11703 11997 11997 11977 11977 
Adiusted R2 0.49 0.61 0.59 0.69 0.45 0.56 0.55 0.62 
1. See notes for Table 4.5. 
2. At least 3 gender-person observations must be observed within a plant for that establishment to 
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Job Satisfaction and Race (WERS) 
Dependent Variables: Job Satisfaction Scores 
M AIE 
Influence Pay Achievement Respect of Boss 
REGRESSOR ALL ALL ALL ALL 
Ethnic 0.082 -0.122 0.050 0.042 
(0.057) (0.055) (0.057) (0.056) 
Ln(pay) 0.353 0.767 0.331 0.280 
(0.028) (0.035) (0.027) (0.028) 
Observations 
Workplaces 1580 1580 1580 1580 
Ethnic Individuals 429 429 429 429 
All Individuals 11803 11803 11803 11803 
Log-L -15715.7 -16359.1 -15856.0 -16794.1 
Pseudo RZ 0.061 0.139 0.058 0.069 
FEMALE 
Influence Pay Achievement Respect of Boss 
REGRESSOR ALL ALL ALL ALL 
Ethnic -0.049 -0.160 -0.152 -0.070 
(0.060) (0.055) (0.054) (0.056) 
Ln(pay) 0.174 0.471 0.154 0.108 
(0.026) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027) 
Observations 
Workplaces 1594 1594 1594 1594 
Ethnic Individuals 471 471 471 471 
All Individuals 11938 11938 11938 11938 
Log-L -15114.3 -16496.5 -15147.5 -16391.4 
Pseudo R2 0.030 0.072 0.068 0.044 
1. See notes to Table 4.11. 
TABLE 4.10b 
Mareinal Effects of Race upon lob Satisfaction 
Dependent variable 
Satisfaction with respect to., 1 
Satisfaction Score 
23 4 5 
Influence over job -0.006 -0.014 -0.012 0.015 0.016 
Pay 0.027 0.021 -0.006 -0.036 -0.006 
Sense of achievement -0.005 -0.007 -0.007 0.008 0.011 
Respect get from supervisors -0.007 -0.006 -0.004 0.008 0.008 
FEMALE 
Dependent variable 
Satisfaction witb respect to., 1 
Satisfaction Score 
234 5 
Influence over Job 0.003 0.008 0.008 -0.010 -0.009 
Pay 0.030 0.032 -0.003 -0.050 -0.010 
Sense of achievement 0.012 0.022 0.022 -0.024 -0.032 
Respect Let from supervisors 0.009 0.010 0.008 -0.011 -0.016 
1. Marginal effects are based upon Table 4.10a above and are calculated, at the mean, as the 
difference in the predicted probability, of satisfaction score k, for a ethnic minority employee 




Job Satisfaction, Race and the Effect of Pay (WERS) 
Dependent Variables: Job Satisfaction Scores 
MALE 
Influence Pay Achievement Respect of Boss 
REGRESSOR ALL ALL ALL ALL 
Ethnic 








1.825 0.392 0.847 1.554 
(0.430) (0.565) (0.532) (0.469) 
-0.310 -0.091 -0.142 -0.269 
(0.075) (0.099) (0.093) (0.082) 
0.364 0.770 0.336 0.290 
(0.029) (0.035) (0.027) (0.028) 
1580 1580 1580 1580 
429 429 429 429 
11803 11803 11803 11803 
-15708.6 -16358.5 -15854.5 -16788.8 
0.062 0.139 0.058 0.070 
1. See notes to Table 4.11. 
TABLE 4.12 
Job Satisfaction and Race (WERS) 
The Estimated Effect of Race by Different Estimation Technique 
Dependent Variables: Job Satisfaction Scores 
MALE 
Influence Pay Achievement Respect of Boss 
Estimated by ALL ALL ALL ALL 
Ordered Probit 0.064 -0.116 0.049 0.041 
(0.058) (0.057) (0.059) (0.058) 
OLS - No establishment Effect 0.057 -0.108 0.040 0.034 
(0.053) (0.056) (0.056) (0.062) 
OLS - Establishment Effect 0.129 -0.110 0.088 0.122 
(0.057) (0.060) (0.058) (0.063) 
OLS - Establishment Effect 0.061 -0.244 0.030 0.062 
Pay term omitted (0.057) (0.061) (0.058) (0.063) 
FEMALE 
Influence Pay Achievement Respect of Boss 
Estimated by ALL ALL ALL ALL 
Ordered Probit -0.041 -0.163 -0.131 -0.059 
(0.061) (0.056) (0.055) (0.058) 
OLS - No establishment Effect -0.049 -0.177 -0.116 -0.069 
(0.053) (0.055) (0.051) (0.060) 
OLS - Establishment Effect -0.025 -0.126 -0.071 0.007 
(0.054) (0.057) (0.056) (0.059) 
OLS - Establishment Effect -0.043 -0.172 -0.088 -0.006 
Pav term omitted (0.055) (0.058) (0.056) (0.058) 
1. See notes for Table 4.11. 
2. At least 3 gender-person observations must be observed within a plant for the establishment to 
be included in the sample. 
3. Male sample: 1278 establishments, 406 ethnic individuals, and 11359 individuals in total. 




Workforce Ethnic Composition and Turnover (WERS) 
Plant-Level Data 






Proportion of Plant Ethnic 0.116 0.115 0.132 0.130 
(0.048) (0.047) (0.054) (0.052) 
Proficiency: 1-6 months -0.017 -0.023 
(0.011) (0.012) 
Proficiency: 6 months or more -0.025 -0.038 
(0.010) (0.012) 
Proportion FT paid L9k or less 0.086 0.100 
(0.030) (0.033) 
Proportion FT paid £22k plus -0.037 -0.039 
(0.019) (0.026) 
Observations I 1628 16281 1628 1628 




Regressions also include controls for the composition of the establishment by age, gender, part- 
time employment and occupation, and for workplace size, single establishment organisation, 
union recognition, industry (SIC code at the one-digit level), employing sector and region. 
Parameter estimates are not reported. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
PROFICIENCY is a manager-derived variable that measures the amount of time required for a 
new employee, in the largest occupational group, to become proficient at their job. The omitted 
category is less than 1 month. 
Equations are estimated by OLS. 
Mean quit rate 0.163. Mean separations rate 0.228. Mean proportion of plant ethnic 0.041. 
TABLE 4.14 
Workplace Tenure and the Racial Composition of the Plant (WERS) 
Deuendent Variables: Years of Workplace Tenure 
MALE FEMALE 
REGRESSOR ALL ALL ALL ALL 
Ethnic -0.496 -0.989 -0.429 -1.130 
(0.300) (0.383) (0.227) (0.313) 
Proportion of Plant Ethnic -2.313 -1.351 
(1.058) (0.851) 
Ethnic * Plant Ethnic 4.131 4.076 
(1.673) (1.238) 
Observations 
Workplaces 1588 1588 1596 1596 
Ethnic workers 448 448 508 508 
All Individuals 12133 12133 12388 12388 
Log-L -17873.5 -17867.9 -18514.6 -18508.5 




Regressions include all controls examined in Table 4.3 and also occupation (at the one-digit 
level). Parameter estimates are not reported. 
Tenure is identified in one of 5 bands. Equations are estimated by maximum likelihood interval 
regression (Stewart, 1983a) and robust standard errors are in parentheses. 





Workforce Ethnic Composition and Absenteeism (WERS) 
Dependent Variable: Proportion days lost to absences 
REGRESSOR ALL ALL 
Proportion of Plant Ethnic 0.987 0.983 
(0.190) (0.190) 
Proficiency: 1-6 months 0.075 
(0.051) 
Proficiency: 6 months or more 0.052 
(0.061) 
Proportion FT paid C9k or less 0.072 
(0.141) 
Proportion FT paid £22k plus -0.300 
(0.155) 
Observations 1417 1417 





Regressions also include controls for the composition of the establishment by age, gender, part- 
time employment and occupation, and for workplace size, single establishment organisation, 
union recognition, industry (SIC code at the one-digit level), employing sector and region. 
Parameter estimates are not reported. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
PROFICIENCY is a manager-derived variable that measures the amount of time required for a 
new employee, in the largest occupational group, to become proficient at their job. The omitted 
category is less than I month. 
Equations are estimated by weighted least squares and correspond to minimum X2 estimates. 
Mean absenteeism rate 0.039. Mean proportion of plant ethnic 0.041. 
Coefficients here show the percentage change in p, / (1-p) for a one-unit change in the 
independent variable xi. To calculate the marginal effect of xi on pi (i. e. ap, / äxß) multiply the 




Determinants of Workforce Ethnic Composition (WERS) 
Plant-Level Data 
Dependent Variable: Establishment Ethnic Minority Employment ment Share 
TOBIT TOBIT OLS CLAD 
REGRESSOR ALL ALL ALL ALL 
Aptitude Tests 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.002 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) 
Personal Reference -0.019 -0.019 -0.006 -0.009 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) 
Qualifications -0.021 -0.021 -0.009 -0.014 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) 
Ln(workplace size) 0.031 0.031 0.008 0.014 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Proficiency: 1-6 months 0.011 0.005 0.006 
(0.008) (0.005) (0.006) 
Proficiency: 6 months plus -0.005 -0.004 -0.007 
(0.009) (0.005) (0.008) 
Proportion FT Paid L9k or less -0.024 -0.016 -0.045 
(0.023) (0.015) (0.011) 
Proportion FT Paid £22k plus -0.053 -0.047 -0.023 
(0.020) (0.014) (0.015) 
Observations 1709 1709 1709 755 
Log-L 332.3 338.0 
Pseudo R2 0.24 0.24 0.16 
Adjusted R2 0.27 
1. Regressions also include controls for the composition of the establishment by age, gender, part- 
time employment and occupation, and for workplace size, single establishment organisation, 
union recognition, industry (SIC code at the one-digit level), employing sector and region. 
Parameter estimates ate not reported. 
2. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are bootstrapped in column four. 
3. For the Tobit estimates the Pseudo R2 is calculated using the method of McKelvey and Zavoina 
(1975). For the CLAD model it is calculated by 1-(E absolute deviations/E raw deviations). 
4. For the workforce ethnic composition 706 values are censored at zero with 1003 positive 
observations. Its unconditional mean is 0.0407, conditional on being uncensored it is 0.110. 
TABLE 4.16b 
Tobit Marginal Effects 
Variable I II 
Aptitude Tests 0.0033 0.0033 
Personal Reference -0.0065 -0.0065 
Qualifications -0.0076 -0.0076 
Ln(workplace size) 0.0110 0.0111 
Proportion Paid £9k or less -0.0084 
Proportion Paid 22k plus -0.0190 
1. Marginal effects are based upon the Tobit estimates, columns one and two of Table 4.16a above, 
and are calculated for the unconditional expected value. 
2. The marginal effect for the test dummy is calculated as the change in predicted probability of 
moving from a plant that does not test to one that does. Similarly for the reference, 
qualification, and proficiency dummies. 
3. Marginal effects for log workplace size, and the proportion of workers paid less than £9,000 or 
more than £22,000 are calculated at the mean. 
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APPENDIX: Sample Selectivity within the WERS 
The WERS survey is a cluster stratified random sample, where the sampling fraction 
is increasing in establishment size and varies by industry code. Large establishments 
are then over-sampled. Secondly, the sampling strategy of interviewing a maximum 
of 25 workers per establishment implies that a plant with 25 employees can 
contribute the same number of employee data points as a workplace with 100 or 
1000 workers. Hence, within the sample of WERS plants, the individual data over- 
samples respondents within small establishments. The WERS data then suffers 
from sample selectivity in two opposite directions. However, since the chief 
selection mechanisms, establishment size and industry, are explanatory variables in 
all analyses it is not clear as to why results should be biased. 
To check whether coefficients suffer from selection bias they are compared 
to estimates using the WERS sample survey weights (see Airey et al, 1999, and Cully 
et al, 1999). DuMouchel and Duncan (1983) discuss the merits and uses of sample 
survey weights. Weighting is unnecessary where the model holds independent of the 
stratification, where parameters are the same for each stratum. Or where we include 
amongst the explanatory variables the variables upon which selection is based, 
intuitively we then control for selection. Both weighted and unweighted estimates 
are then consistent, and the use of sample weights should be avoided. Weighting the 
variance covariance matrix, when unnecessary, inflates standard errors and 
introduces random variation in coefficients. This is potentially problematic here, as 
results are identified by examining a relatively small number of non-white employees 
(approximately round 450 minority males and 500 non-white females). 
Table Al estimates hourly pay equations for males and females, both with 
and without sample weights. For men, results are similar for both the unweighted 
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and weighted estimates, with an ethnic minority coefficient of -0.199 and -0.169 
respectively. For women, the analogous estimates are -0.092 and -0.045, with the 
latter not statistically well determined. 
As a further check results are compared to those from the QLFS. The male 
racial wage differential is estimated, for the QLFS, to be -0.182. When an analogous 
sample and time period to the WERS data are examined the estimate is -0.196. The 
comparable estimate for the, unweighted, WERS data is -0.199 in column one of 
Table Al. Results are then of a similar magnitude for male employees. For females 
in the QLFS, the estimated non-white wage gap is -0.112. For the sample that 
corresponds to the WERS data, the female racial wage differential is -0.131. The 
estimate for the WERS itself is slightly lower at -0.092 (column two, Table Al). For 
females the unweighted estimates then appear comparable to those observed for the 
QLFS, and if anything understate the differential. 
These results suggest the unweighted estimates do not suffer unduly from 
selection bias. The estimation strategy adopted is to include establishment size and 
industry as control variables in all regressions. To account for potential variation in 
coefficients, by observed characteristics, all standard errors are robust to arbitrary 
heteroskedasticity. The potential non-independence of errors within the same plant 
is also corrected for, as ignoring the clustering of individuals within workplaces can 




The Impact of Sample Weights upon the WERS 
Dependent Variable: Ln(wave) 
UNWEIGHTED WEIGHTED 
REGRESSOR MALE FEMALE MALE FEMALE 
Ethnic -0.199 -0.092 -0.169 -0.045 
(0.026) (0.022) (0.040) (0.029) 
Observations 
Workplaces 1588 
Ethnic Individuals 12133 
All Individuals 0.49 
Adjusted R2 448 
1. See notes to Table 4.5. 
1596 1588 1596 
12388 12133 12388 
0.45 0.47 0.44 
508 448 508 
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Chapter Five 
Does Money Buy Happiness? A Longitudinal Study using 
Data on Windfalls 
This chapter is based upon joint work with Professor Andrew Oswald. 
Money and Happiness 
Abstract 
One of the most fundamental ideas in economics is that money makes people 
happy. This chapter constructs a test. It studies longitudinal information on the 
psychological health and reported happiness of approximately 9,000 randomly 
chosen people. In the spirit of a natural experiment, the chapter shows that those in 
the panel who receive windfalls - by winning lottery money or receiving an 
inheritance - have higher mental well-being in the following year. A windfall of 
50,000 pounds is associated with a rise in well-being of between 0.1 and 0.3 
standard deviations. 
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5.1 Introduction 
A central tenet of economics is that money makes people happy. Using deduction, 
rather than evidence, economists teach their students that utility must be increasing 
in income. 1 In this chapter we construct one of the first empirical tests. Our results, 
using two measures of mental well-being, show that the economist's textbook view 
is correct. We also estimate the size of the effect of a windfall on well-being. 
To make persuasive progress on this problem, data with three special 
features are required. First, it is necessary to have a panel of people, that is, 
longitudinal rather than purely cross-sectional information. Second, measures of 
psychological well-being are needed. Third, it is necessary to observe, whether by an 
actual or natural experiment, a random assignment of money amongst individuals. 
We have a data set that approximates these conditions. As far as we know, previous 
investigators in economics or psychology have been unable to implement such a 
test. Diener and Biswas-Diener (2000) argue that this form of research design is 
required. 
Individuals' survey responses to questions about well-being are used in the 
chapter. Such responses have been studied before. They have been used intensively 
by psychologists, examined a little by sociologists and political scientists3, and 2 
IA 
common approach would be to argue that more income simply must make people happier 
because it opens up extra choices that are denied those with less money; yet in principle human 
beings might find it costly to make decisions about how to spend the greater income. Another 
argument might be that people seek more income whenever they can, so that it necessarily makes 
them happier; yet in principle they could be mistaken about how they will feel ex post. However, 
the best reason to want empirical evidence is that it is dangerous for any subject to reach the point 
where it cannot be conceived that a familiar assumption might be wrong. 
2 Earlier work includes Andrews (1991), Argyle (1989), Campbell (1981), Diener (1984), Diener 
et al (1999), Douthitt et al (1992), Fox and Kahneman (1992), Larsen et al (1984), Mullis (1992), 
Shin (1980), Veenhoven (1991,1993), and Wan (1990). 
3 For example, Inglehart (1990) and Gallie et al (1998). There is also a related literature on 
interactions between economic forces and people's voting behaviour; see for example Frey and 
Schneider (1978). 
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studied to a small, but growing, extent by economists4. Some economists may 
emphasise the likely unreliability of subjective data - perhaps because they are 
unaware of the large literature by research psychologists that uses such numbers, or 
perhaps because they believe economists are better judges of human motivation 
than those researchers. A recent literature on the border between economics and 
psychology, however, has attempted to understand the patterns in happiness and 
stress data. 
5.2 Well-being Patterns 
One definition of happiness is the degree to which an individual judges the overall 
quality of life in a favourable way (Veenhoven, 1991,1993). 
Self-reported well-being measures are thought to be a reflection of at least 
four factors: circumstances, aspirations, comparisons with others, and a person's 
baseline happiness or disposition (e. g. Warr, 1980, Chen and Spector, 1991). 
Konow and Earley (1999) describes evidence that recorded happiness levels have 
been demonstrated to be correlated with: 
1. Objective characteristics such as unemployment. 
2. The person's recall of positive versus negative life-events. 
3. Assessments of the person's happiness by friends and family members. 
4. Assessments of the person's happiness by his or her spouse. 
5. Duration of authentic or so-called Duchenne smiles (a Duchenne smile 
occurs when both the zygomatic major and obicularus orus facial 
muscles fire, and human beings identify these as `genuine' smiles). 
4 Recent research papers include: Blanchflower and Freeman (1997), Blanchflower and Oswald 
(1998,1999), Clark (1996), Clark and Oswald (1994), Di Tella and MacCulloch (1999), Di Tella 
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6. Heart rate and blood pressure measures responses to stress. 
7. Skin-resistance measures of response to stress. 
8. Electroencephelogram measures of prefrontal brain activity. 
Rather than summarise the psychological literature's assessment of well-being data, 
this chapter refers readers to the checks on self-reported happiness statistics that are 
discussed in Argyle (1989) and Myers (1993), and to psychologists' articles on 
reliability and validity, such as Fordyce (1985), Larsen, Diener, and Emmons (1984), 
Pavot and Diener (1993), and Watson and Clark (1991). 
We assume a reported well-being function: 
r=h(u(y, z, t))+e (1) 
where r is some measure of psychological stress or self-reported number or well- 
being level (perhaps the integer 4 on a satisfaction scale, or "very happy" on an 
ordinal happiness scale), u(... ) is to be thought of as the person's true well-being or 
utility, h(. ) is a continuous non-differentiable function relating actual to reported 
well-being, y is real income, z is a set of demographic and personal characteristics, t 
is the time period, and e is an error term. It is assumed, as seems plausible, that 
u(... ) is a function that is observable only to the individual. Its structure cannot be 
conveyed unambiguously to the interviewer or any other individual. The error term, 
e, then subsumes among other factors the inability of human beings to 
communicate accurately their happiness level (your `two' may be my `three'). 
5 The 
measurement error in reported well-being data would be less easily handled if well- 
being were to be used as an independent variable. This approach might be viewed as 
et al (2001), Frank (1985,1997), Frey and Stutzer (1998,1999) and Ng (1996,1997). 
5 This recognises the social scientist's instinctive distrust of a single person's subjective 'utility'. 
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an empirical cousin of the experienced-utility idea advocated by Kahneman et al 
(1997). 
It is possible to view some of the self-reported well-being questions in the 
psychology literature as assessments of a person's lifetime or expected stock value 
of future utilities. Equation 1 would then be rewritten as an integral over the u(... ) 
terms. This chapter, however, will use stress and happiness questions on the 
assumption they describe a flow rather than a stock. 
Easterlin's seminal research (1974, and more recently 1995) examined the 
reported level of happiness in the United States. The author viewed people as 
getting utility from a comparison of themselves against others; this is the idea that 
happiness has a large relative component. Hirsch (1976), Scitovsky (1976), Layard 
(1980), Frank (1985,1999) and Schor (1998) have argued a similar thesis; a different 
tradition, with equivalent implications, begins with Cooper and Garcia-Penalosa 
(1999) and Keely (1999). 
5.3 Data 
The data used in this study come from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). 
The BHPS is a nationally representative sample of more than 5,000 British 
households, containing over 10,000 adult individuals, conducted between 
September and Christmas of each year from 1991 to 1998. Respondents are 
interviewed in successive waves; if an individual splits off from their original 
household, all adult members of their new household are also interviewed. Children 
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are interviewed once they reach 16. The sample has remained representative of the 
British population throughout the 1990s. 6 
The BHPS contains a standard mental well-being measure, a General Health 
Questionnaire (GHQ) score. This is a variable used by medical researchers and 
psychiatrists as a measure of stress or psychological distress. It is unfamiliar to some 
economists, but GHQ is probably the most widely used, questionnaire-based, 
method of measuring mental stress. In the spirit favoured by psychologists, it 
amalgamates answers to the following list of twelve questions, each one of which is, 
itself, scored on a four-point scale from 0 to 3: 
Have you recently: 
1. Been able to concentrate on whatever you are doing? 
2. Lost much sleep over worry? 
3. Felt that you are playing a useful part in things? 
4. Felt capable of making decisions about things? 
5. Felt constantly under strain? 
6. Felt you could not overcome your difficulties? 
7. Been able to enjoy your normal day-to-day activities? 
8. Been able to face up to your problems? 
9. Been feeling unhappy and depressed? 
10. Been losing confidence in yourself? 
11. Been thinking of yourself as a worthless person? 
12. Been feeling reasonably happy all things considered? 
6 See Nathan (1999). 
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We use the responses to these so-called GHQ-12 questions. For the first measure of 
mental well-being, we take the simple sum of the responses to the twelve questions, 
coded so that the response with the lowest well-being value scores 3 and that with 
the highest well-being value scores 0. This approach is sometimes called a Likert 
scale and is scored out of 36.7 The GHQ measure of stress, or lack of well-being, 
thus runs from a worst possible outcome of 36 (all twelve responses indicating very 
poor psychological health) to a minimum of 0 (no responses indicating poor 
psychological health). In general, medical opinion is that healthy individuals will 
score typically around 10-13 on the test. Numbers near 36 are rare and usually 
indicate depression in a formal clinical sense. 
A second measure is used in the chapter. We also study a direct happiness 
question. This is question 12 above, denoted GHQH; so our happiness measure is 
in fact one twelfth of the GHQ measure. We assume that this is a sufficiently small 
proportion to be ignored without re-calibrating GHQ on only eleven questions. 
We therefore employ a measure of (un)happiness as well as the mental stress 
measure described earlier. The GHQH question is: have you been feeling 
reasonably happy all things considered? This is the second measure of mental well-being. 
It is coded so that high numbers denote more unhappiness. 
A key requirement for a test is that something approximating a random drop 
of money occurs. In a giant laboratory setting, this could be created experimentally. 
Aside from any ethical considerations, such an experiment at the start of the 21St 
century is probably infeasibly expensive to run. An equivalent is needed. 
This chapter relies on a natural experiment created by windfalls. The data 
contains two sources of these - lottery wins and inheritances. These figures refer to 
7 Likert is 12 times a number from zero to three. An alternative is the Caseness score, which 
counts the number of times that an individual answers in one of two negative response categories. 
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windfalls `within the last year', as assessed by the respondents. Lottery wins 
throughout the chapter include other gambling wins, such as on the soccer `pools'. 
A huge percentage of the British population play the national lottery, and small wins 
are common. Hence for simplicity, because they dominate the data, we talk 
primarily of the lottery. The inheritance variable includes both bequests and 
inherited property (it excludes receipts of gifts or other private income transfers). 
Despite the potential usefulness of lottery data to economists and 
psychologists, the literature exploiting lottery information is still a comparatively 
small one. Most work has looked at how consumption and work choices are 
affected by winning (for example, Bodkin 1959, Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian and Rosen 
1993, Imbens, Rubin and Sacerdote 2000, Kaplan 1985, Kreinin 1961, Landsberger 
1963, and Sacerdote 1996). One well-known study in the psychology literature is 
Brickman, Coates and Janoff-Bulman (1978). This uses only a tiny cross-section 
sample of lottery winners, and concludes that winners are slightly happier than 
those who do not win, but that the difference is not statistically significant. Smith 
and Razzell (1975) examined a cross-section of those who won on football betting 
(the `pools'), and found that there was some evidence of higher recorded happiness; 
but individuals also reported lower well-being in other spheres of life. 
There is an important disadvantage to our data set. Although the British 
panel itself goes back to the start of the 1990s, questions on windfalls are relatively 
new. Information on the size of windfalls is known only for the 1997 and 1998 
survey years. Analysis is therefore restricted to that sample period. 
8 These data are 
augmented with people's GHQ scores from prior waves, so as to allow the 
examination of how windfalls affect both the level of well-being and how it changes 
8 There is one other piece of information. In 1995, people were asked whether they had received a 
windfall. This is used as a control variable in some of the regression equations. 
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over time. In other words, we are able to examine long lags on the dependent well- 
being variables, but have only two years with which to examine the effect of 
windfall gains. 
5.4 Results 
Table 5.1 presents the simplest results. In these bivariate regressions, money does 
buy greater happiness and lower measured stress. 
Rises in well-being, to be clear about the choice of units and definitions, are 
given by declines in GHQ mental stress and in GHQH unhappiness. This follows 
the standard usage in the psychology and medical literature. Hence if money buys 
happiness, that shows up in the chapter's tables as negatives on windfall 
coefficients. 
In general, windfalls are associated with a statistically well-determined 
improvement in well-being. Mental stress (GHQ) and unhappiness (GHQH) both 
decline in the year after a windfall. This effect is found in the cross-sectional levels 
and in the longitudinal changes. 
In the cross-section equations, a windfall dummy (that is, whether the 
individual had either an inheritance or lottery win) enters negatively in both a mental 
stress equation and an unhappiness equation. In the first columns of Tables 5.1a 
and 5.1b, the t-statistics are, respectively, 2.83 and 1.24. Entering the amount of 
windfall gives, predictably, results that are better determined. This is column 2 of 
Tables 5.1a and 5.1b. When only windfall recipients are studied, in column 3, the 
size of the windfall enters with the expected negative sign and it is possible in both 
Table 5.1 a and Table 5.1b to reject the null of zero at normal confidence levels. 
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The longitudinal effect of a windfall is picked up in the first-difference 
equations in the last three columns of Tables 5.1a and 5.1b. Here the two dependent 
variables are the change in mental stress (GHQ) and the change in reported 
unhappiness (GHQH). Person fixed-effects, therefore, have been removed. In five 
of the six equations, it is possible to reject the null of zero on the windfall variables. 
In the sixth case, in column four of Table 5.1a, the t-statistic is 1.64. 
How large are these improvements in well-being? The cross-section 
estimates predict that subsequent to a windfall of 50,000 pounds sterling the level of 
GHQ improves by -0.709. This is approximately 0.13 of a standard deviation in 
GHQ (5.44). For the sample of windfall recipients, the gain in GHQ is -1.11 or 
around 0.21 of the relevant standard deviation (5.28). 10 For GHQH, the predicted 
gain in well-being is -0.042 amongst all respondents, and is -0.114 amongst the sub- 
sample of windfall recipients. These are relative to a standard deviation of 0.59. 
When the change in well-being is instead examined (in columns four to six 
of Tables 5.1a and 5.1b), a 50,000 pounds windfall is predicted to improve GHQ by 
-0.446, or in other words 0.08 of a standard deviation. For the sample of recipients, 
the relevant figure is -1.09, or 0.21 of the relevant standard deviation. When we 
examine the change in GHQH unhappiness, we predict a welfare gain of 
approximately 0.1 of a standard deviation for the sample of all respondents, and 0.2 
of a standard deviation within the sample of windfall recipients. 
11 
9 If equations are, instead, estimated by Ordered Probit or similar methods almost identical results 
are produced. 
10 The change in well-being is calculated for windfalls of 50,000 pounds relative to the minimum 
windfall in the sample. For the sample of all individuals this is 0.1 (a small constant replaces zero 
wins). For the sample of windfall recipients 1 pound. The predicted change in well-being is then 
calculated and compared to the standard deviation in the dependent variable. Where the change in 
well-being is examined we use the standard deviation in the differenced variable. 
I IAs 
an illustrative way to think about the size of this effect, if the estimated number is 0.2 then a 
windfall of 1 million pounds would move a person by 4 standard deviations - or in other words 
from approximately close to the bottom of a well-being distribution to close to the top. 
190 
Money and Happiness 
There are two sources of windfalls in our data - lottery wins and 
inheritances. For the rest of the chapter, we examine their impact upon well-being 
separately, and add explanatory variables. Although this reduces the size of the 
regression samples and tends to weaken the standard errors, it has the advantage of 
providing transparency. Having data on inheritances provides a useful check on the 
results for lottery wins, because people choose to play the lottery, whereas they 
presumably have less control over their probability of receiving bequests. 
The aim of the remainder of the chapter is deliberately not to present 
equations with, necessarily, the highest t-statistics. Rather, it is to provide a feel, by 
studying lottery wins and inheritances separately, even when standard errors become 
poorly determined, for the ubiquity of the expected negative sign on windfalls. 
Later tables find that in all but 2 of 70 occasions - across a variety of settings - the 
windfall coefficient has the expected sign. 
It is natural to begin in a simple way by examining whether, in a cross- 
section, those who obtain such windfalls are happiest. Table 5.2a provides evidence 
consistent with this hypothesis. In the second column of Table 5.2a, the mean 
GHQ stress score among those who are not lottery winners is 11.22. Among 
winners it is 10.91.12 The same pattern is observed for the GHQH unhappiness 
score in the third column of Table 5.2a, though the raw effect is much less 
pronounced. The mean score for winners is 2.00 whilst amongst non-winners it is 
2.01. 
These cross-tabulations are consistent with the idea that money and well- 
being are positively correlated. Yet, these findings are raw cross-section results 
without controls. Further evidence, in the same spirit, would be provided if 
12 We are unable to distinguish between those who do not gamble and those who do gamble but 
do not win. 
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individuals longitudinally report themselves with higher levels of well-being 
subsequent to a lottery windfall. This issue is investigated in the second panel of 
Table 5.2a (so-called Sample 2), and summary statistics reported for those 
individuals where we observe the change in GHQ score. For this sample, the mean 
lottery win, conditional on being a winner, is observed to be considerably lower 
than that observed in the cross-section, respectively 118.5 and 200.0 pounds. 
Investigation revealed this difference to be chiefly attributable to the dropping of a 
small number of large lottery wins from the sample. Whether this selectivity reflects 
coincidence, or a more systematic bias, is not here possible to ascertain. The 
direction of bias is not clear a priori and will depend upon whether there are 
diminishing returns to well-being at very large windfalls. 
Despite these concerns, the mean GHQ and GHQH scores for both 
winners and non-winners are remarkably similar to those observed previously. In 
the lower half of Table 5.2a, column 2, the mean GHQ stress score among lottery 
winners is 10.93, compared to 10.91 for the full sample (called Sample 1). Among 
non-winners it is 11.25, as opposed to 11.22. Both samples appear to capture similar 
patterns in well-being. 
When the data are differenced, and changes over time in a person's well- 
being studied, we observe lottery winners to show, on average, increased levels of 
well-being (more precisely a reduced lack of well-being). In the second half of Table 
5.2a, individuals who record a lottery win experience an average decrease in GHQ 
mental stress of -0.096 points (see column four of Table 5.2a, Sample 2). Amongst 
non-winners, GHQ worsens on average by approximately 0.020. For the GHQH 
unhappiness question the respective figures for winners and non-winners are -0.010 
and 0.006. The observed rise in well-being subsequent to a lottery windfall appears 
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pronounced when contrasted with the fall in well-being for non-winners in the 
period. 
Inheritances also work in the way that would be predicted. In Table 5.2b, 
the GHQ mental stress scores of inheritors are on average better than the scores of 
those who do not inherit any cash; they are 10.93 as opposed to 11.15 (see column 
two of Table 5.2b, Sample 1). For the GHQH unhappiness question, the mean 
response for inheritors is 1.95 (in Table 5.2b), whilst for those who do not receive a 
bequest 2.01. Panel two of Table 5.2b, which uses the so-called Sample 2, restricts 
attention to those individuals where we can observe the change in well-being over 
time. Both for those who inherit and those who do not, this (smaller) sample 
appears to be representative of that observed for the pooled cross-section. 
Furthermore, this selection does little to alter the tenor of the results. 
The most noticeable finding in Table 5.2b, Sample 2, is that there is a 
marked drop in mental stress and unhappiness among those people who inherit. 
Amongst inheritors, there is an average GHQ mental stress decline of -0.429 
compared to a mean rise of 0.0002 amongst non-inheritors. For GHQH 
unhappiness, the relevant figures are -0.097 and 0.006 respectively. As with winning 
the lottery, inheritances are associated with greater psychological well-being. 
These numbers are averages across rather heterogeneous outcomes. It is 
likely that more information, in the statistical sense, is conveyed by the site of the 
inheritance or lottery win. Tables 5.3 and 5.4 explore such data. 
Table 5.3 reveals, in its second column, a strong pattern in which the worst 
mental well-being scores (mean of GHQ is 11.22) are found among those who did 
not receive a lottery win. This accords with intuition. Largish wins are nicer than 
tiny wins. For those individuals who received small winnings, of less than 100 
pounds, there is slightly higher well-being (mean 11.05). For those individuals who 
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win between 100 and 1000 pounds, GHQ scores are observed to be noticeably 
better (mean 10.18). Although the sample size here is not a large one, the stress 
levels of big lottery winners, 1000 pounds or more, seem paradoxically in Sample 1 
of Table 5.5 to rise slightly (mean 10.28). For GHQH, we observe in the second 
column of Table 5.3 a similar relationship, and in this case the effect of winnings 
upon unhappiness is monotonically negative. 
Consider the sample where we observe the change in well-being, namely, 
panel two of Table 5.3. The issue of selectivity can here be seen more clearly: mean 
lottery wins for those individuals who receive more than 1000 pounds is 2868.9 in 
Sample 2 as opposed to 6766.6 for the full sample. Whilst we do not know the 
largest lottery winners, the same distribution of GHQ and GHQH scores is 
observed. Examining changes in scores, Table 5.3 reveals in Sample 2 that GHQ 
stress levels improve with the size of lottery windfall. On average, GHQ worsens 
over the year 1998-97 by 0.020 for non-winners, but improves by -0.081 for small 
winners, -0.109 for medium winners, and -0.655 for the largest winners. For the 
change in GHQH unhappiness levels, the most marked effect is of an improvement 
in happiness of large winners (mean -0.109). 
The same issue can be pursued for individuals who receive an inheritance. 
Table 5.4 reports the data. A consistent and intriguing cross-section pattern is 
revealed in both GHQ and GHQH scores: a smallish inheritance of less than 2500 
pounds is associated with the highest level of well-being. An inheritance of between 
2500 and 10,000 pounds on average improves welfare relative to not receiving an 
inheritance but is associated with lower well-being than the smallest level of 
inheritance. Individuals who receive the largest inheritances, over 10,000 pounds, 
are however those with significantly worse cross-section levels of well-being, both for 
stress (GHQ) and unhappiness (GHQH). This is true in the full sample and in the 
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sample where we observe the change in well-being. Yet, when we instead examine 
the change in well-being in response to a bequest, both GHQ stress levels and 
GHQH unhappiness levels are observed to have improved for all categories, relative 
to a decline observed for non-inheritors. In the longitudinal changes, then, observed 
behaviour matches intuition. The largest windfalls produce the greatest gains in 
GHQH well-being (column 5 of Table 5.4, Sample 2). 
The summary statistics thus support the hypothesis that money is welfare 
improving. Windfalls of cash are associated with higher levels of well-being. This is, 
in the main, observed independent of how the data are cut, for both GHQ mental 
stress and GHQH unhappiness scores, both when examining the level of well-being 
and its change over time. 
This evidence is fairly compelling. The recipients of windfalls have, on 
average, higher levels of well-being. For such summary statistics to provide 
conclusive evidence, however, would require the receipt and size of windfall to be 
randomly distributed across individuals. Whilst windfalls may be unanticipated, this 
is unlikely always to be true. The decision to gamble and the intensity of play are 
likely to be correlated with observed and unobserved characteristics. Indeed early 
tables demonstrate a positive correlation between lottery winnings and income. 
Moreover, if happier people are more (or less) likely to play, and thus win, the 
correlation between winnings and well-being could be due to some subtle self- 
selection of players rather than any welfare-enhancing effects. Similarly, inheritances 
may be positively associated with parental wealth, which is likely to be correlated 
with recipient income (as seen in Tables 5.2 and 5.4). 
To investigate these issues in more detail we turn to regression analysis, and 
throughout the remainder of the chapter we examine the robustness of the negative 
sign on windfall gains. 
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5.4.1 Estimation strategy 
The regression equation estimated is an empirical version of equation 1. Well-being 
is assumed a function of the monetary windfall, personal characteristics (age, 
education, gender, race, and region) and the time period. On occasion it is also 
examined whether results are robust to the inclusion of income as an explanatory 
variable. Well-being for individual i in time period t is then expressed as: 
r; t = Wit, + y, t'S + z; t''y + Eit i=1, ..., n (2) 
t=1, .., T 
where r is the dependent variable that captures individual well-being, w is the 
amount of windfall (lottery win or inheritance), y is family income, z is a vector of 
individual characteristics and time dummies, c is the conformable error term with 
mean zero and constant variance, and 0,8 and y the parameters to be estimated. 
The well-being function is approximated as linear and equations for the two 
measures of well-being, the overall GHQ score (on a0 to 36 scale) and the GHQH 
unhappiness question (on a0 to 3 scale), estimated by OLS. 
13 Alternative 
specifications include a lagged dependent variable or instead adopt the change in 
well-being as the dependent variable. 
5.4.2 Lottery Wins 
A simple regression-equation test of whether winning money improves well-being is 
contained in Table 5.5. Here, and in all subsequent tables, panel A contains analysis 
of the GHQ mental stress score, panel B the GHQH unhappiness score. For 
comparison, column one of Table 5.5 reports the estimated effect of family income 
upon well-being. As expected, richer people are happier. GHQ is estimated to 
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improve by -0.117, and GHQH by -0.005, for an increase in income of ten 
thousand pounds sterling. The controls here, and throughout, are a quadratic in age, 
and dummies for gender, ethnic minority status, educational qualifications, region, 
and year. This cross-section result is, however, likely to confound various influences 
and cannot be presumed to capture causation. 
Columns two and three of Table 5.5 do a regression test of the hypothesis 
that lottery winners are happier. Similarly to the sample statistics observed 
previously, well-being is observed to be higher for those who receive winnings and 
it is increasing in the amount of windfall. The monotonicity in column 3 is 
encouraging. Coefficient estimates are negative but not usually independently well 
determined. For people who win a small amount, such as less than 100 pounds, 
there is only a negligible difference in well-being relative to non-winners. This 
suggests that the pleasure associated with being a winner per se is largely trivial, at 
least for the measures of well-being studied here, and should not greatly influence 
results. 
Column four of Table 5.5 instead enters the amount of winnings as the 
explanatory variable. This gives a strong result. Both for GHQ mental stress and 
GHQH unhappiness, the amount of winnings enters negatively - thus improving 
well-being - and is statistically significant. A windfall of 10,000 pounds improves 
GHQ mental well-being by -0.686 with a t-statistic above 6 and the GHQH 
unhappiness score by -0.032 with a t-statistic of 2.01. These effects are of a 
magnitude approximately 6 times as large as those estimated for income; it is not 
easy to know why. 
The impact of a 50,000 pounds lottery windfall is estimated from Table 5.5 
, 
to improve GHQ mental stress by -3.43 points or over 0.6 of a standard deviation. 
13 This implicitly assumes responses are cardinal. 
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The improvement in GHQH is slightly less marked at -0.16, but still constitutes 
approximately 0.3 of a standard deviation. Nevertheless, if `gamblers' in general 
have high (low) levels of well-being, independent of any monetary gain, we shall 
overestimate (underestimate) the effects of a windfall upon welfare. If gambling 
behaviour is characterised by such selection, coefficient estimates may be different 
when we restrict attention to a sample of winners only. All individuals are then 
gamblers and, moreover, they are also likely to be the more intensive players. In this 
case, selection bias should be reduced. Column five of Table 5.5 checks this and 
reveals that both for GHQ and GHQH the estimated effects of winnings are 
similar, for the sample of all individuals and the sample of winners. This is 
reassuring and suggests that the impact of winnings upon well-being is broadly 
independent to the selection of gamblers. 14 
Walker (1998) and Farrell and Walker (1999) provide evidence that lottery 
expenditure is a form of inferior good, that is, increasing in income but at a 
declining rate. Our amount-won variable may then capture the effect of income and 
be prone to similar problems of status and selection. Table 5.6 examines whether 
the effect of a lottery windfall is robust to the inclusion of a control for income. 
Column one restates the basic result. Column two, of Table 5.6, adds family income 
as an explanatory variable. For both the GHQ mental stress and the GHQH 
unhappiness measures of well-being, the estimated coefficient upon the amount 
won is essentially unaltered - indicating that the psychological benefits of winnings 
occur largely independently of income. 
14 Ideally one would wish to instrument winnings by a variable correlated with play but 
uncorrelated with well-being. As we analyse the effect of the amount won, this requires an 
instrument that identifies gambling propensity, conditional on income. No such variable was here 
available. A large degree of random variation is, however, introduced subsequent to participation. 
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There is potential for non-linearity. This is checked in column three of Table 
5.6, where quadratics in the amount of winnings and income are examined. The first 
and second-order terms for the amount won enter with the expected signs, 
consistent with diminishing returns, but are not statistically significantly different 
from zero - neither for stress (GHQ) or reported feelings of unhappiness (GHQH). 
An alternative approach to the self-selection of gamblers is followed in 
Table 5.7. This assumes the effects of selection are stable over time, and examines 
the change in well-being associated with a windfall. 
As seen previously, the sample of individuals where such data are observed 
omits some of the largest windfalls. This has the effect of increasing the magnitude 
of the estimated effect of winnings upon mental stress (GHQ) and reducing the 
estimated effect upon unhappiness (GHQH) and in both cases reduces the 
precision of estimates. Nevertheless, when a lagged dependent variable is included 
in column three of Table 5.7, the effect is to increase the estimated gain in well- 
being subsequent to a lottery win. In contrast, the coefficient upon income is driven 
towards zero and is no longer well determined. 
In column three of Table 5.7 a control for previous gambling behaviour is 
added - whether the individual received a lottery windfall in 1995.15 Again the 
estimated coefficient upon amount won is more pronounced whilst the income 
parameter is unaffected. Moreover, previous gambling exerts a positive, though not 
statistically well-determined, effect upon both GHQ mental stress and GHQH 
unhappiness scores. 16 This evidence suggests that any differences in well-being 
levels between gamblers and non-gamblers do not crucially shape results. 
15 The amount won is not known. 
16 This result holds if lottery winnings in the current year are omitted. 
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A similar conclusion is reached when we examine the change in well-being 
scores over time in columns four and five of Table 5.7. For GHQ mental stress 
scores, a windfall of 10,000 pounds is predicted to improve well-being, relative to 
the previous year, by -1.976. This effect is statistically significant only at the 10 
percent level. By comparison, in column one of Table 5.7, where the dependent 
variable is the level of GHQ the predicted improvement in well-being is -0.826. 
Similar results are observed for GHQH unhappiness, although coefficient estimates 
are again not well-determined. Interestingly, high-income individuals are observed in 
Table 5.7 column five to have experienced, on average, a decline in well-being levels 
over this period, both for GHQ and GHQH. 
Hence, whilst, due to the characteristics of the sample, care must be taken in 
interpretation, results seem robust to the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable, 
to controlling for previous gambling success, and to examining the change in well- 
being over time. If anything, such checks magnify the improvement in well-being 
from a lottery windfall. 
5.4.3 Inheritances 
A potential difficulty with the examination of lottery wins is that the act of 
gambling, and winning, may bring pleasure independent of monetary gain. Table 5.8 
therefore explores the impact upon well-being of receiving an inheritance. This 
event is likely to occur with the death of a close friend or relative and hence, in 
contrast, often be associated with reductions in well-being. 
Column one of Table 5.8 estimates the effect of income upon well-being for 
this sample. Results are close to those in column one of Table 5.5. Table 5.8's 
column two examines a simple test of whether a windfall increases happiness. 
Receiving a bequest is found to improve well-being for both GHQ mental stress 
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and GHQH unhappiness scores. For GHQ the estimated coefficient is -0.235, for 
GHQH -0.061, though only the latter effect is statistically robust. Column three 
extends this analysis by instead entering dummies for the amount of inheritance. 
For both measures of well-being it is predominantly small inheritances, of less than 
2500 pounds, that are observed to reduce mental stress and unhappiness. The effect 
upon GHQ is estimated at -0.488. For GHQH the parameter estimate is -0.102. 
Again only the latter effect is statistically significantly different from zero. Medium 
sized bequests are observed to improve well-being, whilst the largest inheritances 
are estimated to increase GHQ mental stress, though reduce GHQH unhappiness. 
Column four of Table 5.8 examines the effect of the amount of inheritance, 
in tens of thousands of pounds, upon well-being. Both GHQ and GHQH scores 
are shown to be improving in the size of the bequest, despite the non-linearity 
observed above. A bequest of 10,000 pounds is predicted to improve the GHQ 
mental health score by -0.075 points and the GHQH unhappiness score by -0.014 
points. When analysis is conditional upon only those individuals who do inherit, in 
column five of Table 5.8, both GHQ and GHQH coefficients are attenuated and 
are less precisely estimated but remain negative. 
McGarry (1999) examines data on intended bequests and finds that the 
major determinant of the size of bequest is parental wealth. A significant role is, 
though, found also for the closeness of family relations. 
With respect to the data studied here, recipients of the smallest category of 
inheritance (less than 2500 pounds) may include grandchildren rather than children 
and individuals with weaker parental links. They may then be more distant from the 
deceased benefactor and thus likely to suffer less distress. As the amount of 
inheritance increases, we potentially observe individuals with closer ties to the 
deceased. Also, larger inheritances may be in the form of property or other assets, 
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which themselves may, possibly, induce greater levels of stress in disposing of. The 
improvement in well-being observed for small inheritances may be being offset for 
larger bequests by the mental stress associated with bereavement. 
Alternatively, those who inherit are themselves likely to be more affluent, 
due to linkages in family wealth, potentially with higher levels of well-being. Yet for 
such a mechanism to explain the behaviour observed here would require this effect 
to be felt for small inheritances but not for large. Such a relation seems doubtful, 
especially as the age, gender, race, education and region of the recipient are held 
constant. 
Table 5.9 seeks to investigate these issues. It uses the sample of individuals 
where past (i. e. lagged levels of) GHQ and GHQH data are available. Column one 
replicates the result for column four of Table 5.8. Parameter estimates are found to 
be similar, though less well determined. In column two of Table 5.9, family income 
is added as an explanatory variable. If the observed effect of the size of inheritance 
upon well-being reflects the wealth of inheritors, then the addition of this variable 
should drive the estimated coefficient towards zero. In fact, the estimated 
relationship between well-being and bequests seems to be independent to the 
inclusion of an income control. Furthermore, when we add a lagged dependent 
variable or instead examine the change in well-being, 
17 in columns three and four of 
Table 5.9 respectively, the estimated beneficial effect of a bequest increases. Thus 
results do not depend upon the wealth of inheritors. 
Any gains in well-being associated with an inheritance are potentially 
contaminated by distress associated with the death of a close relative. The estimates 
so far may then form a lower bound upon the true effect. Assuming stress levels are 
17 This will capture the effect of selectivity if it remains stable over time. 
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liable to be high both pre- and post-bereavement, it seems natural to examine how 
well-being changes over time in response to an inheritance. Columns one and two 
of Table 5.10 indicate an improvement in both GHQ mental health scores and 
GHQH unhappiness scores that is increasing in the size of the bequest. This is true 
both within the sample of all individuals and the sample restricted to inheritors only. 
A 50,000 pounds inheritance is predicted to produce an improvement in GHQ 
mental stress of -0.99 and GHQH unhappiness of -0.15, both of which are 
approximately 0.2 of a standard deviation. 
These results may reflect heightened distress pre-bereavement and a 
subsequent return to `normal' well-being levels. If so, we spuriously overestimate 
the effect of a windfall. If the bequest is anticipated, consumption patterns may 
change in advance, improving welfare, and, in contrast, we may underestimate the 
true gain in well-being. Hence we next examine the change in well-being over longer 
time periods, namely, two-year and three-year gaps. Columns three to six of Table 
5.10 show that the results are robust to such considerations; indeed the gains in 
well-being from an inheritance appear to be amplified. A bequest of 10,000 pounds 
improves the GHQ mental stress score by -0.520 and the GHQH unhappiness 
scores by -0.083, compared to the well-being levels that prevailed three years prior. 
The latter effect is found to be statistically significant at normal confidence levels. 
5.5 Conclusions 
Economists assume, without detailed evidence, that a person who becomes richer 
becomes happier. This chapter shows that what is arguably the central tenet of 
economics is supported by the data. 
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While it is known from recent cross-sectional work that reported happiness 
is positively correlated with income, that is not a persuasive reason to believe that 
more money leads to greater well-being. Cross-section patterns are at best 
suggestive because their causal implications are hard to interpret. Constructing a 
compelling test is difficult because of the stringent requirements of an ideal data set. 
Our approach seems to have three advantages. First, we follow a group of 
individuals longitudinally, and thus can measure the same person's well-being and 
income level at different points in time. Second, the data set provides information 
on financial windfalls (inheritances and lottery wins). These are probably as close as 
can be achieved to randomly occurring events in which some individuals have 
money showered upon them while others, in a control group, do not. Third, 
information is available on two ways to measure well-being: mental stress using a 
standard psychological health measure, and happiness using a simple four-point 
question. 
We find that, as theory would predict, a windfall of money in year t is 
followed by lower mental stress and higher reported happiness. '8 At a conservative 
estimate, a windfall of 50,000 pounds improves mental well-being by between 0.1 
and 0.3 standard deviations. 
18 Because we have data on both windfalls and well-being only for two years right at the end of 
our sample, it is not possible to assess whether people adapt psychologically to a windfall 
(perhaps returning eventually to some baseline happiness level). But the longitudinal data 
collection is continuing, so eventually it should be possible to address this question. 
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All All Windfall All All Windfall 
Regressor GHQ GHQ GHQ AGHQ dGHQ dGHQ 
Windfall dummy -0.299 -0.156 
(0.106) (0.095) 
Ln(Windfall amount) -0.054 -0.103 -0.034 -0.101 
(0.016) (0.045) (0.015) (0.048) 
Observations 
Individuals in Panel 9588 9588 2932 8620 8620 2722 
Panel Total 17556 17556 3737 16075 16075 3478 
Mean GHQ stress score 11.14 11.14 10.90 11.16 11.16 10.93 
(5.44) (5.44) (5.28) (5.43) (5.43) (5.27) 
Mean windfall amount 388.7 388.7 1825.9 376.0 376.0 1737.6 
(5655.3) (5655.3) (12151.5) (5344.5) (5344.5) (12387.8) 
TABLE 5.1b 
Unhappiness Equations 











L1 GH H 
Windfall 
L1 GH H 
Windfall dummy -0.014 -0.026 
(0.011) (0.013) 
Ln(Windfall amount) -0.003 -0.011 -0.005 -0.013 
(0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.006) 
Observations 
Individuals in Panel 9588 9588 2932 8696 8696 2737 
Panel Total 17556 17556 3737 16201 16201 3499 
Mean GHQH 2.01 2.01 2.00 2.01 2.01 2.00 
unhappiness 
(0.59) (0.59) (0.59) (0.59) (0.59) (0.59) 
Mean windfall amount 388.7 388.7 1825.9 376.0 376.0 1737.6 
(5655.3) (5655.3) (12151.5) (5344.5) (5344.5) (12387.8) 
1. Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and the repeat 
sampling of individuals. All estimates are from least squares bivariate regressions. Data are for 
1997 and 1998. 
2. GHQ is a measure of mental stress on a 36-point scale. GHQH is a measure of unhappiness on 
a 4-point scale. 
3. `All' refers to the whole sample. The heading `Windfall' refers to the sub-sample of those people 
who receive a non-zero windfall. Windfalls refer to cumulative gains, from lottery winnings plus 
inheritances, within the last year. They are deflated to 1997 values. 
4. The log of windfall corrects the zero-windfall terms by adding a small constant (0.1). 
5. The first three columns are cross-sections. The second three columns are differences. 
6. Where sample means are reported, standard deviations are in parentheses. 
The Effects of Windfalls upon Two Measures of Well-being in a Panel 
TABLE 5.1 a 
Mental Stress Equations 
Dependent Variable: GHQ Stress Scores 
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Lottery Lottery 
Win Amount GHQ GHQH dGH dGH H Income Frequency 
No 11.22 2.01 21532 14079 
(5.48) (0.59) (18730) 
Yes 200.0 10.91 2.00 23439 3334 
(2859.2) (5.29) (0.59) (17234) 
Total 38.3 11.16 2.01 21897 17413 
(1253.4) (5.45) (0.59) (18467) 
Sample 2. The sub-sample with La ed GH Scoret available 
Lottery Lottery 
Win Amount GHQ GHQH dGH dGH H Income Frequency 
No 11.25 2.02 0.020 0.006 21445 11558 
(5.46) (0.58) (5.41) (0.71) (18395) 
Yes 118.5 10.93 2.01 -0.096 -0.010 23483 2831 
(565.6) (5.19) (0.58) (5.27) (0.70) (17378) 
Total 23.3 11.19 2.02 -0.003 0.003 21846 14389 
(255.2) (5.41) (0.58) (5.38) (0.71) (18217) 
TABLE 5.2b 
Summary Statistics by Whether had an Inheritance 
Sam le 1: The Pooled Cross-section 
Bequest 
Bequest Amount GHQ GHQH AGH AGH H Income Frequency 
No 11.15 2.01 21811 16953 
(5.45) (0.59) (18113) 
Yes 14547.6 10.93 1.95 24621 422 
(32582.4) (5.16) (0.61) (27959) 
Total 353.3 11.15 2.01 21898 17375 
(5544.4) (5.44) (0.59) (18418) 
Sample 2: The sub-sample with Lagged GHQ Scores available 
Bequest 
Bequest 
Amount GHQ GHQH dGH dGH H Income Frequency 
No 11.19 2.02 0.0002 0.006 21797 13306 
(5.40) (0.58) (5.36) (0.70) (17827) 
Yes 14137.0 11.10 1.96 -0.429 -0.097 24465 340 
(30362.3) (5.34) (0.62) (5.59) (0.78) (28793) 
Total 352.2 11.18 2.02 -0.010 0.003 21864 13646 
(5268.9) (5.39) (0.58) (5.37) (0.70) (18184) 
1. Sample 2 denotes those in the data set for whom we have some observations on well-being for 
earlier periods. Lottery winnings and inheritances refer to cumulative gains within the last year. 
The amount of lottery winnings, bequests and income variables are deflated to 1997 values. 
2. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
3. AGHQ refers to the one period change in GHQ score (GHQt - GHQ,., ). OGHQH is 
defined 
analogously. 
Summary Statistics by Source of Windfall 
TABLE 5.2a 
Summary Statistics by Whether Had a Win on the Lottery 
Sample 1: The Pooled Cross-section 
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Summary Statistics by Amount of Windfall 
TABLE 5.3 
Summary Statistics by Amount of Win on Lottery 
Sample 1: The Pooled Cross-section 
Lottery Lottery 
Win Amount GHQ GHQH dGH AGH H Income Frequency 
No 11.22 2.01 21532 14079 
(5.48) (0.59) (18730) 
1-99 28.6 11.05 2.01 23098 2769 
(24.1) (5.34) (0.59) (16684) 
100-999 256.6 10.18 1.98 23921 497 
(195.4) (4.98) (0.56) (17278) 
1000 plus 6766.6 10.28 1.94 33776 68 
(19009.5) (4.67) (0.57) (30829) 
Total 38.30 11.16 2.01 21897 17413 
(1253.4) (5.45) (0.59) (18467) 
Sam le 2: The sub -sample with Lagged GH Scores available 
Lottery Lottery 
Win Amount GHQ GHQH dGH dGH H Income Frequency 
No 11.25 2.02 0.020 0.006 21445 11558 
(5.46) (0.58) (5.41) (0.71) (18395) 
1-99 28.9 11.07 2.02 -0.081 -0.011 23073 2353 
(23.9) (5.22) (0.58) (5.28) (0.71) (16667) 
100-999 259.7 10.24 1.98 -0.109 0.009 24156 423 
(200.2) (5.02) (0.57) (5.30) (0.66) (17707) 
1000 plus 2868.9 10.31 1.98 -0.655 -0.109 35878 55 
(2865.8) (4.53) (0.59) (4.25) (0.66) (33319) 
Total 23.3 11.19 2.02 -0.003 0.003 21846 14389 
(255.2) (5.41) (0.58) (5.38) (0.71) (18217) 
1. Lottery winnings and inheritances refer to cumulative gains within the last year. The amount of 
lottery winnings, bequests and income variables are deflated to 1997 values. 
2. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
3. AGHQ refers to the one period change in GHQ score (GHQ, - GHQt_i). AGHQH is defined 
analogously. 
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TABLE 5.4 
Summary Statistics by Amount of Inheritance 
Sample 1: The Pooled Cross-section 
Bequest 
Bequest 
Amount GHQ GHQH dGH dGH H Income Frequency 
No 11.15 2.01 21811 16953 
(5.45) (0.59) (18113) 
1-2499 881.7 10.58 1.89 24269 189 
(629.3) (5.04) (0.56) (19974) 
2500- 5351.7 10.95 1.97 23270 118 
9999 (2150.1) (5.19) (0.61) (14219) 
10,000+ 46442.8 11.50 2.02 26588 115 
(49917.4) (5.34) (0.68) (44894) 
Total 353.3 11.15 2.01 21880 17375 
(5544.4) (5.44) (0.59) (18418) 
Sample 2: The sub-sample with Lagged GHQ Scores available 
Bequest 
Bequest 
Amount GHQ GHQH dGH dGH H Income Frequency 
No 11.19 2.02 0.0002 0.0061 21797 13306 
(5.40) (0.58) (5.36) (0.70) (17827) 
1-2499 908.4 10.76 1.90 -0.2800 -0.0933 23489 150 
(641.5) (5.20) (0.58) (5.42) (0.74) (19709) 
2500- 5477.4 11.04 1.99 -0.8242 -0.0769 24366 91 
9999 (2177.6) (5.25) (0.61) (5.43) (0.67) (14723) 
10,000+ 42140.3 11.68 2.04 -0.2929 -0.1212 26033 99 
(45324.0) (5.62) (0.68) (6.00) (0.91) (45544) 
Total 352.2 11.18 2.02 -0.0105 0.0035 21864 13646 
(5268.9) (5.39) (0.58) (5.37) (0.70) (18184) 
1. Lottery winnings and inheritances refer to cumulative gains within the last year. The amount of 
lottery winnings, bequests and income variables are deflated to 1997 values. 
2. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
3. OGHQ refers to the one period change in GHQ score (GHQt - GHQt. i)", &GHQH is defined 
analogously. 
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The Effect of a Lottery Win upon Well-being 
TABLE 5.5a 
Mental Stress Equations 
Dependent Variable: GHQ Stress Scores 
All All All All Win 
Regressor 1997-98 1997-98 1997-98 1997-98 1997-98 
Amount of Income -0.117 
(0.025) 
Lottery Win -0.199 
(0.110) 
Lottery Win: 1-99 pounds -0.077 
(0.118) 
Lottery Win: 100-999 -0.796 
(0.237) 
Lottery Win: 1000 or more -0.825 
(0.603) 
Amount of Lottery Win -0.686 -0.666 
(0.110) (0.124) 
Observations 
Individuals in Panel 9493 9493 9493 9493 2607 
Panel Total 17413 17413 17413 17413 3334 
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
TABLE 5.5b 
Unhappiness Equations 
Dependent Variable: GH H Unh appiness Scores 
All All All All Win 
Regressor 1997-98 1997-98 1997-98 1997-98 1997-98 
Amount of Income -0.005 
(0.003) 
Lottery Win -0.005 
(0.012) 
Lottery Win: 1-99 pounds 0.000 
(0.013) 
Lottery Win: 100-999 -0.026 
(0.026) 
Lottery Win: 1000 or more -0.078 
(0.069) 
Amount of Lottery Win -0.032 -0.031 
(0.016) (0.018) 
Observations 
Individuals in Panel 9493 9493 9493 9493 2607 
Panel Total 17413 17413 17413 17413 3334 
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
1. Standard errors are in parentheses. See notes to Table 5.1. 
2. The lottery win dummies are relative to the omitted category of zero winnings. The amount 
variables are measured in £10,000's (deflated to 1997 values). 
3. All regressions are estimated by OLS and include controls for age, gender, race, highest 
educational qualification, region of residence, and year. 
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The Effect of a Lottery Win upon Well-being: Non-linear Income Effects 
All All All 
Re, grerror 1997-98 1997-98 1997-98 
Amount of Lottery Win 
(Amount of Lottery Win)2/100 
Amount of Income 
(Amount of Income)2/100 
Observations 
Individuals in Panel 
Panel Total 
Adjusted R2 
-0.686 -0.664 -1.510 







9493 9493 9493 
17413 17413 17413 
0.03 0.03 0.03 
TABLE 5.6b 
Unhappiness Equations 
Debendent Variable: GHOH Unhami'iness Scores 
All All All 
Regressor 1997-98 1997-98 1997-98 
TABLE 5.6a 
Mental Stress Equations 
dent Variable: GHQ Stress Scores 
Amount of Lottery Win 
(Amount of Lottery Win)2/100 
Amount of Income 
(Amount of Income)2/100 
Observations 
Individuals in Panel 
Panel Total 
Adjusted R2 







9493 9493 9493 
17413 17413 17413 
0.01 0.01 0.01 
1. Standard errors are in parentheses. See notes to Table 5.1. 
2. The amount variables are measured in £10,000's (deflated to 1997 values). 
3. All regressions are estimated by OLS and include controls for age, gender, race, highest 
educational qualification, region of residence, and year. 
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The Effects of a Lottery Win upon Well-being: Robustness Checks 
TABLE 5.7a 
Mental Stress Equations 

















Amount of Lottery Win -0.826 -1.391 -1.449 -1.976 -2.012 (1.357) (1.127) (1.135) (1.174) (1.181) 
Amount of Income -0.123 -0.020 -0.020 0.088 0.088 
(0.029) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) 
GHQ (t-1) 0.491 0.491 
(0.011) (0.011) 
Lottery Win in 1995 0.059 0.037 
(0.084) (0.078) 
Observations 
Individuals in Panel 7515 7515 7515 7515 7515 
Panel Total 14389 14389 14389 14389 14389 
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.26 0.26 0.00 0.00 
TABLE 5.7b 
Unhappiness Equations 
Variable: GHQH Unbapt 
GHQH GHQH GHQH AGHQH L GHQH 
All All All All All 
Regressor 1997-98 1997-98 1997-98 1997-98 1997-98 
Amount of Lottery Win 
Amount of Income 
GHQH (t-1) 
Lottery Win in 1995 
Observations 
Individuals in Panel 
Panel Total 
Adjusted R2 
-0.019 -0.059 -0.073 -0.181 -0.177 
(0.141) (0.134) (0.135) (0.157) (0.157) 
-0.003 -0.000 -0.001 0.006 0.006 





7515 7515 7515 7515 7515 
14389 14389 14389 14389 14389 
0.01 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.00 
1. Standard errors are in parentheses. See notes to Table 5.1. 
2. The amount variables are measured in £10,000's (deflated to 1997 values). 
3. All regressions are estimated by OLS and include controls for age, gender, race, highest 
educational qualification, region of residence, and year. 
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The Effect of an Inheritance upon Well-being 
TABLE 5.8a 
Mental Stress Equations 
dent Variable: GHQ Stress Scores 
All All All All Inherit 
Regressor 1997-98 1997-98 1997-98 1997-98 1997-98 
Amount of Income 
Inheritance dummy 
Inheritance: 1-2499 pounds 
Inheritance: 2500-9999 
Inheritance: 10,000 or more 
Amount of Inheritance 
Observations 















9488 9488 9488 9488 392 
17375 17375 17375 17375 422 
0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 
TABLE 5.8b 
Unhappiness Equations 
Detendent Variable: GHDH Unha/biness Scores 
All All All All Inherit 
Regressor 1997-98 1997-98 1997-98 1997-98 1997-98 




Inheritance: 10,000 or more 
Amount of Inheritance 
Observations 















9488 9488 9488 9488 392 
17375 17375 17375 17375 422 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
1. Standard errors are in parentheses. See notes to Table 5.1. 
2. The inheritance dummies are relative to the omitted category of not receiving a bequest. The 
amount variables are measured in £10,000's (deflated to 1997 values). 
3. All regressions are estimated by OLS and include controls for age, gender, race, highest 
educational qualification, region of residence, and year. 
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The Effect of an Inheritance upon Well-being: Robustness Checks 
TABLE 5.9a 
Mental Stress Equations 
dent Variable: GHQ Stress Scores 
GHQ GHQ GHQ dGHQ dGHQ 
All All All All All 
Regressor 1997-98 1997-98 1997-98 1997-98 1997-98 
Amount of Inheritance -0.075 -0.078 -0.136 -0.198 -0.196 (0.079) (0.079) (0.118) (0.178) (0.178) 
Amount of Income -0.113 -0.014 0.089 
(0.029) (0.022) (0.024) 
GHQ (t-1) 0.492 
(0.011) 
Observations 
Individuals in Panel 7262 7262 7262 7262 7262 
Panel Total 13646 13646 13646 13646 13646 
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.03 0.25 0.00 0.00 
TABLE 5.9b 
Unhappiness Equations 
Dependent Variable: GH-OH Unbai iness Scores 
GHQH GHQH GHQH AGHQH AGHQH 
All All All All All 
Regressor 1997-98 1997-98 1997-98 1997-98 1997-98 
Amount of Inheritance -0.009 -0.009 -0.014 -0.030 -0.030 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.023) (0.023) 
Amount of Income -0.001 0.001 0.007 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
GHQH (t-1) 0.248 
(0.012) 
Observations 
Individuals in Panel 7262 7262 7262 7262 7262 
Panel Total 13646 13646 13646 13646 13646 
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.00 
1. Standard errors are in parentheses. See notes to Table 5.1. 
2. The amount variables are measured in £10,000's (deflated to 1997 values). 
3. All regressions are estimated by OLS and include controls for age, gender, race, highest 
educational qualification, region of residence, and year. 
4. iGHQ refers to the one period change in GHQ score (GHQt - GHQt. 1). 
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The Effect of an Inheritance upon Well-being: First Differences 
TABLE 5.10a 
Mental Stress Equations 
Detendent Variable: GHO Stress Scores 
dGHQ 1GHQ d2GHQ d2GHQ d3GHQ d3GHQ 
All Inherit All Inherit All Inherit 
Regressor 1997-98 1997-98 1997-98 1997-98 1997-98 1997-98 
Amount of Inheritance -0.196 -0.235 -0.363 -0.450 -0.520 -0.683 
(0.178) (0.220) (0.296) (0.358) (0.413) (0.484) 
Amount of Income 0.089 -0.031 0.087 -0.251 0.054 -0.605 
(0.024) (0.085) (0.038) (0.161) (0.064) (0.284) 
Observations 
Individuals in Panel 7262 316 7262 316 7262 316 
Panel Total 13646 340 13646 340 13646 340 
Adjusted R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03 
TABLE 5.10b 
Unh appiness Equations 
De endent Variable: GH H Unhapp iness Scores 
1GHQH dGHQH d2GHQH d2GHQH d3GHQH d3GHQH 
All Inherit All Inherit All Inherit 
Regressor 1997-98 1997-98 1 997-98 1997-98 1997-98 1997-98 
Amount of Inheritance -0.030 -0.031 -0.060 -0.072 -0.083 -0.108 
(0.023) (0.029) (0.033) (0.041) (0.038) (0.049) 
Amount of Income 0.007 -0.002 0.008 -0.017 0.007 -0.036 
(0.003) (0.012) (0.005) (0.021) (0.008) (0.038) 
Observations 
Individuals in Panel 7262 316 7262 316 7262 316 
Panel Total 13646 340 13646 340 13646 340 
Adiusted R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 
1. Standard errors are in parentheses. See notes to Table 5.1. 
2. The amount variables are measured in £10,000's (deflated to 1997 values). 
3. All regressions are estimated by OLS and include controls for age, gender, race, highest 
educational qualification, region of residence, and year. 
4. AGHQ refers to the one period change in GHQ score (GHQt - GHQ1_1). 02GHQ is the two 
period change in GHQ score (GHQ, - GHQ, _2)., 
&3GHQ is the three period change in GHQ 
score (GHQ, - GHQ, _; 
). Similarly terms are defined for GHQH. 
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Chapter Six 
The Decline of Well-being amongst Britain's Public 
Sector Workers 
This chapter is based upon joint work with Professor Andrew Oswald. 
Public Sector Well-being 
Abstract 
Over the period from 1991 to 1998, British public sector employees are found to 
show substantially reduced well-being levels, both in absolute terms and relative to 
private sector employees. At the start of the 1990s, the levels of psychological 
health, as measured by a General Health Question score, for public sector workers 
were similar to those within the private sector, but by 1998 were noticeably worse. 
Consistent with this, a relative decline in public sector job satisfaction is also noted. 
It is not possible to be completely certain as to why stress within the public sector 
has risen. The evidence, however, suggests it cannot be adequately explained by the 
changing composition of public sector employment, by the relative decline in public 
sector pay, or by aggregate movements in economic conditions. 
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6.1 Introduction 
In the early 1990s, the British government entered into an experiment. It embarked 
on a process of reform, with the objective of improving the provision of public 
services. The public sector was subjected to greater, and more formal, scrutiny. 
League tables on the performance of health and education authorities were 
published. Schools were subject to external inspections and newspapers printed the 
results. Market forces were introduced into the state sector, as contracting-out and 
the encouragement of competitive tendering forced public sector suppliers to 
compete with private sector firms. Workers such as college employees were required 
to reapply for their own jobs. In 1993 tough budgetary limits were imposed upon 
the public sector and pay awards recommended by public sector review bodies were 
not fully implemented. ' Such a policy was sustained for the remainder of the 1990s. 
This experiment is of interest to other countries that may choose to follow suit. 
Despite anecdotal evidence of high levels of mental distress in particular 
cross-sections (Kapur, Borill and Stride, 1998), and concern about recruiting 
(Machin, 1999), comparatively little attention has been paid to the well-being of 
representative samples of public sector workers. This chapter examines the well- 
being of these employees, and contrasts outcomes with those in the private sector. 
The central finding of the chapter is that, over the 1990s, there has been a 
sharp increase in observed stress levels and a marked decline in job satisfaction 
within the public sector, relative to private sector employees. This effect is found 
whichever way the data are cut and irrespective of the estimation method used. The 
1 For a discussion of the change in public sector pay, see Blackaby et al (1999), Disney and 
Gosling (1998) and Elliott and Duffus (1996). 
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well-being advantage observed for public sector workers at the beginning of the 
1990s is found to be negligible, if positive at all, by the end of the sample period. 
The plan of the chapter is as follows. Section two discusses the use and 
validity of subjective measures of well-being. Section three outlines the data 
analysed, whilst section four discusses results. Finally, section five concludes. 
6.2 Subjective measures of worker well-being 
Individuals' survey responses to questions about well-being are analysed in this 
chapter. Whilst such responses have been studied extensively by psychologists' the 
use of such data by economists is relatively modest, ' but growing. Some economists 
may emphasise the likely unreliability of subjective data - perhaps because they are 
unaware of the large literature by research psychologists that uses such numbers. A 
recent literature on the border between economics and psychology has, however, 
attempted to understand the patterns in well-being data. 
Self-reported well-being measures are thought to be a reflection of at least 
four factors: circumstances, aspirations, comparisons with others, and a person's 
baseline happiness or disposition (e. g. Warr, 1980, Chen and Spector, 1991). Konow 
and Earley (1999) document evidence that recorded well-being levels have been 
demonstrated to be correlated, in the expected direction, with objective 
characteristics, such as unemployment, and with the person's recall of positive 
versus negative life-events. Well-being is also positively correlated with assessments 
of the person's happiness by friends or family members and his or her spouse. 
2 Earlier work includes Andrews (1991), Argyle (1989), Diener (1984), Diener et al (1999), 
Douthitt et al (1992), Fox and Kahneman (1992), Larsen et al (1984), Mullis (1992), Veenhoven 
(1991,1993), and Warr (1990). 
'Recent papers include: Blanchflower and Freeman (1997), Blanchflower and Oswald (1999, 
2000), Clark (1996), Clark and Oswald (1996), Di Tella and MacCulloch (1999), Di Tella et al 
(2001), Frank (1985,1997), Frey and Stutzer (1998,1999) and Ng (1996). 
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Moreover, physiological responses - heart rate, blood pressure measures and skin- 
resistance measures of response to stress - are correlated with well-being responses 
in the expected way. Such a pattern of results can probably not be reconciled with a 
purely idiosyncratic variable. ' 
A more rigorous argument in favour of the ability of the researcher to make 
use of well-being data is found in Kahneman et al (1997). The authors argue that 
functions that relate subjective feelings to physical variables are similar for different 
types of people. They suggest the well-being of any event has a basic scale: pleasant, 
neutral, and unpleasant. Other scales may expand the positive or negative categories 
to a finer degree but the neutral case is a constant. It is argued the distinctiveness of 
this neutral value provides a focal point that allows some confidence in matching 
subjective experiences across time for a given individual and to support 
interpersonal comparisons. 
Here we assume a reported well-being function: 
r= h(u(y, z, t)) +e (1) 
where r is some self-reported number on an ordinal well-being scale, u(... ) is 
thought to be an individual's true level of well-being, h(. ) is a continuous non- 
differentiable function relating actual to reported well-being, y is real income, z is a 
set of demographic and personal characteristics, t is the time period, and e an error 
term. It is assumed, as seems plausible, that u(... ) is a function observable only to 
the respondent. Its structure cannot be conveyed unambiguously to the interviewer 
or any other individual. The error term, e, then subsumes among other factors the 
inability of human beings to communicate accurately their well-being level. ' This 
° For alternative discussions of well-being data, and the issues of reliability and validity, see 
Argyle (1989) Fordyce (1985), Larsen et al (1984), Pavot and Diener (1993), and Watson and 
Clark (1991). 
S This recognises the social scientist's instinctive distrust of a single person's subjective `utility' 
and the likelihood that self-reported data, whilst informative, will be subject to error. 
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measurement error in reported well-being would, though, be less easily handled if 
well-being were to be used as an independent variable. 
6.3 Data 
The data used in this study come from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). 
The BHPS is a nationally representative sample of more than 5,000 British 
households, containing over 10,000 adult individuals, conducted late each year from 
1991 to 1998. Respondents are interviewed annually. If an individual leaves their 
original household all adult members of their new household are also interviewed. 
Children are interviewed once aged 16. Together this should ensure the sample 
remains broadly representative of the British population. 6 These data include 
detailed information concerning earnings, education, employment characteristics 
and demographics, worker well-being and job satisfaction. Attention is here 
restricted to those individuals aged less than 65 and in employment at the survey 
date, approximately 5,000 respondents in any one year. 
The BHPS contains a standard mental well-being measure, a General Health 
Questionnaire (GHQ) score. This is a variable used by medical researchers and 
psychiatrists as a measure of stress or psychological distress. It is likely to be 
unfamiliar to some economists, but the GHQ is probably the most widely used, 
questionnaire-based, method of measuring mental stress. It amalgamates answers to 
the following twelve questions: 
6 Nathan (1999) undertakes a systematic analysis of the effects of attrition, and compares the 
BHPS to Census data, the General Household Survey (GHS) and the Family Expenditure Survey 
(FES), with respect to age, sex, marital status, socio-economic group, ethnicity, employment 
status and household characteristics. The author concludes that cumulative attrition in the BHPS 
is limited and does not lead to serious bias in inference. 
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Have you recently: 
1. Been able to concentrate on whatever you are doing? 
2. Lost much sleep over worry? 
3. Felt that you are playing a useful part in things? 
4. Felt capable of making decisions about things? 
5. Felt constantly under strain? 
6. Felt you could not overcome your difficulties? 
7. Been able to enjoy your normal day-to-day activities? 
8. Been able to face up to your problems? 
9. Been feeling unhappy and depressed? 
10. Been losing confidence in yourself? 
11. Been thinking of yourself as a worthless person? 
12. Been feeling reasonably happy all things considered? 
Each one of the responses to these questions is scored on a four-point scale, from 0 
to 3, where the response with the lowest well-being level scores 3 and that with the 
highest scores 0. The responses to these twelve questions are then summed to form 
an overall measure of GHQ distress. ' This approach is sometimes called a Likert 
scale and is scored out of 36. This measure of stress, or lack of well-being, thus 
runs from a worst possible outcome of 36 (all twelve responses indicating very poor 
psychological health) to a minimum of 0 (no responses indicating poor 
psychological health). In general, medical opinion is that healthy individuals will 
score typically around 10-13 on the test. Numbers near 36 are rare and usually 
indicate depression in a formal clinical sense. 
7 Responses are derived from a self-completion questionnaire. Some 95 percent of individuals 
answer at least one GHQ question and 94 percent all twelve. Amongst employed respondents the 
latter figure is approximately 96 percent. 
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A second measure of worker well-being is used in the chapter, employees' 
job satisfaction. Satisfaction has been found to influence subsequent labour market 
behaviour. It is a significant predictor of quits (Freeman, 1978) and is negatively 
related to absenteeism, non- and counter-productive work. Furthermore, it is 
related, in the expected direction, with other indicators of well-being: poor mental 
health, length of life and coronary heart disease (see Clark and Oswald, 1996). 
Within the BHPS all working respondents are asked to rate their level of 
satisfaction with respect to seven aspects of their employment: promotion 
prospects, total pay, relations with supervisor, job security, ability to work on own 
initiative, the actual work itself, and, the hours of work. Each of these categories is 
assigned a rank between 1 and 7,1 representing `not satisfied at all', 7 indicating 
`completely satisfied' and the numbers from 2 to 6 corresponding to intermediate 
levels of satisfaction (where 4 is `neither satisfied or dissatisfied'). ' Finally, and 
subsequent to these seven questions, a question was asked: 
`All things considered, horn sati. rfced or dissatisfied are you with your present job overall using the 
same 1-7 scale? " 
The method in which these questions were asked suggests individuals 
evaluated many attributes of their job package when responding. It seems probable 
this approach will elicit responses more closely approximating satisfaction at the 
workplace, than would a simple direct question. Responses to this last question then 
form the basis of analysis of job satisfaction within the BHPS. Unfortunately the 
method in which the questions were asked changed in 1998, with only a subset of 
the preliminary satisfaction questions retained. Analysis is here restricted to the 
8 In wave one the categories 1,4 and 7 are given the descriptions outlined, whilst 2,3,5 and 6 are 
left unlabeled. From wave two onwards all values were given a label, with the descriptors 
'mostly' and 'somewhat' added. The question itself was a constant. This issue is discussed later. 
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years 1991 to 1997, for which consistent satisfaction data are available. The GHQ 
data remain consistent in every wave and are analysed for the period 1991 to 1998. 
These two measures, GHQ and job satisfaction, are viewed as describing the 
flow of worker well-being and are used to examine how well-being has changed 
over time in both the public and private sectors. 
6.4 Results 
Table 6.1 presents the simplest results and examines whether well-being levels, as 
measured by (Likert scaled) GHQ scores, have declined over time for public and 
private sector workers. Figure 6.1 plots the corresponding time trend. 
To be clear, about the choice of units and definitions, rising well-being is 
here given by declining GHQ mental stress scores. This follows the standard usage 
in the psychology and medical literature. Hence if well-being is falling over time. 
GHQ will be rising. 
In the summary statistics, public sector workers are observed to experience a 
pronounced increase in measured stress, relative to private sector employees. 
Between 1991 and 1998 the average GHQ score of public sector employees 
worsens by approximately 1.3 points, from 10.36 to 11.63. This is a large, and 
statistically significant, increase over a period of less than a decade. In comparison, 
the difference in mean GHQ stress scores between unemployed and employed 
individuals, in the BHPS over the period, is approximately 2 points, that between 
females and males 1.4 points. 9 
9 Clark and Oswald (1994) instead study the alternative Caseness score version of the GHQ, this 
counts the number of times, out of twelve, that an individual answers in one of two negative 
response categories. Caseness scores are, on average, 1.5 points higher for the unemployed. 
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For private sector employees, average GHQ levels are initially, in 1991, 
similar to those observed in the public sector, at 10.14, and we cannot reject the null 
of equality of public and private sector scores at conventional significance levels-10 
By 1998 mean GHQ levels within the private sector have risen to 10.65. This marks 
a statistically significant deterioration in measured stress. However, from 1994 
onwards we can reject the null of equality in mean GHQ scores between the 
sectors, for all reasonable p-values, in favour of higher public sector stress. For 
both public and private sector employees we thus observe a worsening of well-being 
in the 1990s. " This effect is particularly pronounced for those workers employed 
by the state. 
These findings are, however, raw cross-section results without controls. 
Many factors shape, or are correlated with, GHQ. It could, in principle, be that the 
pattern in mean GHQ scores in Table 6.1 reflects changes in the composition of the 
public, and private, sectors. The growth in stress could, perhaps, capture the growth 
of part-time, female, and white-collar employment observed for the economy over 
the period. For the public sector this may be a particular concern, as privatisation, 
compulsory competitive tendering, and a shift towards more private sector style 
management may have amplified these general trends. To investigate issues more 
fully we turn to regression analysis. 
6.4.1 Estimation strategy 
The model estimated is an empirical version of equation 1. Well-being is assumed a 
function of personal characteristics (such as education, age, gender and race), 
employer characteristics (e. g. establishment size), variables associated with the 
10 Tests are here t-tests of the equality of means, allowing for potentially unequal variances. 
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labour contract (income, hours of work, occupation) and the time period. Well- 
being for individual i, in time period t, is then expressed as: 
r;, = ý'X+ yi<<P + Xis ß+ zig Y+ Elt i=1, ..., n (2) 
t=1, .., T 
where, r is the dependent variable that captures individual well-being, t the time 
trend, y the vector of pay and hours variables, x the vector of worker characteristics, 
z the vector of employer characteristics12, E the conformable error term with mean 
zero and constant variance, and X, cp, f and y the vectors of parameters to be 
estimated. " The well-being function is approximated as linear and, where the GHQ 
score (on a0 to 36 scale) is the dependent variable, equations estimated by OLS. 14 
Table 6.2a presents the regression equivalent to Table 6.1 and estimates the 
time trend in GHQ, after controlling for observed characteristics. Columns one and 
two estimate regressions separately for public and private sector employees, and 
report the coefficients upon year dummies (these represent the growth in GHQ 
relative to 1991). Column one indicates that GHQ mental stress in the public sector 
is higher by, on average, 1.009 points in 1998 relative to 1991. In column two, the 
estimated growth in mental stress in the private sector is 0.463 points. In both cases 
the null hypothesis of no change is rejected at normal confidence levels. This 
suggests public sector stress grew by 0.546 GHQ points relative to the private 
sector over the period. 
Column three pools the data and includes an interaction term between 
public sector status and the year dummies. These interaction terms capture the 
" Blanchflower and Oswald (2000) document evidence of falling well-being levels for the US 
and Britain, since the early 1970s. 
12 Industry dummies are not included due to the high degree of collinearity with public sector 
status. 
13 This approach implicitly assumes well-being responses are cardinal. 
14 Results are qualitatively unchanged if equations are estimated by the Ordered Probit technique. 
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growth in GHQ levels in the public sector, over and above that in the private 
sector. 15 Again we observe a statistically significant worsening of stress levels in the 
public sector. The growth in GHQ stress, between 1991 and 1998, is some 0.679 
points greater than that observed for private sector employees. This effect is non- 
negligible. Examining coefficients from the GHQ regression, it is over twice as large 
as the stress differential estimated for non-white respondents' (0.299) and 
approximately half as large as the estimated gender differential (1.100 for women). 16 
Table 6.2b repeats the previous analysis, but instead includes a simple time 
trend. " In this case, GHQ is estimated to worsen by approximately 0.120 and 0.047 
points per year, in the public and private sectors respectively. Over the eight-year 
period (1991 to 1998) this suggests public sector stress has worsened by 0.511 GHQ 
points, relative to the private sector. The interaction term in column three of Table 
6.2b suggests public sector stress has grown, on average, by 0.093 points per year 
faster, over the period, than that in the private sector. This implies public sector 
stress has worsened, relatively, by 0.651 GHQ points between 1991 and 1998. All 
effects are statistically significantly different from zero. 18 
The results suggest a fall in the mental health of state sector workers of 
between 0.5 and 0.6 GHQ points. These estimates may, however, be an unreliable 
guide to the growth in GHQ, as Table 6.1 indicates there was a marked jump in 
reported GHQ between 1991 and 1992, within both sectors. 19 Indeed, examining 
column two of Table 6.2a, the difference in mental stress levels in the private sector 
between 1992 and 1998 is small and statistically insignificant. In comparison, both 
in columns one and three, for the public sector the null of equality of GHQ levels in 
15 The public sector dummy subsumes the effect of the public sector in 1991. 
16 Positive effects denote greater stress. 
17 Where the time trend equals 1 if the year is 1991,2 if the year is 1992, etc. 
1e The use of more disaggregated occupation codes produced substantially similar results. 
19 This may, potentially, be due to the onset of recession. 
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1992 and 1998 can be rejected at normal confidence levels. Table 6.3 then examines 
the coefficients upon a time trend for the period 1992 to 1998. Whilst the estimates 
suggest a positive and statistically significant worsening of GHQ in the public 
sector, the private sector time trend is small and not statistically different from zero. 
The increase in stress levels in the private sector, over the period, is then largely a 
result of upward shift in GHQ between 1991 and 1992, with little increase 
thereafter. In contrast, public sector stress is observed to rise by 0.4 to 0.5 GHQ 
points between 1992 and 1998.20 
6.4.2 The trend in public sector well-being and the business cycle 
Pay is likely to be pro-cyclical in both the public and private sectors, however the 
greater volatility of pay in the latter generates an observed counter-cyclical public 
sector pay premium (see Disney and Gosling, 1998). Public sector employment may 
then be, relatively, more attractive in economic downturns. The relative fall in 
public sector well-being could then capture the improvement in economic 
conditions over the 1990s. 
The BHPS covers the eight-year period 1991 to 1998 and so observes only a 
part of the business cycle. A complete test of whether public sector well-being is 
counter-cyclical is then not, here, possible. Instead, in column four of Table 6.2b, 
we examine whether conditions in the local economy can explain the increase in 
public sector stress. The county unemployment rate21 is entered as a measure of 
local labour market conditions. This is interacted with the public sector indicator to 
allow for a differential impact of local unemployment upon GHQ stress for public 
sector employees. 
20 In the results that follow estimation is upon the 1991 to 1998 sample. The broad tenor of result 
is the same if we omit the 1991 survey data. 
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Where local unemployment is high, public sector employment is likely to be 
more attractive and stress lower. This would suggest a negative coefficient upon the 
public sector unemployment effect. The reverse is observed. The parameter is not, 
however, statistically different from zero. Moreover, the estimated time trend in 
public sector stress increases, and remains statistically robust. Local labour market 
conditions do not then explain the trend in public sector GHQ stress levels, 
nevertheless it remains possible national conditions are influencing results. 
An alternative test is carried out in column four of Table 6.3. If the 
observed positive trend in public sector stress reflects a counter-cyclical movement 
in well-being, one may expect the rise in stress to occur predominantly towards the 
end of the 1990s, where economic conditions are improving. For the early part of 
the decade, where the economy is more depressed, ' public sector well-being would 
be expected to be greater, and the trend in GHQ attenuated. We then analyse these 
data for the period 1991 to 1995. Public sector stress is here estimated to grow by 
0.106 GHQ points per year faster than that amongst private sector employees, and 
remains statistically well determined. The deterioration in public sector well-being 
then seems to have begun to occur prior to the economic upturn of the late 1990s. 
Whilst the movement in the aggregate economy is likely to play a role in the 
reduction in public sector well-being the evidence, here, is that it does fully explain 
the upward trend in stress levels. 
6.4.3 The trend in public sector well-being by worker characteristics 
The reforms to the public sector in the 1990s are unlikely to have affected 
employees uniformly. Tables 6.4a and 6.4b examine the trends in GHQ mental 
21 Source: Labour Market Trends (1999). 
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stress, in the public and private sectors, for different groups of individuals. Column 
one, of Table 6.4a, displays coefficient estimates for the pooled sample, where an 
interaction effect captures the trend in public sector GHQ. Disney, Gosling and 
Machin (1995) report evidence that in 1990 approximately 91 percent of public 
sector establishments recognise unions for manual workers and some 98 percent for 
non-manual employees. The respective figures in the private sector are 44 and 28 
percent. The trend in public sector well-being may then, in part, pick up changes in 
well-being within unionised plants, not captured by a union dummy. 23 Column two 
restricts analysis to unionised workplaces, itself potentially an endogenous choice 
variable, and thus implicitly conditions upon union status. Results are essentially 
unchanged. 
Columns three and four of Table 6.4a examine the trend in well-being for 
males and females respectively. Parameter estimates suggest mental stress among 
private sector females worsened, with a positive and statistically significant effect. 
For males the effect is smaller and not well determined. Within the public sector, 
both males and females are observed to have experienced a large increase in mental 
stress (fall in well-being) but again this is only statistically significantly different from 
zero for women. In both cases we cannot reject the equality of the time trend 
coefficients, between men and women, at normal confidence levels. 
Column five of Table 6.4a estimates the time trend in well-being for the 
South of England (London, the South East and East Anglia), column six the North 
of England (North West and North East), Scotland and Wales. Within the South, 
public sector stress is estimated to increase, on average, by 0.064 GHQ points per 
year. This is slightly below that observed for the country as a whole, and is not 
22 The national (claimant) unemployment rate was 7.7 in 1991,9.3 in 1992,9.9 in 1993,9.0 in 
1994,7.7 in 1995.7.1 in 1996,5.4 in 1997 and 4.6 in 1998 (Labour Market Trends, 1999). 
23 There may also be a problem of collinearity between public sector and union status. 
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statistically robust. Within the North of England, Scotland and Wales, the public 
sector time trend is estimated to be 0.102 GHQ points per year, and in this case is 
statistically well determined. The fall in well-being in the public sector is then, if 
anything, larger outside the South-East of England, in regions where the growth in 
the economy has been less pronounced. 
Table 6.4b examines the time trend in mental stress by workers' highest 
academic qualification. Column one reports parameter estimates for individuals with 
no formal qualification, column two individuals with at least one O-level, column 
three workers with one A-level or more, and column four degree-qualified 
employees. In all four cases the growth in mental stress in the private sector is 
positive and similar, though not well determined. For all education groups the 
(relative) public sector time trend is observed to be positive, but only for those 
individuals with no formal qualification is it statistically robust. Here mental stress is 
predicted to grow, on average, by 0.171 GHQ points per year faster than that 
observed in the private sector. For individuals with degrees, where the public sector 
time trend is smallest, the estimated effect is 0.067 GHQ points per year. Despite 
the difference in coefficients, we cannot reject the null of equality of the public 
sector time trends. 24 
The evidence suggests the fall in well-being (rise in mental stress) within the 
public sector has been greatest for the less educated. This is potentially consistent 
with the greater impact that public sector reforms, such as compulsory competitive 
tendering and privatisation of services, have had upon relatively less-skilled 
employees. Indeed, Disney and Gosling (1998) find that the public-sector pay 
' Results are similar when we examine the effects separately for males and females. 
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premium to have almost entirely been eroded for workers with no formal 
qualifications between the 1980s and 1990s. 25 
This decline in relative pay may help to explain the reduction in public 
sector well-being in the 1990s. Yet it does not appear to offer a complete 
explanation. Whilst a relative decline in public sector pay may be expected to reduce 
well-being it would seem plausible this would have greatest impact where pay levels 
lag those observed in the private sector. The decline in public sector well-being 
would then be predicted to be greatest amongst highly qualified employees, and in 
the South East. " This is not the case. The rise in mental distress in the public 
sector is greater for less qualified workers and larger outside the South. 
Furthermore, for women, for whom public sector pay premiums remain robustly 
positive, the rise in GHQ mental stress is observed to be greater. Finally, the results 
observed are robust to omitting controls for pay and/or the hours of work. Whilst 
declining (relative) public sector pay would seem to play a part in the observed fall 
in well-being it does not seem to tell the full story. 
6.4.4 The changing composition of public sector employment 
The decline in well-being may then be linked to the changing working conditions, of 
some, in the public sector. Estimates may, however, be biased due to the changing 
characteristics of public sector jobs. Reforms that have increased market pressure 
on low-skilled occupations may have caused a shift towards white-collar 
employment, as former public sector occupations have been reclassified as being 
within the private sector. This may explain the trend in GHQ stress if occupations 
transferred from the public to the private sector were associated with low levels of 
25 Elliot and Duffus (1996) observe a general decline in the public-sector wage premium, for all 
workers, once account is made for occupational structure dating from the early 1970s. 
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stress. The largest increases in mental stress in the public sector are, however, 
observed for the least educated individuals, whom are more likely to work within 
jobs transferred to the private sector. Alternatively, for occupations remaining 
within the public sector, changing recruitment patterns may produce composition 
change within jobs. 
Table 6.5 investigates these issues by estimating the time trend in public and 
private sector well-being for those individuals who have remained in the same 
sector, over the samples eight-year period (1991 to 1998). The composition of 
public and private sector employees, within this sample, is then unchanged. 
Columns one and four report results for those individuals observed in every wave 
(the balanced sample), columns two and five those workers observed in the same 
sector in each period (the `stayers'). Compared to the results in Table 6.2b, both the 
public and private sector time trends are estimated to be greater in the balanced 
sample (0.228 compared to 0.120 for the public sector, and 0.061 compared to 
0.047 for the private sector). This suggests there may be issues of sample selection 
for those individuals observed in employment and who respond in every wave of 
the survey. This appears especially true for the public sector sample. Nevertheless, 
when we examine the sample of `stayers' the estimated time trends are largely 
unchanged, at 0.206 for public sector employees and 0.061 for private sector 
workers. In all cases parameters are statistically robust. 
An alternative test, of whether composition change can explain the trend in 
public sector well-being, is offered in column three of Table 6.5, where the trend in 
GHQ is estimated for a sample of public sector occupations that have experienced 
little or no reform (see Appendix). Within these occupations, with limited 
composition change, the estimated coefficient upon the time trend is again positive 
26 See Blackaby et at (1999) for a description of public sector pay premia. 
232 
Public Sector Well-being 
and statistically significant, and estimated to be similar to that for all public sector 
workers at 0.102. 
Table 6.6 examines longitudinal changes in GHQ well-being for workers 
followed over time. This will control for any person fixed-effects in GHQ well- 
being levels. 27 Column one of Table 6.6 examines the one-year change in GHQ 
scores, for the years 1992 to 1998 (one period is lost due to calculating the first 
difference). The public sector parameter here measures how much faster public 
sector GHQ has risen, on average, year-to-year relative to the private sector, 
between 1991 and 1998. The estimated coefficient, at 0.096, is similar to the public 
sector time trend observed in column three of Table 6.2b, though in this case not 
statistically well determined. 
Column two of Table 6.6 analyses the change in well-being over the entire 
eight-year period, and examines how the same person's GHQ score changes 
between 1991 and 1998. The public sector parameter here captures the, average, 
growth in public sector stress over the eight-year period between 1991 and 1998, 
compared to workers in the private sector. The estimated public sector coefficient, 
at 0.689 GHQ points, is similar to previous estimates of the increase in public sector 
stress over the period, and is statistically different from zero. Columns three and 
four of Table 6.6 similarly analyse the change in well-being for the sample of 
`stayers'. Results are, as in Table 6.5, even more pronounced and in both cases 
statistically robust. 
A final issue with these estimates concerns endogenous job choice. Within a 
sector where the conditions of work are worsening it will be those who most dislike 
27 One may wish to identify the difference in well-being levels between the public and private 
sectors by examining the change in well-being for job switchers between the sectors. This is not 
here attempted due the relatively small number of individuals who move between the sectors. 
Moreover, observed mobility is likely to capture a large degree of endogenous job choices and 
classification error. Rather we focus upon the relative trend in GHQ over time. 
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a new regime who are prone to leave. Observing those who remain within the 
public sector then may underestimate the true decline in well-being, and the 
estimates above would be a lower bound on the true deterioration in public sector 
stress. This logic may, however, be mitigated by investment in sector-specific skills, 
which may make it unprofitable to switch jobs even as conditions deteriorate. 
In summary, the estimates suggest between 1991 and 1998 the mental stress 
levels of British public sector employees worsened by 0.5 to 0.6 GHQ points, 
relative to the private sector. There is some evidence that this trend cannot be, 
adequately, explained by changes in the composition of public sector employment 
or relative-pay effects. 
6.4.5 An alternative measure of Mental Distress 
An alternative method of measuring GHQ mental distress, as opposed to the Likert 
score (on a0 to 36 scale), is to form a dichotomous indicator of those likely to be at 
risk of psychiatric morbidity. This is commonly measured as being individuals who 
respond to four or more of the twelve GHQ questions negatively 2' 
Table 6.7 presents the sample proportions of individuals with high mental 
distress, within the public and private sectors, over time. The broad patterns in 
proportions are similar to that observed for the (Likert) overall GHQ score in Table 
6.1. For both public and private sector employees there has been a statistically 
significant increase in the proportion of employees with high mental distress, 
between 1991 and 1998. Moreover by the end of the period the incidence of mental 
distress is statistically significantly greater in the state sector. 
Table 6.8a examines whether public sector workers are more likely to report 
high mental distress scores, for each year in the 1990s. Estimation is by the Probit 
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technique and positive coefficients are associated with an increased likelihood of 
mental distress . 
29 For the early 1990s the incidence of high mental distress, whilst 
generally more likely, in the public sector is not statistically significantly different 
from that in the private sector. However, after 1997 we do observe a positive and 
statistically robust public sector coefficient. By the end of the 1990s public sector 
employees are more likely to be characterised as being highly distressed. "' 
Estimates may, however, conceal changes in the composition of public 
sector jobs. Table 6.8b then examines the model for the sample of `stayers'. A 
similar pattern in the estimated public sector coefficients, to that in Table 6.8a, is 
observed and if anything shows a more pronounced trend over time. The public 
sector effect is, however, only well determined in the last period, 1998. 
Whilst a greater time span would be desired to analyse the permanence of 
these results, they usefully reinforce previous estimates and suggest the upward 
trend in mental stress in the public sector is non-trivial. 
6.4.6 Job satisfaction 
An alternative measure of worker well-being is now examined, and versions of 
equation (2) estimated where job satisfaction is the dependent variable. The job 
satisfaction data are observed as ordered categorical responses (on a1 to 7 scale) 
and estimation is by the Ordered Probit technique of McKelvey and Zavoina 
(1975). Positive coefficients here denote higher levels of satisfaction are more likely. 
Mean satisfaction scores are reported, for the public and private sectors, in 
Table 6.9 and Figure 6.2 plots the time trends. Consistent satisfaction data here only 
cover the period 1991 to 1997, and results are henceforth restricted to that period. 
28 See Bowling (1997) for a full discussion. 
29 Examining marginal effects suggests a similar qualitative interpretation. 
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Comparable to the rise in GHQ mental stress observed previously, we observe a 
sharp drop in mean job satisfaction levels in the early 1990s, but one which flattens 
out in 1994 and climbs slowly thereafter. Whereas public sector satisfaction was, on 
average, 0.18 points higher than that observed in the private sector in 1991, by 1997 
the gap had all but disappeared, to 0.03. This fall in job satisfaction is of a similar 
magnitude to the difference in satisfaction levels observed, in the sample, between 
union and non-union workplaces (see Freeman, 1978, for the classic economics 
discussion of union voice and job satisfaction). 
An additional issue with these satisfaction data is that in 1991 the categories 
1,4 and 7 were given descriptions whilst 2,3,5 and 6 were left unlabeled. This had 
the effect of providing focal points for responses at those categories with titles. As 
the job satisfaction data are positively skewed, with mean values of above 5 on a1 
to 7 scale, this may over-estimate job satisfaction in 1991. From 1992 onwards all 
categories were given a descriptive label. The question itself was a constant. 
Whilst satisfaction in 1991 may be overstated, it is not clear why public 
sector workers should respond to this discrepancy in a systematically differently way 
to employees in the private sector. The question format in 1991 would then add 
noise, but not bias, into comparisons of public and private sector employees. Yet, 
the way the question, in 1991, provided focal points to responses, may lead to 
measurement error positively related to true satisfaction, overstating any satisfaction 
differential in that year. 
Table 6.10a offers a simple attempt to analyse this issue, by examining cross- 
section snapshots of workers for each year between 1991 and 1997, and estimates 
the satisfaction differential between public and private sectors workers. In 1991 the 
30 Analogous to previously, when these data are pooled over time, we observe a positive and 
well-determined trend in public sector stress over and above that observed in the private sector. 
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public sector parameter is estimated to be 0.129, this effect remains relatively stable 
at approximately 0.100 for the years 1992 to 1995, but in 1996 and 1997 the 
estimated coefficient is attenuated and no longer statistically significantly different 
from zero. Table 6.10b presents the marginal effects associated with the estimates. 
In 1991 public sector employees are observed to be 5 percent more likely to be 
`mostly' or `completely' satisfied (categories 6 and 7). Between 1992 and 1995 the 
figure lies between 3.4 and 4.0 percent. In 1996 this falls to 2.0 percent, and in 1997 
to 1.2 percent. 
During the early 1990s, when job satisfaction was falling, the public-sector 
satisfaction differential remained positive and statistically significantly different from 
zero. This suggests any dissatisfaction resulting from public sector reforms was, at 
least partially, offset by growing dissatisfaction amongst private sector employees. 
Only in the late 1990s, when private sector satisfaction rose faster than that in the 
public sector, did the estimated differential fall. 
Whilst the difference in the estimated public sector effect between 1991 and 
1992 is relatively minor, we henceforth err on the side of caution and restrict 
attention to the sample period 1992 to 1997. " Table 6.11 a pools the data over time 
and estimates the coefficient upon time trends in job satisfaction, for samples of 
public and private sector workers. Table 6.11b presents the marginal effects. We 
again observe a statistically significant worsening of worker well-being, here job 
satisfaction, for workers within the state sector between 1992 and 1997. Amongst 
private sector employees we observe a small and statistically insignificant fall in job 
satisfaction. Column three, where we pool the public and private sectors and 
capture the trend in the state sector by an interaction term, confirms these findings. 
31 Results are, however, qualitatively the same for the period 1991 to 1997. 
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Whilst these estimates are likely to mask the dip in observed job satisfaction 
in the middle of the decade (Figure 6.2) they suggest the satisfaction differential 
between public and private sector occupations narrowed between 1991 and 1998. 
Furthermore, the estimated time trend in public-sector job satisfaction is essentially 
the same when we omit controls for pay and/or the hours of work. 
6.5 Conclusions 
Well-being has worsened markedly among Britain's public sector workers. It is not 
possible to be completely certain as to why. The evidence suggests composition 
change within public sector employment and the relative decline in public sector pay 
are not sufficient explanations. 
It would be desirable to examine further years of data to check the 
permanence of these results, and to see whether they remain during an economic 
downturn. Nevertheless, given that the downward trend in public sector well-being 
is observed to have occurred, in part, prior to the economic upswing of the late 
1990s, and to be greatest in regions that have benefited least from this upturn, it is 
not clear that general economic conditions will explain the results. 
Whilst these data are insufficient to fully isolate those workers for whom 
well-being has fallen within the public sector, it appears the rise in stress has 
disproportionately affected those workers with relatively lower-skills and women. 
What can be said, however, is that the evidence appears to point unambiguously to a 
non-negligible increase in GHQ mental stress, and fall in job satisfaction, among 
Britain's public employees over the 1990s. 
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GHQ MENTAL STRESS HEALTH SCORES 
TABLE 6.1 
Mean Scores in GHQ Mental Stress Health Scores over Time 
Public and Private Sector EmNovees over Time 
Year PUBLIC PRIVATE 
1991 10.36 (4.55) 10.14 (4.31) 
1992 10.94 (4.81) 10.58 (4.68) 
1993 10.85 (4.78) 10.54 (4.87) 
1994 11.13 (4.96) 10.69 (5.04) 
1995 11.41 (5.48) 10.71 (4.89) 
1996 11.29 (5.37) 10.71 (4.99) 
1997 11.50 (5.60) 10.59 (4.96) 
1998 11.63 (5.62) 10.65 (4.98) 
Total 11.12 (5.15) 10.57 (4.84) 
  Standard deviations are in parenthesis. 
  The GHQ variable measures mental distress or lack of psychological well-being on a 
36-point scale, with 0 being the lowest level of distress and 36 the highest. 
FIGURE 6.1 
GHQ Levels of UK Workers over Time 
Public and Private Sector Employees 
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TABLE 6.2a 
The Trend in GHQ Mental Stress Health Scores over Time (1991-8) 
Coefficients upon Year Dummies 
Dependent Variable: GHQ 
REGRESSOR PUBLIC PRIVATE ALL 
1992 0.577 0.408 0.404 
(0.151) (0.098) (0.098) 
1993 0.463 0.349 0.342 
(0.165) (0.107) (0.107) 
1994 0.677 0.475 0.465 
(0.171) (0.111) (0.111) 
1995 0.918 0.510 0.492 
(0.188) (0.113) (0.113) 
1996 0.772 0.510 0.488 
(0.190) (0.113) (0.112) 
1997 0.914 0.410 0.385 
(0.200) (0.112) (0.112) 
1998 1.009 0.463 0.439 
(0.198) (0.113) (0.113) 




Public* 1993 0.156 
(0.197) 










Ln(pay) -0.234 -0.319 -0.350 
(0.204) (0.107) (0.092) 
Observations 
Individuals (N) 2303 5883 7737 
Panel Total (NT) 9221 22534 33000 
Adjusted R2 0.04 0.03 0.03 
1. All equations are estimated by OLS. Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust to 
arbitrary heteroscedasticity and the repeat sampling of the same individuals over time. 
2. All regressions also include quadratics in age and job tenure, and controls for the hours of work, 
temporary employment, workplace size, education, gender, race, union recognition, occupation 
(SOC Code at the one-digit level), marital status and region. Parameter estimates are not 
reported. 
3. The year dummies show how GHQ has increased relative to 1991. 
4. Column three also includes controls for non-government non-profit organisations. For this 
column year dummies capture the time trend in the private sector. The public-year interactions 
capture the difference in trend between the public and private sectors, the public indicator the 
difference in constant terms. 
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TABLE 6.2b 
The Trend in GHQ Mental Stress Health Scores over Time (1991-8) 
Coefficients upon a Time Trend 
Dependent Variable: GHQ 
REGRESSOR PUBLIC PRIVATE ALL ALL 
Time trend 0.120 0.047 0.043 0.050 
(0.026) (0.015) (0.014) (0.021) 
Public Sector -0.324 -0.466 
(0.162) (0.449) 
Public*(Time trend) 0.093 0.102 
(0.029) (0.039) 
Ln(pay) -0.217 -0.321 -0.349 -0.349 
(0.203) (0.107) (0.092) (0.092) 
County Unemployment Rate 0.010 
(0.024) 
Public*(Unemployment Rate) 0.013 
(0.040) 
Observations 
Individuals (N1 2303 5883 7737 7737 
Panel Total (N1) 9221 22534 33000 33000 
Adjusted RZ 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 
1. See notes for Table 6.2a. 
2. The time trend here equals 1 if the year is 1991,2 if the year is 1992,..., and 8 if the year is 1998. 
3. In column three the time trend captures the trend in the private sector. The public-trend 
interaction captures the difference in time trend between the public and private sectors, the 
public sector indicator the difference in constant terms. 
TABLE 6.3 
The Time Trend in GHQ Mental Stress Health Scores over Time (1992-8) 
Coefficients upon a Time Trend., The effect of dropping 1991 
Dependent Variable: GHQ 
I PUBLIC PRIVATE ALL ALL 





0.080 0.010 0.007 0.106 





-0.267 -0.312 -0.364 -0.278 
(0.221) (0.113) (0.099) (0.106) 
Observations 
Individuals (Ni) 
Panel Total (NT) 
Adiusted RZ 
I 
2115 5354 7066 6621 
7930 19441 28429 20614 
0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 
See notes for Table 6.2a. 
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TABLE 6.4a 
The Time Trend in GHQ Mental Stress Health Scores over Time (1991-8) 
All employees: By Union recognition, Gender and Region 
Dependent Variable: GHQ 







Panel Total (NT) 
Adjusted R2 
0.043 0.044 0.025 0.065 0.066 0.043 
(0.014) (0.024) (0.018) (0.024) (0.026) (0.027) 
-0.324 -0.363 -0.336 -0.173 -0.154 -0.333 
(0.162) (0.195) (0.236) (0.234) (0.290) (0.284) 
0.093 0.096 0.075 0.093 0.064 0.102 
(0.029) (0.036) (0.044) (0.040) (0.052) (0.050) 
-0.349 -0.442 -0.521 -0.247 -0.235 -0.529 
(0.092) (0.138) (0.135) (0.143) (0.160) (0.161) 
7737 4351 3837 3900 2683 2438 
33000 16969 16288 16712 11064 10278 
0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.05 
1. See notes to Table 6.2b. 
2. UNION denotes a union recognised workplace. 
3. SOUTH includes London, the South East of England and East Anglia. 
4. NORTH includes the North East of England, the North West of England, Scotland and Wales. 
TABLE 6.4b 
The Time Trend in GHQ Mental Stress Health Scores over Time (1991-8) 
All employees: By Education 
Dependent Variable: GHQ 







Panel Total (NT) 
Adjusted R2 
0.048 0.044 0.051 0.032 
(0.030) (0.023) (0.029) (0.048) 
-0.620 -0.288 -0.403 -0.163 
(0.345) (0.276) (0.302) (0.474) 
0.171 0.093 0.074 0.067 
(0.071) (0.049) (0.054) (0.074) 
-0.238 -0.224 -0.350 -0.759 
(0.205) (0.149) (0.182) (0.248) 
1908 2952 2174 1089 
7525 12098 8883 4494 
0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 
1. See notes to Table 6.2b. Education refers to highest (formal) qualification, or equivalent. 
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REGRESSOR 
PUBLIC PRIVATE 
BALANCE STAYERS PUBLIC OBS BALANCE STAYERS 
Time trend 0.228 0.206 0.102 0.060 0.061 
(0.040) (0.043) (0.043) (0.025) (0.026) 
Ln(pay) -0.390 -0.325 -0.408 -0.249 -0.303 
(0.361) (0.423) (0.303) (0.220) (0.237) 
Observations 
Individuals (N; ) 607 427 903 1086 891 
Panel Total (NT) 4156 3416 3406 7894 7128 
Adiusted R2 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04 
1. See notes to Table 6.2b. 
2. BALANCE denotes a respondent observed within the sample for all eight waves (1991-1998). 
STAYER denotes an employee observed in the same sector in all eight waves. 
3. PUBLIC JOB denotes an occupation considered that has remained largely untouched by 
privatisation and competitive tendering, and where composition change is limited (see 
Appendix). 
TABLE 6.6 
The Time Trend in GHQ Mental Stress Health Scores over Time (1991-8) 
The Change in Well-being 
Dep endent Variable: dGH /d7GH 
Z1GHQ d7GHQ AGHQ d7GHQ 
ALL ALL STAYERS STAYERS 
Regressor 1992-8 1998 1992-8 1998 
Public 0.096 0.689 0.178 0.985 
(0.066) (0.346) (0.071) (0.445) 
Ln(pay) -0.156 0.288 -0.089 -0.224 
(0.064) (0.302) (0.085) (0.434) 
Observations 
Individuals (N; ) 5696 2384 1335 1335 
Panel Total (NT) 23380 2384 9345 1335 
Adiusted RZ 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.04 
1. See notes to Table 6.2b. 
2. ALL denotes the unbalanced sample for of respondents for whom a change in GHQ is 
observed. STAYER denotes an employee observed in the same sector in all eight waves. 
3. All equations are estimated by OLS. Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust to 
arbitrary heteroscedasticity and the repeat sampling of the same individuals over time. 
4. tGHQ refers to the one period change in GHQ score (GHQt - GHQt. t). A7GHQ is the 
change in GHQ score over the full seven year period of the panel (GHQt - GHQta) _ 
(GHQi s- GHQ1 1). 
5.1992-8 then denotes that changes in GHQ are only available for that period. 
TABLE 6.5 
The Time Trend in GHQ Mental Stress Health Scores over Time (1991-8) 
The Effect of Composition Change: By Sector 
Dependent Variable: GHQ 
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TABLE 6.7 
Proportion of Respondents with High Mental Stress 
Public and Private Sector Emblovees over Time 
Year PUBLIC PRIVATE 
1991 0.17 (0.37) 0.15 (0.35) 
1992 0.20 (0.40) 0.19 (0.39) 
1993 0.20 (0.40) 0.18 (0.38) 
1994 0.21 (0.40) 0.18 (0.38) 
1995 0.21 (0.41) 0.17 (0.37) 
1996 0.21 (0.40) 0.18 (0.38) 
1997 0.23 (0.42) 0.17 (0.38) 
1998 0.25 0.43 0.17 0.37 
Total 0.21 (0.41) 0.17 (0.38) 
  Standard deviations are in parenthesis. 
" The measure of high mental distress is a dichotomous indictor, taking the value 1 if an 
individual answers negatively to four or more of the twelve GHQ questions and 0 otherwise. 
  This measure is commonly employed as an indicator of likely psychiatric disorder. 
TABLE 6.8a 
Yearly Cross-section High Mental Stress Regressions (1991-8) 
The Public Sector Effect 
Dependent Variable: High Mental Stress 
REGRESSOR 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Public Sector 0.097 0.023 0.059 0.036 0.014 -0.022 0.158 0.136 
(0.065) (0.065) (0.068) (0.067) (0.068) (0.067) (0.067) (0.068) 
Ln(pay) 0.031 -0.056 -0.089 -0.030 -0.076 -0.055 -0.071 -0.095 





4571 4141 3915 3968 4019 4125 4144 4117 
-1923.1 -1976.8 -1831.0 -1865.9 -1876.3 -1947.1 -1946.0 -1927.2 
0.035 0.040 0.044 0.042 0.046 0.053 0.051 0.071 
1. All equations are estimated by the Probit technique. Standard errors are in parentheses and are 
robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity. 
2. All columns include the same controls as in Table 6.2a. Parameter estimates are not reported. 
3. The public sector dummy is relative to those in the private sector, in the sample year. 
4. The Pseudo R2 is calculated using the method of McKelvey and Zavoina (1975). 
TABLE 6.8b 
Yearly Cross-section High Mental Stress Regressions (1991-8) 
The Public Sector Effect: The `Sta, yens' 
Dependent Variable: High Mental Stress 
REGRESSOR 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Public Sector -0.003 0.008 -0.122 -0.166 0.102 -0.045 0.187 0.232 
(0.129) (0.118) (0.119) (0.117) (0.123) (0.119) (0.121) (0.121) 
Ln(pay) -0.091 -0.020 0.002 -0.162 -0.083 -0.124 0.110 -0.159 
(0.130) (0.114) (0.121) (0.115) (0.114) (0.112) (0.116) (0.118) 
Observations 
Individuals 1335 1335 1335 1335 1335 1335 1335 1335 
Log-L -494.4 -585.9 -584.7 -565.1 -562.9 -606.3 -600.9 -628.5 
Pseudo RZ 0.108 0.075 0.080 0.101 0.108 0.067 0.082 0.124 
1. See notes to Table 6.8b. STAYER denotes a respondent observed in the same sector in every 
period. 
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JOB SATISFACTION 
TABLE 6.9 
Mean Job Satisfaction Scores over Time 
Public and Private Sector EmNovees over Time 
Year PUBLIC PRIVATE 
1991 5.58 (1.41) 5.40 (1.57) 
1992 5.56 (1.30) 5.42 (1.41) 
1993 5.45 (1.33) 5.35 (1.40) 
1994 5.36 (1.39) 5.29 (1.43) 
1995 5.39 (1.29) 5.30 (1.39) 
1996 5.40 (1.28) 5.36 (1.34) 
1997 5.43 (1.27) 5.40 1.32 
Total 5.46(1.33) 5.36 1.4 7 
  Standard deviations are in parenthesis. 
  The job satisfaction variable measures overall satisfaction on a 7-point scale, with 1 
being the lowest level of satisfaction and 7 the highest. In 1991 the categories 1,4 and 7 
were given descriptions whilst 2,3,5 and 6 are left unlabeled. From 1992 onwards all 
values were given a label. The question itself was a constant. In 1998 the process by 
which the question is asked was changed. 
FIGURE 6.2 
job Satisfaction Levels of UK Workers over Time 
Public and Private Sector Employees 
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TABLE 6.10 
Yearly Cross-section Job Satisfaction Equations (1991-7) 
The Public Sector Effect 
Dependent Variable: Overall Job Satisfaction 
REGRESSOR 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 






(0.045) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048) (0.049) (0.049) (0.048) 
0.028 0.078 0.058 0.036 -0.020 -0.006 0.025 
(0.040) (0.044) (0.045) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) 
4551 4127 3897 3949 4009 4115 4132 
-7216.3 -6137.8 -5836.9 -6059.4 -6013.2 -6076.9 -6054.2 
0.089 0.097 0.095 0.091 0.102 0.087 0.087 
1. All equations are estimated by the Ordered Probit technique. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
2. All columns include the same set of controls as in Table 6.2a. Coefficients are not reported. 
3. The public sector dummy is relative to those in the private sector, in the sample year. 
4. Consistent job satisfaction data cover only the period 1991-1997. 
5. The Pseudo RZ is calculated using the method of McKelvey and Zavoina (1975). 
TABLE 6.10b 
The Marginal Effect of the Time Trend upon Overall Job Satisfaction 
Sample 1 2 
Overall Satisfaction Score 
345 6 7 
1991 -0.008 -0.004 -0.008 -0.017 -0.013 0.005 0.045 
1992 -0.004 -0.005 -0.009 -0.008 -0.012 0.010 0.027 
1993 -0.004 -0.004 -0.010 -0.008 -0.012 0.014 0.024 
1994 -0.004 -0.006 -0.010 -0.008 -0.011 0.016 0.024 
1995 -0.004 -0.006 -0.011 -0.010 -0.014 0.019 0.025 
1996 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.004 -0.006 0.009 0.011 
1997 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 0.005 0.007 
1. Row one corresponds to column one of Table 6.10a above. Row two to column two, etc. 
2. The marginal effects are calculated as the difference in the predicted probability, of satisfaction 
score k, when moving from the private to public sector. 
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TABLE 6.11 a 
The Trend in Job Satisfaction Scores over Time (1992-7) 
Coefficients upon a Time Trend 
Dependent Variable: Overall Tob Satisfaction 
REGRESSOR PUBLIC PRIVATE ALL 
Time trend -0.026 -0.007 -0.006 
(0.008) (0.005) (0.005) 
Public Sector 0.169 
(0.050) 
Public*(Time trend) -0.019 
(0.009) 
Ln(pay) -0.023 0.041 0.027 
(0.053) (0.028) (0.024) 
Observations 
Individuals (N) 2015 5019 6712 
Panel Total (NT) 6861 16477 24229 
Log-likelihood -9933.5 -25126.4 -36297.4 
Pseudo R2 0.102 0.082 0.087 
1. See notes to Table 6.10 Standard errors are robust to the repeat sampling of individuals over 
time. 
2. In column three the time trend captures the trend in the private sector. The public-trend 
interaction captures the difference in time trend between the public and private sectors. The 
public sector dummy shows the level of job satisfaction for the base person in the public sector. 
TABLE 6.1lb 
The Mareinal Effect of the Time Trend upon Overall Tob Satisfaction 
Overall Satisfaction Score 
Sample 1234567 
Public (1992-1997) 
Public sector trend 0.004 0.006 0.013 0.010 0.017 -0.020 -0.030 
Private (1992-1997) 
Private sector trend 
All (1992-1997) 
Private sector trend 
Public sector trend 
0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.004 -0.005 -0.008 
0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.004 -0.005 -0.007 
0.005 0.007 0.013 0.011 0.016 -0.021 -0.030 
1. Row one corresponds to column one of Table 6.11a above. Row two to column two, etc. 
2. The marginal effects are calculated as the difference in the predicted probability, of satisfaction 
score k, when moving from 1992 to 1997. 
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APPENDIX: Definition of Public Sector Occupations 
The table below outlines occupations considered to be predominantly within the 
public sector. They must satisfy three criterions: 
1. Sector has not been subject to privatisation or contracting out (e. g. 
eliminates British Rail, traffic wardens, refuse collectors) 
2. Job itself is not subject to contracting out (e. g. rules out cleaning staff in 
hospitals). 
3. Limited opportunities for transferring into the private or non-profit 
sector within the same occupation (e. g. eliminates dentists). 
SOC Codes Corres to Public 
Soc Description of Occupation 
150 Officers in UK armed forces 
151 Officers in foreign & Commonwealth armed forces 
152 Police officers 
153 Fire service officers 
155 Customs & excise, immigration service officers 
191 Registrars & administrators of educational establishments 
220 Medical practitioners 
230 University & polytechnic teaching professionals 
231 Higher & further education teaching professionals 
233 Secondary education teaching professionals 
234 Primary & nursery education teaching professionals 
235 Special education teaching professionals 
239 Other teaching professionals 
240 Judges & officers of the court 
293 Social workers, probation officers 
340 Nurses 
341 Midwives 
342 Medical radiographers 
600 NCOs & other ranks, UK armed forces 
601 NCOs & other ranks, foreign & Commonwealth armed forces 
610 Police officers (sergeant & below) 
611 Fire service officers (leading fire officer & below) 
613 Customs & excise officers, immigration officers 
640 Assistant nurses, nursing auxiliaries 
641 Hospital ward assistants 
642 Ambulance staff 





This thesis has studied the forces that influence pay and well-being. We have used 
new data, with detailed information about both the employee and the firm, to 
investigate the relative importance of the employer in determining worker pay. This 
work adds to an emerging research field that studies matched worker-firm data. It 
also questions whether wage determination is, in some way, non-competitive. 
Chapter two tests whether more profitable firms pay higher wages, chapter three 
whether pay is greater in large employers. In both chapters the role of unobserved 
worker quality, and the sorting of employees into firms, is studied in detail. The 
role of the employer in explaining the racial wage differential is investigated in 
chapter four, with particular focus upon the relationship between pay and the ethnic 
makeup of the workforce. 
This thesis has also examined the determinants of self-reported measures of 
well-being. It has used these variables to provide several new tests of economic 
hypotheses. In chapter three we use such data to test whether working conditions 
are inferior within large establishments or firms. The role of the employer in 
explaining racial differentials in job satisfaction is examined in chapter four. This 
provides a new approach to the analysis of racial disadvantage in Britain. Chapter 
five tested one of the most fundamental ideas in economics, that money makes 
people happy. It examined whether recorded measures of mental distress and 
happiness improved subsequent to receiving a windfall of money. Finally, the well- 
being levels of British public sector workers over the 1990s were examined in 
chapter six. 
Chapter two studied whether more profitable firms pay higher wages. OLS 
estimates of the elasticity of wages with respect to (current) firm profits per 
employee were equal to 0.02, after controlling for observed worker and firm 
characteristics. This is not as small as first appears. Moving from a firm with 
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profitability one standard deviation below the mean to one with profits one 
standard deviation above the mean was predicted to increase wages by 8 percent. 
The positive effect of firm profitability was found to be robust to controlling for 
formal profit-sharing schemes, within occupations where labour supply difficulties 
should be limited, and with respect to past firm profitability. Moreover, the 
observed link between pay and profitability was not found only in the union sector. 
Few previous investigators have had access to matched data. Such data were 
here used to more fully model worker and firm heterogeneity in pay. When controls 
for worker and firm fixed effects were added, we observed statistically significant 
evidence in support of rent-sharing upon weekly earnings, with an estimated 
elasticity of 0.01, but no robust positive effect upon hourly pay, in a sample that 
potentially favours the rent-sharing hypothesis. Estimates upon weekly earnings 
could, however, capture increased hours of work, if positively correlated with 
movements in firm profitability. A key issue in estimation is endogeneity. An 
increase in worker pay will reduce firm profitability, other things being equal. The 
estimated parameter upon firm profitability may then be biased downward. Chapter 
two instruments firm profitability by international product market shocks, captured 
by movements in US industry profitability. The estimated rent-sharing parameters, 
both for weekly and hourly pay, were, however, either incorrectly signed or 
statistically insignificant. Support for the rent-sharing hypothesis was then found to 
be, at best, modest and limited to weekly earnings, within a sample that is likely, if 
anything, to overstate the impact of profitability upon pay. 
Chapter three examined four potential explanations for the observed 
positive relationship between employer size and worker pay: unobserved 
productivity differences, compensating differentials, rent-sharing, and differences in 
monitoring intensity. Using employer-employee data, we found the addition of 
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richer controls for employer characteristics (the firm's capital to labour ratio and 
profitability, and the workplace's monitoring intensity) to leave the estimated 
establishment size coefficients largely unperturbed. The evidence suggested neither 
rent-sharing nor monitoring costs could, here, explain the size-wage correlation. 
The role of unobserved differences in labour productivity was analysed in 
two ways. Correlates of worker skill, such as the use of information technology and 
the skill of the establishment's workforce, were found to explain up to 15 percent of 
the plant size-wage relationship, and up to 30 percent of the firm size effect upon 
pay. Secondly, controls for person fixed-effects were found to reduce the estimated 
effect of workplace size upon wages by over a half. Nevertheless, wages remained 
statistically significantly greater in large establishments. 
Whether the relationship between employer size and pay reflects a 
compensating differential, possibly for inferior working conditions, was tested in 
chapter three using well-being data. Job satisfaction was found to be superior in the 
smallest plants, but differences in satisfaction between medium-sized and large 
establishments were not pronounced. The evidence does not then offer a 
convincing route as to why pay is observed to be higher in the largest plants, relative 
to medium-sized establishments. Moreover, much of the dissatisfaction associated 
with workplace size was found to be attributable to the size of the parent company. 
Holding firm size constant we observed no robust independent influence of 
establishment size upon satisfaction. In contrast, wages were observed to be 
statistically significantly greater in large plants, after conditioning upon the size of 
the firm. 
On this evidence, employee distaste for employer size does not offer a 
persuasive explanation for the existence of a plant size-wage premium, though it 
may help to explain the firm size-wage premium. Correlates of worker skill and 
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person fixed effects were, instead, found to offer the most convincing avenue from 
which to explain the establishment size-wage differential. A large unexplained wage 
premium, to those employees working in the largest workplaces, does though 
remain. 
The influence of the employer upon racial differentials in pay and job 
satisfaction was examined in chapter four. Non-white workers were found to earn 
lower wages in establishments with more ethnic minority co-workers. White wages, 
in contrast, were only weakly related to the racial composition of the plant. The gap 
between ethnic minority and white pay was hence larger in establishments with 
more non-white workers. The racial differential in pay was also observed to be 
robust to controls for occupation, and for workers within the same workplace. The 
primary avenue for the racial wage gap is then not that ethnic minority workers are 
employed in low-pay plants, rather they are less well paid in any given workplace. 
Job satisfaction data were used to test whether well-being is lower for non- 
white employees, and in plants which hire more ethnic minority workers. 
Establishments that employ a greater proportion of non-white staff were found to 
be associated with lower levels of job satisfaction, for white males, white females, 
and for ethnic minority women. Results were, however, more mixed for non-white 
men. Plants with a greater ethnic minority employment share were also observed to 
be associated with a higher rate of quits, separations, and absenteeism. The 
evidence suggests non-white workers are, here, employed in workplaces with lower 
levels of worker well-being. This could reflect either discrimination or unobserved 
worker quality differences, where non-white workers are for some reason less 
productive (possibly due to pre-labour market discrimination). 
Evidence was also observed consistent with ethnic minority employees 
trading off lower pay to work with more minority co-workers. Non-white pay was 
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found to be lower, employer tenure higher, in plants with a greater ethnic minority 
employment share. Nevertheless, ethnic minority workers were found to be less 
satisfied with their pay, compared to otherwise similar white workers, even when 
pay is held constant. Non-white men are -4.2 percent less likely, than white males, to 
respond as satisfied or very satisfied with their pay, whilst non-white women are - 
6.0 percent less likely than similar white females. Results remained when the 
establishment's effect upon satisfaction was held constant. This provides new 
evidence that seems consistent with racial discrimination on pay. 
Chapter five devised a test of what is probably one of the central tenets of 
economics, that a person who becomes richer becomes happier. Whilst recent work 
has documented a positive cross-section correlation between reported happiness 
and income, that is not a persuasive reason to believe that more money leads to 
greater well-being. Cross-section patterns are at best suggestive because their causal 
implications are hard to interpret. The analysis in chapter five has three advantages. 
First, individuals are followed longitudinally and the same person's well-being and 
income levels measured at different points in time. Second, two types of financial 
windfall (inheritances and lottery wins) are observed. In the spirit of a random 
experiment, these approximate random events in which some individuals have 
money showered upon them while others, in a control group, do not. Third, two 
measures of well-being are analysed: mental stress using a standard psychological 
health score, and happiness using a simple four-point question. Even the 
psychological literature appears not to have had a suitable longitudinal test. 
The evidence did indeed suggest, as theory would predict, that money 
improves well-being. A monetary windfall in year t was found to be followed by 
lower mental stress and higher reported happiness in year t+1. At a conservative 
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estimate, a windfall of 50,000 pounds is predicted to improve mental well-being by 
between 0.1 and 0.3 standard deviations. 
Chapter six studied how the reported well-being levels of British public 
sector workers changed over 1990s, and compared outcomes to those for workers 
in the private sector. Well-being was found to have notably deteriorated amongst 
Britain's public sector workers. At the start of the 1990s, levels of well-being, as 
measured by a standard psychological health score, for public sector workers were 
similar to those within the private sector, but by 1998 were markedly worse. 
Consistent with this, a relative decline in public sector job satisfaction was also 
observed. 
We can not be completely certain as to why stress has risen with the public 
sector. The evidence of chapter six suggests it can not be satisfactorily explained by 
changes in the composition of public sector employment, by a decline in public 
sector pay relative to the private sector, or by aggregate movements in economic 
conditions. The rise in stress was, though, found to have disproportionately affected 
those workers with relatively lower-skills, and women. What is clear, however, is 
that the evidence shows a marked reduction in well-being amongst Britain's public 
employees over the 1990s. 
255 
References 
Abowd, J. A. "The effect of wage bargains on the stock market value of the firm. " 
American Economic Review 79 (1989): 774-800. 
Abowd, J. M., and F. Kramarz. "Econometric analyses of linked employer-employee 
data. " Labour Economics 6 (1999): 53-74. 
Abowd, J. M., Kramarz, F., and D. N. Margolis. "High wage workers and high wage 
firms. " Econometrica 67 (1999): 251-333. 
Abowd, J. M., Kramarz, F., Margolis, D. N., and K. R. Troske. "The relative 
importance of employer and employee effects on compensation: A 
comparison of France and the United States", mimeo, LAMIA, 1998. 
Abowd, J. M., and T. Lemieux. "The effects of product market competition on 
collective bargaining agreements: The case of foreign competition in 
Canada. " Quarterly Journal of Economics 108 (1993): 983-1014. 
Airey, C. and five others. The Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS) 1997- 
8: Technical Report, National Centre for Social Research, London, 1999. 
Albaek, K., Arai, M., Asplund, R., Barth, E., and E. Strojer Madsen. "Measuring 
wage effects of plant size. " Labour Economics 5 (1998): 425-448. 
Allen, S. G. "Compensation, safety, and absenteeism: Evidence from the paper 
industry. " Industrial and Labor Relations Review 34 (1981): 207-218. 
Altonji, J. G., and C. R. Pierret. "Employer learning and statistical discrimination", 
NBER working paper, 1997. 
Altonji, J. G., and R. M. Blank. "Race and gender in the labor market. " In Handbook 
of Labor Economics, vol. 3C, edited by 0. Ashenfelter and D. Card, 3143-3259. 
Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 1999. 
Andrews, F. M. "Stability and change in levels and structure of subjective well- 
References 
being: USA 1972 and 1988. " Social Indicators Research 25 (1991): 1-30. 
Arellanno, M., and S. Bond. "Some test of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo 
evidence and an application to employment equations. " The Review of 
Economic Studies 58 (1991): 277-297. 
Argyle, M. The Psychology of Happiness. London: Roudedge, 1989. 
Azariadis, C. "Implicit contracts and underemployment equilibria. " Journal of Political 
Economy 83 (1975): 1183-1202. 
Baily, M. N. "Wages and employment under uncertain demand. " Review of Economic 
Studies 41 (1974): 37-50. 
Baker, G. P., Jensen, M. C., and K. J. Murphy. "Compensation and incentives: 
Practice versus theory. " Journal of Finance 43 (1988): 596-616. 
Barmby, T., and G. Stephan. "Worker absenteeism: Why firm size may matter. " The 
Manchester School68 (2000): 568-577. 
Barron, J. M., Black, D. A., and M. A. Loewenstein. "Employer size: The 
implications for search, training, capital investment, starting wages and wage 
growth. " journal of Labor Economics 5, no. 76-89 (1987). 
Bartel, A. P. "Race differences in job satisfaction: A reappraisal. " Journal of Human 
Resources 16 (1981): 294-303. 
Beatson, M. "Progress towards a flexible labour market. " Employment Gazette (1995): 
55-66. 
Becker, G. S. The Economics of Discrimination. 1st ed. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1957. 
Benito, A. "Wage Premia in the British Labour Market. " PhD thesis, University of 
Warwick, 1997. 
Binmore, K., Rubinstein, A., and A. Wolinsky. "The Nash bargain solution in 
economic modelling. " Rand Journal of Economics 17 (1986): 176-188. 
257 
References 
Black, D. "Discrimination in an equilibrium search model. " Journal of Labor Economics 
13 (1995): 309-334. 
Black, S. E., and P. E. Strahan. "The division of spoils: Rent-sharing in a regulated 
industry", mimeo, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 1999. 
Blackaby, D. H., Clark, K., Leslie, D. G., and P. D. Murphy. "Black-white male 
earnings and employment prospects in the 1970s and 1980s: Evidence for 
Britain. " Economic Letters 46 (1994): 273-279. 
Blackaby, D. H., and J. Frank. "Ethnic and other minority representation in UK 
academic economics. " Economic Journal 110 (2000): 293-311. 
Blackaby, D. H., Leslie, D. G., Murphy, P. D., and N. C. O'Leary. "The ethnic wage 
gap and employment differentials in the 1990s: Evidence for Britain. " 
Economic Letters 58 (1998): 97-103. 
Blackaby, D. H., Murphy, P. D., and N. C. O'Leary. "The payment of public sector 
workers in the UK: Reconciliation with North American findings. " Economic 
Letters 65 (1999): 239-243. 
Blackburn, M., and D. Neumark. "Unobserved ability, efficiency wages, and inter- 
industry wage differentials. " Quartery Journal of Economics 107 (1992): 1421- 
1436. 
Blanchflower, D. "Union relative wage effects: A cross-section analysis using 
establishment data. " British Journal of Industrial Relations 22 (1984): 311-332. 
. "Wages and concentration in British manufacturing. 
" Applied Economics 18 
(1986): 1025-1038. 
Blanchflower, D. G., and A. J. Oswald. "What makes an entrepreneur? " Journal of 
Labor Economics 16 (1998): 26-60. 
Blanchflower, D. G., and A j. Oswald. "The rising well-being of the young. ", edited 
by D. G. Blanchflower and R. B. Freeman. Chicago: University of Chicago 
258 
References 
Press and NBER, 1999. 
Blanchflower, D. G., and A. J. Oswald. "Well-being over time in Britain and the 
USA", mimeo, University of Warwick, 2000. 
Blanchflower, D. G., Oswald, A. J., and P. Sanfey. "Wages, profits and rent- 
sharing. " Quarterly Journal of Economics 111 (1996): 227-252. 
Blanchflower, D. G., Oswald, A., and M. D. Garrett. "Insider power in wage 
determination. " Economica 57 (1990): 143-170. 
Blanchflower, D. G., and R. B. Freeman. "The legacy of Communist labor 
relations. " Industrial and Labor Relations Review 50 (1997): 438-459. 
Bodkin, R. "Windfall income and consumption. " American Economic Review 49 (1959): 
602-614. 
Booth, A. L., and J. Frank. "Earnings, productivity and performance related pay. " 
Journal of Labor Economics 17 (1999): 447-463. 
Borjas, G. J. "Job satisfaction, wages and unions. " Journal of Human Resources 14 
(1979): 21-40. 
Bound, J., Jaeger, D. A., and R. M. Baker. "On potential problems with instrumental 
variables estimation when the correlation between the instruments and the 
endogenous explanatory variable is weak. " Journal of the American Statistical 
Association 90 (1995): 443-450. 
Bowling, A. Measuring Health: A Review ofQuality of Life Scales. 2nd ed. Buckingham, 
UK: Open University Press, 1997. 
Brickman, P., Coates, D., and R. Janoff-Bulman. "Lottery winners and accident 
victims: Is happiness relative? " Journal of Personality and Social Prychology 36 
(1978): 917-927. 
Brown, C., and J. Medoff. "The employer size-wage effect. " Journal of Political 
Economy 97 (1989): 1027-1059. 
259 
References 
Brown, D., and S. McIntosh. "If you're happy and you know it... job satisfaction in 
the low wage service sector", Centre for Economic Performance working 
paper, LSE, 1998. 
Budd, J. W., and M. J. Slaughter. "Are profits shared across borders? Evidence on 
international rent sharing", NBER working paper, 2000. 
Burdett, K., and D. T. Mortensen. "Wage differentials, employer size, and 
unemployment. " International Economic Review 39 (1998): 257-273. 
Burgess, S., and P. Metcalfe. "Incentives in organisations: A selective overview of 
the literature with application to the public sector", mimeo, CMPO, 
University of Bristol, 1999. 
Campbell, A. The Sense of Well-Being in America. New York: McGraw Hill, 1981. 
Campbell, C. M. "Do firms pay efficiency wages? Evidence with data at the firm 
level. " Journal of Labor Economics 11 (1993): 442-470. 
Carrington, W. J., and K. R. Troske. "Interfirm segregation and the black/white 
wage gap. " Journal of Labor Economics 16 (1998): 231-260. 
Chen, P. Y., and P. E. Spector. "Negative affectivity as the underlying cause of 
correlations between stressors and strains. " Journal ofApplied Pychology 7 
(1991): 398-407. 
Christofides, L., and A. J. Oswald. "Real wage determination and rent-sharing in 
collective bargaining agreements. " Quarterly Journal of Economics 107 (1992): 
985-1002. 
Clark, A. E. "Job satisfaction in Britain. " British Journal of Industrial Relations 34 
(1996): 189-217. 
Clark, A. E., and A. J. Oswald. "Unhappiness and unemployment. " Economic Journal 
104 (1994): 648-659. 
. 




Clark, A. E., Oswald, A. J., and P. B. Warr. "Is job satisfaction U-shaped in age? " 
Journal of Occupational and Organi. Zational Prychology 69 (1996): 57-81. 
Cochrane, R. "Marriage and madness. " Prychodogy Review 3 (1996): 2-5. 
Cooper, B., and C. Garcia-Penalosa. "Status effects and negative utility growth", 
mimeo, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, 1999. 
Cox, D. "Motives for private income transfers. " Journal of Political Economy 95 (1987): 
508-546. 
Cully, M. and six others. The 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey - First 
Findings, Department of Trade and Industry, London, 1999. 
Currie, J., and S. McConnell. "Firm-specific determinants of the real wage. " The 
Review of Economics and Statistics 74 (1992): 297-304. 
Deaton, A. The Analysis of Household Surveys: A MicmeconometricApproach to Development 
Policy. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1997. 
Denny, K., and S. Machin. "The role of profitability and industrial wages in firm 
level wage determination. " Fiscal Studies 12 (1991): 34-45. 
Di Tella, R., MacCulloch, R., and A. J. Oswald. "The macroeconomics of 
happiness", mimeo, Harvard Business School, 1998. 
. "Preferences over inflation and unemployment: Evidence from surveys of 
happiness. " American Economic Review forthcoming (2000). 
Di Tella, R., and R. MacCulloch. "Partisan social happiness", mimeo, Harvard 
Business School, 1999. 
Dickens, W., and L. Katz. "Inter-industry wage differences and industry 
characteristics. " In Unemployment and the Structure of LaborMarkets, edited by K. 
Lang and J. S. Leonard. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987. 
Diener, E. "Subjective well-being. " Pychological Bulletin 95 (1984): 542-575. 
261 
References 
Diener, E., Gohm, C. L., Suh, E., and S. Oishi. "Similarity of the relations between 
marital status and subjective well-being across cultures", mimeo, Psychology 
Department, University of Illinois, undated. 
Diener, E., and R. Biswas-Diener. "Will money increase subjective wellbeing? A 
literature review and guide to needed research", mimeo, Psychology 
Department, University of Illinois, 2000. 
Diener, E., Suh, E. M., Lucas, R. E., and H. L. Smith. "Subjective well-being: Three 
decades of progress. " Psychological Bulletin 125 (1999): 276-303. 
Disney, R., and A. Gosling. "Does it pay to work in the public sector? " Fiscal Studies 
19 (1998): 347-374. 
Disney, R., Gosling, A., and S. Machin. "What has happened to union recognition in 
Britain. " Economica 63 (1996): 1-18. 
Doms, M., Dunne, T., and K. R. Troske. "Workers, wages and technology. " 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (1997): 253-290. 
Douthitt, R. A., MacDonald, M., and R. Mullis. "The relationship between measures 
of subjective and economic well-being: A new look. " Social Indicators Research 
26 (1992): 407-422. 
Duesenberry, J. S. Income, Saving and the Theory of Consumer Behavior. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1949. 
DuMouchel, W., and G. J. Duncan. "Using sample survey weights in multiple 
regression analyses of stratified samples. " Journal of the American Statistical 
Association 78 (1983): 535-543. 
Easterlin, R. A. "Does economic growth improve the human lot? Some empirical 
evidence. " In Nations and Households in Economic Growth: Essays in Honour of 
Moses Abramowitýedited by P. A. Reder and M. W. David. New York and 
London: Academic Press, 1974. 
262 
References 
. "Will raising the incomes of all increase the happiness of all? " Journal of 
Economic Behavior and OqaniZation 27 (1995): 35-47. 
Elliot, R. F., and K. Duffus. "What has been happening to pay in the public-service 
sector of the British economy? Developments over the period 1970-1992. " 
British Journal of Industrial Relations 34 (1996): 51-85. 
Entorf, H., Gollac, M., and F. Kramarz. "New technologies, wages, and worker 
selection. " Journal of Labor Economics 17 (1999): 464-491. 
Estevao, M., and S. Tevlin. "Do firms share their success with workers? The 
response of wages to product market conditions", mimeo, Finance and 
Economics Discussion Series, Federal Reserve Board, 2000. 
Farrell, L., and I. Walker. "The welfare effects of lotto: Evidence from the UK. " 
Journal of Public Economics 72 (1999): 99-120. 
Fisher, F. M., and J. J. McGowan. "On the misuse of accounting rates of return to 
infer monopoly profits. " American Economic Review 73 (1983): 82-97. 
Fordyce, M. W. "The psychap inventory: A multi-scale test to measure happiness 
and its concomitants. " Social Indicators Research 18 (1985): 1-33. 
Forth, J., and N. Millward. "The determinants of pay levels and fringe benefit 
provision in Britain", mimeo, National Institute of Economic and Social 
Research, 2000. 
Fox, C. R., and D. Kahneman. "Correlations, causes and heuristics in surveys of life 
satisfaction. " Social Indicators Research 27 (1992): 221-234. 
Frank, R. H. Choosing the Right Pond. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. 
. "The frame of reference as a public good. " Economic Journal 107 (1997): 
1832-1847. 
. Luxury Fever. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
Freeman, R. B. "Job satisfaction as an economic variable. " American Economic Review 
263 
References 
68 (1978): 125-141. 
Frey, B. S., and A. Stutzer. "Measuring preferences by subjective well-being", 
mimeo, University of Zurich, 1998. 
. 
"Happiness, economy and institutions. " Economic Journal forthcoming 
(2000). 
Frey, B. S., and F. Schneider. "An empirical study of politico-economic interaction 
in the United States. " Review of Economics and Statistics 60 (1978): 174-183. 
Frisch, M. B, Cornell, J., Villanueva, M., and P. J. Retzlaff. "Clinical validation of the 
quality of life inventory: A measure of life satisfaction for use in treatment 
planning and outcome assessment. " PyschologicalAssessment 4 (1992): 92-101. 
Gallie, D., White, M., Cheng, Y. and M. Tomlinson. Restructuring the Employment 
Relationship. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. 
Gibbons, R., and L. Katz. "Does unmeasured ability explain inter-industry wage 
differentials. " The Review of Economic Studier 59 (1992): 515-535. 
Goux, D., and E. Maurin. "Persistence of inter-industry wage differentials: A re- 
examination using matched worker-firm panel data. " Journal of Labor 
Economics 17 (1999): 492-533. 
Green, F., Machin, S., and A. Manning. "The employer size-wage effect: Can 
dynamic monopsony provide an explanation. " Oxford Economic Papers 48 
(1996): 433-455. 
Greene, W. EconometricAnalysir. 4th ed. London: Prentice-Hall, 2000. 
Gregory, R. G., and J. Borland. "Recent Developments in Public Sector Labor 
Markets. " Handbook of Labor Economics edited by 0. Ashenfelter and D. 
Card, 3573-630. Vol. 3C. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 1999. 
Groshen, E. "Sources of intra-industry wage dispersion: How much do employers 
matter? " 0Quar1erly Journal of Economics 106 (1991): 869-884. 
264 
References 
Hamermesh, D. S. "Economic aspects of job satisfaction. " In Essays in Labor Market 
Analysis, edited by O. Ashenfelter and W. Oates. New York: John Wiley and 
Sons, 1977. 
. Labor Demand. Princeton, USA: Princeton University Press, 1993. 
. "The changing distribution of job satisfaction", mimeo, University of 
Texas, 1998. 
. 
"LEEping into the future of labor economics: The research potential of 
linking employer and employee data. " Labour Economics 6 (1999): 25-41. 
Hausman, J. A., and D. A. Wise. "Stratification on endogenous variables and 
estimation: The Gary income maintenance experiment. " In StructuralAnalysis 
of Discrete Data with Econometric Applications, edicted by D. F. McFadden and 
C. F. Manski. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1981. 
Hellerstein, J. K., Neumark, D., and K. R. Troske. "Wages, productivity, and worker 
characteristics: Evidence from plant level production functions and wage 
equations. " Journal of Labor Economics 17 (1999): 409-446. 
Hildreth, A. K. "Rent-sharing and wages: Product demand or technology driven 
premia? " Economics of Innovation and New Technology 5 (1998): 199-226. 
Hildreth, A. K., and A. J. Oswald. "Wages and rent-sharing: Evidence from 
company and establishment panels. " Journal of Labor Economics 15 (1997): 
318-337. 
Hirsch, B. T., and E. J. Schumacher. "Labor earnings, discrimination, and the racial 
composition of jobs. " Journal of Human Resources 27 (1992): 602-28. 
Hirsch, F. The Social Limits to Growth. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1976. 
Holtmann, A. G., and T. L. Idson. "Employer size and on-the-job training 
decisions. " Southern Economic Journal 58 (1991): 339-355. 
265 
References 
Holtz-Eakin, D., Joulfaian, D., and H. Rosen. "The Carnegie Conjecture: Some 
empirical evidence. " Quarterly Journal of Economics 108 (1993): 413-435. 
Holzer, H. J. "Why do small establishments hire fewer blacks than large ones? " 
Journal of Human Resources 32 (1997): 896-914. 
Holzer, H. J., and K. R. Ihlanfeldt. "Customer discrimination and employment 
outcomes for minority workers. " Quarterly Journal of Economics 113 (1998): 
835-867. 
Idson, T. L. "Establishment size, job satisfaction and the structure of work. " Applied 
Economics 22 (1990): 1007-1018. 
Idson, T. L., and D. J. Feaster. "A selectivity model of employer-size wage 
differentials. " Journal of Labor Economics 8 (1990): 99-122. 
Idson, T. L., and W. Y. Oi. "Workers are more productive in large firms. " American 
Economic Review 89 (1999): 104-108. 
Imbens, G., Rubin, D., and B. Sacerdote. "Estimating the effect of unearned income 
on labor earnings, savings and consumption: Evidence from a survey of 
lottery players", NBER working paper, 2000. 
Inglehart, R. Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1990. 
Johnson, G. E., and F. P. Stafford. "Alternative approaches to occupational 
exclusion. " In Women's work and wages, edited by I. Persson, and C. Jonung. 
London: Routledge, 1998. 
Johnston, J. and J. DiNardo. Econometric Methods. 4th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1997. 
Jovanovic, B. "Job matching and the theory of turnover. " Journal of Political Economy 
87 (1979): 972-990. 
Kahneman, D., Wakker, P. P., and R. Sarin. "Back to Bentham? Explorations of 
266 
References 
experienced utility. " Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (1997): 375-406. 
Kaplan, H. "Lottery winners and work commitment. " Journal of the Institute of 
Socioeconomic Research 10 (1985): 82-94. 
Kapur, N., Borrill, S., and C. Stride. "Psychological morbidity and job satisfaction in 
hospital consultants and junior house officers: multi-centre, cross sectional 
survey. " British Medical Journal 317 (1998): 511-512. 
Keely, L. C. "Why isn't growth making us happier? ", mimeo, New College, 
University of Oxford, 1999. 
Knight, K. G., and P. L. Latreille. "Discipline, dismissals and complaints to 
employment tribunals. " British Journal of Industrial Relations 38 (2000): 533- 
555. 
Konow, J., and J. Earley. "The hedonistic paradox: Is homo-economicus happier? ", 
mimeo, Department of Economics, Loyola Marymount University, 1999. 
Kreinin, M. "Windfall income and consumption - additional evidence. " American 
Economic Revier' 51 (1961): 388-390. 
Kremer, M. "The O-Ring theory of economic development. " Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 108 (1993): 551-575. 
Krueger, A. B., and L. H. Summers. "Reflections on the inter-industry wage 
structure. " In Unemployment and the Structure of Labor Markets, edited by K. 
Lang and J. S. Leonard. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987. 
. "Efficiency wages and the inter-industry wage structure. " Econometrica 56 
(1988): 259-293. 
Labour Market Trends. London: Office for National Statistics, 1999. 
Landsberger, M. "Windfall income and consumption. " American Economic Review 53 
(1963): 534-540. 
Larsen, R. J., Diener, E., and R. A. Emmons. "An evaluation of subjective well- 
267 
References 
being measures. " Social Indicators Research 17 (1984): 1-18. 
Layard, R. "Human satisfactions and public policy. " Economic Journal90 (1980): 737- 
750. 
Leigh, J. P. "Sex differences in absenteeism. " Industrial Relations 22 (1983): 349-361. 
Leonard, J. S. "Carrots and sticks: Pay, supervision, and turnover. " Journal of Labor 
Economics 5 (1987): S136-S152. 
Lindbeck, A., and D. Snower. The Insider-Outsider Theory of Employment and 
Unemployment. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989. 
Locke, E. A. "The nature and causes of job satisfaction. " In Handbook of Industrial 
and Organizational Psychology, edited by M. D. Dunette. Chicago: Rand- 
McNally, 1976. 
MacCulloch, R. "The Structure of the Welfare State. " PhD thesis, University of 
Oxford, 1996. 
MacDonald, J., and R. Moffitt. "The uses of tobit analysis. " Review of Economics and 
Statistics 62 (1980): 318-321. 
Machin, S. "Editorial: Will the NHS pay awards help recruitment. " British Medical 
Journa1318 (1999): 958. 
Main, B., and B. Reilly. "The employer size-wage gap: Evidence for Britain. " 
Economica 60 (1993): 125-142. 
Mayer, C. "The real value of company accounts. " Fiscal Studies 9 (1988): 1-17. 
McDonald, I. M., and R. M. Solow. "Wage bargaining and employment. " American 
Economic Review 71 (1981): 896-908. 
McGarry, K. "Inter vivos transfer and intended bequests. " Journal of Public Economics 
73 (1999): 321-351. 
McKelvey, W., and R. Zavoina. "A statistical model for the analysis of ordinal-level 
dependent variables. " Journal of Mathematical Sociology 4 (1975): 103-120. 
268 
References 
Mellow, W. "Employer size and wages. " The Review of Economics and Statistics 64 
(1982): 495-501. 
Metcalf, D., Hansen, K., and A. Charlwood. "Unions and the sword of justice: 
Unions and pay systems, pay inequality, pay discrimination and low pay", 
Centre for Economic Performance working paper, LSE, 2000. 
Moulton, B. R. "Random group effects and the precision of regression estimates. " 
Journal of Econometrics 32 (1986): 385-397. 
Mullis, R. J. "Measures of economic well-being as predictors of psychological well- 
being. " Social Indicators Research 26 (1992): 119-135. 
Mumford, K., and P. Smith. "Job tenure in Australia and Britain: Individual versus 
workplace effects", mimeo, University of York, 2000. 
Murphy, K. J. "Executive compensation. " In Handbook of Labor Economics, vol. 3B, 
edited by 0. Ashenfelter and D. Card. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 1999. 
Murphy, K. M., and R. H. Topel. "Unemployment, risk, and earnings: Testing for 
equalizing wage differentials in the labor market. " In Unemployment and the 
Structure of Labor Markets, edited by K. Lang and J. S. Leonard. Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1987. 
Myers, D. G. The Pursuit of Happiness. London: Aquarian, 1993. 
Nathan, G. "A review of sample attrition and representativeness in three 
longitudinal surveys", Office for National Statistics, London, 1999. 
Neal, D. A., and W. R. Johnson. "The role of premarket factors in black-white wage 
differences. " Journal of Political Economy 104 (1996): 869-895. 
Neumark, D. "Employers' discriminatory behavior and the estimation of wage 
discrimination. " Journal of Human Resources 23 (1988): 279-295. 
Ng, Y. K. "Happiness surveys: Some comparability issues and an exploratory survey 





"A case for happiness, cardinalism, and interpersonal comparability. " 
Economic Journal 107 (1997): 1848-1858. 
Nickell, S. "Biases in dynamic models with fixed effects. " Econometrica 49 (1981): 
1417-1426. 
Nickell, S., and S. Wadhwani. "Insider forces and wage determination. " Economic 
Journal 100 (1990): 496-509. 
Nickell, S., Vainiomaki, J., and S. Wadhwani. "Wages and product market power. " 
Economica 61 (1994): 457-473. 
Oaxaca, R. "Male-female wage differentials in urban labor markets. " International 
Economic Review 14 (1973): 693-709. 
Oettinger, G. S. "Statistical discrimination and the early career evolution of the 
black-white wage gap. " Journal of Labor Economics 14 (1996): 52-78. 
Offer, A. "Epidemics of abundance: Overeating and slimming in the USA and 
Britain since the 1950s", Discussion Papers in Economic and Social History, 
University of Oxford, 1998. 
Oi, W. Y., and T. L. Idson. "Firm size and wages. " In Handbook of Labor Economics, 
vol. 3B, edited by 0. Ashenfelter and D. Card, 2165-2214. Amsterdam: 
Elsevier Science, 1999. 
Oswald, A. J. "The microeconomic theory of the trade union. " Economic Journal92 
(1982): 576-595. 
. "Rent-sharing in the labor market", Warwick Economics Research Paper 
Series, University of Warwick, 1996. 
. "Happiness and economic performance. " Economic Journal 107 (1997): 1818- 
1831. 
Pavot, W., and E. Diener. "Review of the satisfaction with life scales. " Prychological 
270 
References 
Assessment 5 (1993): 164-172. 
Pearce, J. E. "Tenure, unions, and the relationship between employer size and 
wages. " Journal of Labor Economics 8 (1990): 251-269. 
Pencavel, J. H. Labor Markets Under Trade Unionism. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 
1991. 
Pissarides, C. Equilibrium Unemployment Theory. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1990. 
Powell, J. "Least absolute deviations estimation for the censored regression model. " 
Journal of Econometrics 25 (1984): 303-325. 
Pudney, S. "Pay differentials, discrimination and worker grievances", mimeo, Public 
Sector Economics Research Centre, University of Leicester, 2000. 
Rayton, B. A. "Rent-sharing or incentives? Estimating the residual claim of average 
employees. " Applied Economic Letters 4 (1996): 725-728. 
Regional Trends. London: Office for National Statistics, 1999. 
Reilly, K. T. "Human capital and information. " Journal of Human Retources 30 (1995): 
1-18. 
Rose, M. "How far can I trust it? The job satisfaction data in the WERS98 employee 
survey", mimeo, University of Bath, 2000. 
Rosen, S. "The theory of equalizing differences. " In Handbook of Labor Economics, 
vol. 1, edited by 0. Ashenfelter and R. Layard. Amsterdam: North Holland, 
1986. 
Sacerdote, B. "The Lottery Winner Survey, Crime and Social Interactions and Why 
Is There More Crime in Cities? " PhD thesis, Harvard University, 1996. 
Schor, J. The OverrpentAmerican. New York: Basic Books, 1998. 
Scitovsky, T. The Joyless Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976. 
Scott, F., and J. Garen. "Probability of purchase, amount of purchase, and the 




Shapiro, C., and J. E. Stiglitz. "Equilibrium unemployment as a worker discipline 
device. " American Economic Review 74 (1984): 433-444. 
Shields, M. A., and S. Wheatley Price. "The earnings of male immigrants in England: 
Evidence from the Quarterly LFS. " Applied Economics 30 (1998): 1157-1168. 
Shin, D. C. "Does rapid economic growth improve the human lot? Some empirical 
evidence. " Social Indicators Research 8 (1980): 199-221. 
Slichter, S. "Notes on the structure of wages. " The Review of Economics and Statistics 32 
(1950): 80-91. 
Smith, S. and P. Razzell. The Pools Winners. London: Caliban Books, 1975. 
StataCorp. Stata Statistical Software. Version 7.0. College Station, Texas: Stata 
Corporation, 2001. 
Stewart, M. B. "On least squares estimation when the dependent variable is 
grouped. " Review of Economic Studies 50 (1983a): 141-149. 
. "Racial discrimination and occupational attainment in Britain. " Economic 
Journal 93 (1983b): 521-541. 
"Union wage differentials, product market influences and the division of 
rents. " Economic Journal 100 (1990): 1122-1137. 
Teal, F. "The size and sources of economic rents in a developing country 
manufacturing labour market. " Economic Journal 106 (1996): 963-976. 
Troske, K. R. "Evidence on the employer size-wage premium from worker- 
establishment matched data. " The Review of Economics and Statistics 81 (1999): 
15-26. 
van den Berg, G. J., and G. Ridder. "An empirical search model of the labor 
market. " Econometrica 66 (1998): 1183-1221. 
Van Reenen, J. "The creation and capture of economic rents: Wages and innovation 
272 
References 
in a panel of UK companies. " Quarterly Journal of Economics 111 (1996): 195- 
226. 
Veenhoven, R. "Is happiness relative? " Social Indicators Research 24 (1991): 1-34. 
. Happiness in Nations: Subjective Appreciation of life in 56 Nations, 1946-1992. 
Rotterdam: Erasmus University Press, 1993. 
Walker, I. "Lotteries: Determinants of ticket sales and the optimal payout rate. " 
Economic Policy 27 (1998): 358-399. 
Warr, P. B. "The springs of action. " In Models of Man, edited by A. J. Jones and D. 
M. Chapman. Leicester: British Psychological Society, 1980. 
. 
"The measurement of well-being and other aspects of mental health. " 
Journal of Occupational Psychology 63 (1990): 193-210. 
. "Well-being and the workplace. " In Well-being: The Foundations of Hedonic 
P. ychology, edited by D. Kahneman, E. Diener, and N. Schwarz, 392-412. 
New York: Russel Sage, 1999. 
Watson, D., and L. A. Clark. "Self versus peer ratings of specific emotional traits: 
Evidence of convergent and discriminant validity. " Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology 60 (1991): 927-940. 
Weiss, A. "Determinants of quit behavior. " Journal of Labor Economics 2 (1984): 371- 
387. 
Wilhelm, M. 0. "Bequest behavior and the effect of heirs' earnings: Testing the 
altruistic model of bequests. " American Economic Review 86 (1996): 874-892. 
Windmeijer, F. A. G. "Goodness-of-fit measures in binary choice models. " 
Econometric Reviews 14 (1995): 101-116. 
Winkelmann, L., and R. Winkelmann. "Why are the unemployed so unhappy? " 
Economica 65 (1998): 1-15. 
Winter-Ebmer, R., and J. Zweimuller. "Firm-size wage differentials in Switzerland: 
273 
References 
Evidence from job-changers. " American Economic Review 89 (1999): 89-93. 
Zax, J. S. "Quits and race. " Journal of Human Resources 24 (1989): 469-493. 
274 
